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1.1 Motivation and Object of Research 
It is widely known that tax effects are, in general, hard to identify despite being important 
to corporations (Frank and Goyal, 2009; Hennessy and Whited, 2005). Yet, the relevance of 
taxes is indisputable as corporations worldwide engage in various tax avoidance strategies 
extending from rather unexciting deferral of taxes to highly aggressive tax shelter participation 
and thereby, lowering their foreign tax rate to low one-digit numbers (Donohoe, McGill, and 
Outslay, 2012). Thus, well-founded tax research is indispensable. 
In recent years, media coverage has once more accentuated the need for knowledge about 
taxes and especially tax avoidance of corporations. Famous examples include Google Inc. 
employing the widely discussed “Double Irish” and “Dutch Sandwich” structure and Starbucks 
Corp. shifting its UK income to low-tax jurisdictions for years.1 Besides those reports about 
selected – mostly U.S. – corporations, secret tax documents of over 300 multinational 
corporations (MNCs) have been released by the International Consortium of Investigative 
Journalists (ICIJ) in 2014.2 The revealed advance tax rulings (ATRs) offered refined tax 
structures secured by Luxembourg’s tax authority. Two years later, the Panama Papers have 
been published uncovering information about further efficient tax avoidance structures.3 
Whether illegal or legal – note that tax avoidance is usually legal –, the reduction of corporate 
taxes generally evokes a public picture of unfairness. It does not only draw the attention of the 
public but also of fiscal authorities and governments (Bozanic, Hoopes, Thornock, and 
Williams, 2016), because it is incompatible with the original intention of tax law (Kadet, 2016). 
                                                 
1
 Forbes (2016, December 22), available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2016/12/22/how-google-
saved-3-6-billion-taxes-from-paper-dutch-sandwich/#10ea35a91c19 and The Guardian (2015, December 15), 
available at https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/dec/15/starbucks-pays-uk-corporation-tax-8-million-
pounds. 
2
 ICIJ (2014, November 5), available at https://www.icij.org/project/luxembourg-leaks/leaked-documents-expose-
global-companies-secret-tax-deals-luxembourg. 
3
 The Guardian (2016, April 5), available at https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/03/what-you-need-to-
know-about-the-panama-papers. 
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Hindering corporate tax avoidance is thus an essential objective for policymakers. 
Consequently, corporations are confronted with strict domestic and international regulations 
(e.g. Desai, Dyck, and Zingales, 2007). For example, the U.S. regulators introduced FIN 48 in 
2006 to increase the transparency on uncertain tax positions, i.e., unrecognized tax benefits 
(Blouin and Robinson, 2011) and through its base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) project 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) released, amongst other 
measures, actions to align tax systems, restrain certain types of ATRs and increase transparency 
in tax reporting and transactions (OECD, 2015a). However, even though the implementation 
into national tax law is in progress, recent cases shed doubt on the success of BEPS and previous 
regulations. 
In October 2015, the European Commission ruled – for the first time ever – on the 
question of illegal state aid in the cases of Fiat in Luxembourg and Starbucks in the Netherlands 
(European Commission, 2015). Not quite a year later, Apple’s special tax deals in Ireland were 
also classified by the European Commission as illegal state aid resulting in $ 14.5 billion in 
back taxes.4 Thus, not only MNCs are continuously criticized for their behavior, governments 
and fiscal authorities apparently did not act responsibly, either. 
True to the motto know your enemy, regulators need to understand every detail in order 
to impede corporate tax avoidance. Why do MNCs pursue tax avoidance strategies, i.e., why 
do they oppose the public opinion and policymakers? Why do some corporations avoid taxes 
more effectively than others? And to what extent are other fiscal authorities involved in 
corporate tax planning? Especially since the call for more research on tax avoidance in the 
famous review by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), researchers worldwide have attempted to 
provide answers to these questions.  
                                                 
4
 The New York Times (2016, August 30), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/31/technology/apple-tax-
eu-ireland.html?_r=0. 
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As anecdotal evidence suggests, many corporations engage in tax avoidance. On the one 
hand, reducing the corporate tax liability through deferral or elimination obviously generates a 
substantial benefit as after-tax profits increase. On the other hand, tax avoidance may induce 
various costs including, but not limited to, firm risk, reputational concerns, and agency issues. 
Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011) find a higher stock price crash risk as a result of tax avoidance. 
Balakrishnan, Blouin, and Guay (2017) show increased information asymmetries and Hasan, 
Hoi, Wu, and Zhang (2014) provide evidence of negative effects on costs of bank capital. 
Therefore, corporations pursue tax planning strategies only if benefits exceed the risks (Blouin, 
2014). This approach is in line with the general tradeoff theory suggesting that corporations 
weigh associated costs and benefits and subsequently adjust their level of tax avoidance (Kim, 
McGuire, Savoy, and Wilson, 2016). Put differently, they optimize their tax planning taking all 
related factors into consideration.  
Another large strand of literature focusses on the determinants of tax avoidance. For 
example, subsidiaries in tax havens (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2006) as well as international 
activities in general (Collins and Shackelford, 2003) facilitate tax planning. Other determinants 
include ownership structures (Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin, 2010), manager compensation 
(Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker, 2012), labor unions (Chyz, Leung, Li, and Rui, 2013), and 
business models (Higgins, Omer, and Phillips, 2015). Furthermore, firm-specific characteristics 
taken from accounting data, such as size, profitability, or leverage, are shown to impact the 
level of tax avoidance (e.g. Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Plesko, 2003). It is obvious that 
previous literature has addressed many different factors regarding corporate tax avoidance and 
that it moved us closer to solving the central questions.  
Nonetheless, it seems as if there are still significant knowledge gaps. Prior regulation 
attempts have not yet been sufficient as the corporate trend towards tax avoidance is still in full 
swing (Dyreng, Hanlon, Maydew, and Thornock, 2017). Various challenges in correctly and 
comprehensively identifying effects and determinants of corporate tax avoidance may be causal 
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for this research gap to which this thesis aims to contribute by addressing the following issues: 
ambiguities regarding the impact of determinants on tax avoidance, lack of sufficient disclosure 
about tax planning details, and weak as well as confounding effects. 
First, despite having identified a battery of potential determinants, their actual impact 
and the specified magnitude of their influence on corporate tax avoidance is questionable. Many 
prior studies disregard the persistent part of the data over time and focus on changes only. 
However, as Hsiao (2003, p. 8) states “ignoring the individual […] specific effects that exist 
among cross-sectional […] units but are not captured by the included explanatory variables can 
lead to […] inconsistent or meaningless estimates of interesting parameters”. This does not 
necessarily imply that known determinants are of little value. Yet, the explanatory power of the 
commonly employed ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of pooled panel data (e.g. Chen 
et al., 2010; Higgins et al., 2015) should be enhanced by completing the set of variables.  
Second, the publicly accessible data do not allow to capture all tax avoidance strategies 
a corporation engages in. The amount of tax relevant data disclosed by corporations is usually 
limited to what is required in the financial reports. Survey evidence suggests that managers 
refrain from voluntarily disclosing further information about tax structures as they fear the risk 
of tax litigations, negative media coverage, or customer boycotts (Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, 
and Shroff, 2014). Additionally, as many countries take tax secrecy very seriously, information 
about how, if at all, governments and fiscal authorities are involved is treated as highly 
confidential and thus, not accessible. It is known that countries contend in drawing MNCs to 
their respective jurisdiction to increase their own benefits (Givati, 2009). However, publishing 
more detailed information may lead to undesired scrutiny into tax structures by other affected 
states. Acquiring normally hidden information could tremendously extend knowledge about tax 
avoidance practices. 
Third, with regard to capital market effects of tax avoidance, it is necessary to understand 
that taxes often present only a small fraction of the available information. Hanlon and Slemrod 
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(2009) find only weak negative effects of tax shelter participation and Gallemore, Maydew, and 
Thornock (2014) have trouble identifying reputational effects. For empirical analyses, it is 
consequently beneficial if the respective object of investigation attracts lots of attention. But 
even if sufficient salience is given, it is often difficult to identify clear effects. Disentangling 
the many factors that impact firm value would straighten up ambiguous results.  
Considering the just discussed challenges, the three essays presented in this thesis 
enhance the understanding of corporate tax avoidance through refined tax research. They show 
the importance and benefit of elaborate identification strategies as they include the usually 
unobserved time-invariant component and analyze the unique setting of Luxembourg Leaks 
(LuxLeaks). Such an exogenous shock can provide insight into otherwise unobservable aspects 
of tax avoidance. Secret ATRs have been released providing the market with unknown 
information about the MNCs tax avoidance and involvement of Luxembourg’s fiscal authority. 
Furthermore, by analyzing LuxLeaks, which was accompanied with high media coverage, 
certain effects can be isolated as the disclosed ATRs provide the taxpayer with tax certainty 
about the agreed tax payments. 
The first essay “The Undersheltering Puzzle and its Persistence over Time” is a single-
author paper. Thus, apart from some recommendations on earlier versions, the complete essay 
is my sole responsibility. I investigate corporate tax avoidance over time and the reasoning 
behind its persistence. My results suggest a high impact of unobserved time-invariant firm-
specific characteristics. Thereby, I can show that research in the context of tax avoidance needs 
to take into account this aspect of firm fixed effects to identify additional effects with greater 
confidence. The paper was presented at the Doctoral Research Seminar in Cologne 2017.  
The second essay “Tax Avoidance through Advance Tax Rulings – Evidence from the 
LuxLeaks Firms” is co-authored by Michael Overesch, Chair of Business Taxation at the 
University of Cologne, who facilitated an exchange of structural ideas. I conducted the 
subsequent data collection and all empirical analyses. We analyze the influence of ATRs on 
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corporate tax avoidance and identify lower effective tax rates (ETRs) after the respective ruling. 
The unique setting of LuxLeaks enables us to explore priorly unknown aspects of tax avoidance. 
The paper was presented at the 39th European Accounting Association Annual Congress in 
Maastricht 2016, the 78. Jahrestagung des Verbandes der Hochschullehrer für 
Betriebswirtschaft in Munich 2016, and at the 72nd Annual Congress of the International 
Institute of Public Finance in South Lake Tahoe 2016. 
The third essay “Effects of Disclosing Tax Avoidance: Capital Market Reaction to 
LuxLeaks” is co-authored by Michael Overesch, Chair of Business Taxation at the University 
of Cologne and Alexander Tassius, former doctoral research assistant at the Chair of Business 
Taxation at the University of Cologne. Based on a previously joint working paper, I was 
responsible for substantial revisions with regard to structural, formalistic, and empirical aspects. 
Examining also the event of LuxLeaks, we consider the capital market reaction and find some 
evidence for an increase in firm value after the unintended disclosure. Employing an event study 
design on this unique event provides the opportunity to gain knowledge about challenging 
effects of tax avoidance. The paper was presented at the Doctoral Research Seminar in Cologne 
2016, the 6th EIASM Conference on Current Research in Taxation in Bonn 2016, the Zentrum 
für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung Workshop in Mannheim 2016, the 3rd WU – Vienna 
University of Economics and Business Doctoral Seminar in Vienna 2016, the WHU – Otto 
Beisheim School of Management Research Seminar in Vallendar 2016, and the 40th European 
Accounting Association Annual Congress in Valencia 2017. 
1.2 The Undersheltering Puzzle and its Persistence over Time 
1.2.1 Research Question and Design 
The first essay “The Undersheltering Puzzle and its Persistence over Time” investigates 
corporate tax avoidance over time and the reasoning behind persistent tax avoidance. Over the 
past decade, researchers worldwide aimed to provide an understanding of corporate tax 
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avoidance and answer the question of why some corporations avoid less taxes than others. The 
latter is generally dubbed the undersheltering puzzle (Weisbach, 2002). Literature has produced 
a number of determinants, such as the level of foreign activities and financial accounting data, 
which are supposed to explain the cross-sectional variation in tax avoidance implying that each 
corporation can reach any desired level of tax avoidance if those factors are adjusted 
accordingly. Nevertheless, some corporations appear to have better chances at reducing their 
ETRs as the common belief of tax unfairness and media coverage of certain U.S. MNCs 
suggest. One potential explanation for this phenomenon, which prior research seems to miss, is 
related to the dimension of time. 
Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008) as well as Guenther, Matsunaga, and Williams 
(2017) show some persistence of ETRs, i.e., an impact of current tax planning on future levels 
of tax avoidance. I expect to confirm their results. However, beyond the scope of previous 
research, I aim to raise awareness of this phenomenon and furthermore, show the reason for 
persistent tax avoidance. As many empirical studies disregard unobserved time-invariant firm-
specific characteristics, I hypothesize that they determine a majority of the variation in 
corporate tax avoidance in a panel of firms and thus, explain the persistence over time.  
First, I employ various explorative analyses to thoroughly introduce the aspect of 
persistence. I define persistent corporations as those corporations which report in the same level 
of the GAAP ETR distribution as before. This leads to roughly 50 % of my data being classified 
as persistent in terms of tax avoidance. As the amount is, however, a matter of definition, I 
apply alternative identification strategies of persistent corporations. Second, to empirically 
show the impact of firm fixed effects on corporate tax avoidance, I use two different sets of 
tests. On the one hand, I compare standard OLS regressions with fixed effects regressions. 
Thereby, I can identify changes in magnitude and significance of common determinants. On 
the other hand, I perform a variance decomposition with various model specifications revealing 
10 
 
the explanatory power of fixed effects. To assure the robustness of my results, I apply 
alternative measures of tax avoidance. 
The empirical analysis is based on a dataset of U.S. corporations. The needed financial 
statement data is extracted from the database Compustat North America for the years 1987-
2015 leading to a sample of over 9,000 firms.  
1.2.2 Results and Contribution to the Literature 
The explorative results suggest that there is persistence of tax avoidance. Even though 
perfect persistence does hardly exist, at least some corporations exhibit persistent ETRs. Their 
ETRs change considerably less over the years than the ETRs of other firms. Furthermore, I find 
evidence that the reason behind this persistence are firm fixed effects, i.e., unobserved time-
invariant firm-specific characteristics generating a stable level of tax avoidance. Including this 
time-invariant factor in a variance decomposition highlights the importance regarding future 
identification strategies. 96.3 % of the explained variation in tax avoidance are attributable to 
firm fixed effects. Other common control variables and industry fixed effects appear to be rather 
irrelevant in comparison. Although I find some evidence that the latter represent one 
considerable aspect of the time-invariant effect. Furthermore, I show that the inclusion of firm 
fixed effects alters common determinants’ point estimators by over one third of its original 
magnitude. 
Prior literature has produced only limited evidence on the persistence of tax avoidance 
as it has not been the focus of those studies (Dyreng et al., 2008; Guenther et al., 2017). Abdul 
Wahab and Holland (2015) investigate with some more detail the persistence of book-tax 
differences. However, the reason for persistence remains – until today – unexplored. I can show 
that tax avoidance is driven by an unobserved time-invariant effect. By identifying this aspect, 
I add the dimension of time to the undersheltering puzzle and suggest an explanation for the 
invariable part of tax avoidance. Prior literature on the determinants of tax avoidance mostly 
considers only the smaller variable fraction. 
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Given the importance of the identified effect, prior identification strategies in the context 
of corporate tax avoidance are most likely misspecified. Following Hsiao (2003), drawn 
inferences from the commonly applied specifications can be inconsistent and meaningless. To 
identify the magnitude of effects with greater confidence the dimension of time cannot be 
neglected. These new results should also be of interest to policymakers as they gain new insight 
about corporate tax avoidance. If they ignore that some corporations hardly change at all 
irrespective of altering commonly known determinants, unsophisticated attempts of regulation 
might be in vain. 
1.3 Tax Avoidance through Advance Tax Rulings – Evidence from the 
LuxLeaks Firms 
1.3.1 Research Question and Design 
The second essay “Tax Avoidance through Advance Tax Rulings – Evidence from the 
LuxLeaks Firms” analyzes the effect of engaging in ATRs on corporate tax avoidance of the 
respective MNCs. ATRs are offered in 32 of the OECD countries (OECD, 2013) and constitute 
agreements between a tax authority and a taxpayer about the application of tax law (OECD, 
2015b). Thereby, they provide the MNC ex ante with tax certainty. Despite being legal in its 
nature, recent cases of ATRs appear to be agreements in which fiscal authorities secure 
sophisticated international tax avoidance structures to MNCs. These include for example 
transfer prices, hybrid financing, or disregarded entities, which are usually associated with a 
high risk of tax litigation (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2017). As a consequence, MNCs 
might refrain from these structures without ATRs. With ATRs, however, they lead with 
certainty to almost no tax payments (ICIJ, 2014a/2014b). Even though ATRs are of high interest 
for tax avoidance of MNCs, the effect and its extent are unexplored. 
In 2014, the ICIJ posted a database of over 300 MNCs and their confidential tax 
documents about ATRs with Luxembourg’s fiscal authority. This event, widely known as 
LuxLeaks, provides a unique setting to investigate the relationship of ATRs and tax avoidance. 
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Using the sample of exposed firms, we examine the additional tax avoidance of MNCs engaging 
in ATRs compared to MNCs that do not. As ATRs secure complex tax avoidance structures, 
we expect increases in worldwide tax avoidance after the ATR has been signed. We apply a 
fixed effects panel regression model with various control variables to measure the effect of 
engaging in an ATR by comparing the change in tax avoidance of MNCs that signed ATRs to 
the trend of the control group in the absence of ATRs. We use GAAP ETR as a well-established 
ex post measure of tax avoidance (e.g. Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). A lower ETR implies 
higher tax avoidance. The variable of interest is basically an interaction term of MNCs that 
engage in ATRs and the effective period after the ruling, for which we consider the year after 
the ATR. 
In addition to simple robustness checks, such as placebo tests and using CASH ETR and 
FOREIGN ETR as alternative tax avoidance measures, we further examine subsamples from 
different countries and exploit the durability of tax rulings by extending the period in which we 
believe it to be effective. Lastly, we combine propensity score matching and difference-in-
differences estimation to mitigate the endogeneity concerns in our identification strategy. By 
selecting very similar MNCs, the only remaining difference is the decision to engage in an ATR 
and thus, the threat of spurious results is reduced. 
For our empirical analyses, we combine the database of the ICIJ with consolidated 
financial statement data from Compustat North America and Compustat Global. Our data 
requirements lead to a sample of 136 MNCs that engaged in ATRs, issued and signed in 
Luxembourg between 2002 and 2010. To examine the change in tax avoidance, we include data 
from 2000 until 2014, leading to a control group of over 5,000 MNCs. 
1.3.2 Results and Contribution to the Literature 
The results of our main estimation indicate that MNCs significantly reduced their ETRs 
after engaging in an ATR. This implies that a single tax deal with one tax haven, i.e., in our 
case Luxembourg (Marian, 2017), affects the worldwide level of corporate tax avoidance. More 
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precisely, we identify a decline in GAAP ETR by about 4 percentage points attributable to the 
tax structure secured through a Luxembourg ATR. Our robustness tests lead to similar 
inferences with regard to significance and magnitude. Even though this is only a short-term 
effect, the economic magnitude becomes indisputable considering that over a three-year period 
the decline still amounts to 2 percentage points. Considering a mean corporate ETR of 28 %, 
the latter implies that MNCs reduced their taxes by 7 % through ATRs and thus, saved lots of 
taxes. Consequently, our results confirm our expectation that MNCs significantly reduce their 
ETR through Luxembourg ATRs. 
Previous literature analyzes various tax planning structures (for an overview see Hanlon 
and Heitzman, 2010) and their impact on overall corporate tax avoidance (e.g. Dyreng and 
Lyndsey, 2009; Markle and Shackelford, 2012a/2012b). Through the additionally identified 
effect attributable to ATRs, our study provides first insight into tax avoidance under certainty 
as previously identified tax planning structures may be exploited in a more aggressive way if 
secured by fiscal authorities. 
Moreover, our results are of interest to policymakers. By showing the reduction in ETRs 
after engaging in an ATR, our results suggest that ATRs may be used for tax abuse and offer a 
better understanding of the impact of ATRs on the scope of corporate tax avoidance. The results 
are in line with the BEPS initiative trying to increase tax transparency between countries and 
suppress exploitation of ATRs, as we confirm that fiscal authorities need to collaborate in order 
to hinder tax avoidance. 
1.4 Effects of Disclosing Tax Avoidance: Capital Market Reaction to 
LuxLeaks 
1.4.1 Research Question and Design 
The final essay “Effects of Disclosing Tax Avoidance: Capital Market Reaction to 
LuxLeaks” scrutinizes the capital market reaction to disclosure of tax avoidance. Risk averse 
managers refrain from voluntary disclosure as they place high values on potential reputation 
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and litigation risks (Graham et al., 2014). Unintended disclosure, such as LuxLeaks, is also 
scarce as documents have to be leaked or gathered through intense scrutiny. Consequently, little 
is known about the effects of disclosing additional information. Providing the capital market 
with a realistic and credible picture of the MNC’s tax planning, unintended disclosure should 
increase firm value because the reduction of taxes is associated with after-tax profits (Bryant-
Kutcher, Guenther, and Jackson, 2012; Inger, 2014). However, Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) as 
well as Gallemore et al. (2014) find negative capital market reactions to the detection of tax 
shelters. 
One reason for this negative effect may be the risk of tax litigations. If the disclosed tax 
avoidance structures are, on the contrary, legal and secured by fiscal authority, the level of 
litigation risk should be low. The unexpected dissemination of tax documents in the course of 
LuxLeaks on November 5th, 2014 perfectly matches this criterion. The involuntarily disclosed 
ATRs provide tax certainty. Thus, we might expect a positive capital market reaction as 
shareholders reward disclosure of tax structures which are associated with low litigation risks. 
Nevertheless, media condemned the involved corporations and Luxembourg’s fiscal authority 
for drastically reducing corporate taxes on an industrial scale. If these news trigger significant 
and predominant reputational risks, the capital market reaction can also be negative. 
LuxLeaks provides a unique setting through which we can identify clear effects as an 
event study design enables us to analyze the capital market reaction around the particular day. 
Considering each MNC’s share prices and the development of the respective capital market, we 
calculate the cumulated abnormal returns (CARs) and investigate whether they differ 
significantly from zero. We test the robustness of our results by applying varying event window 
lengths, adjusted standard errors, and an alternative method to calculate the abnormal returns. 
Moreover, we distinguish between firms with different levels of corporate tax avoidance as we 
expect the capital market to react differently according to what image of tax aggressiveness the 
previously reported ETR evokes. 
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To perform our analyses, we gather data about sample firms from the database published 
by the ICIJ, stock prices and accounting data from Compustat North America and Compustat 
Global, and index price information from Datastream. To maximize the sample to 148 firms, 
or rather 103 firms in the analyses of CARs for different levels of tax avoidance, we fill in 
missing values with hand-collected data from consolidated financial reports. 
1.4.2 Results and Contribution to the Literature 
The results suggest a positive capital market reaction to the unintended disclosure of tax 
avoidance through LuxLeaks. Over a seven-day period around the event, the return of the 
sample firms was, on average, 1.22 percentage points higher than the market. Finding no 
negative effects, we can clearly conclude that reputational risks do not outweigh the positive 
effects. However, as not all specifications are robust to cross-sectional correlation, we infer 
only cautiously that market participants may reward credible disclosure of sophisticated tax 
avoidance structures. The inferences of our results are reinforced by our robustness tests as well 
as additional results regarding sample splits according to different firm characteristics. In our 
subsequent analyses, we find that the positive effect is especially pronounced for firms with 
extraordinarily high ETRs. This finding implies that the capital market values the unexpected 
information about a firm’s commitment to sophisticated tax avoidance. Regarding low-ETR 
firms, we do not find a robust, positive capital market reaction. 
Previous literature shows no mutual consent on the potential trend of disclosing 
additional information about tax avoidance on firm value. One strand of literature suggests a 
positive effect on firm value (e.g. Bryant-Kutcher et al., 2012). However, an increase in 
uncertainty may reverse the positive valuation (Drake, Lusch, and Stekelberg, 2017). A small 
strand of literature confirms this negative effect for the detection of tax shelters (e.g. Hanlon 
and Slemrod, 2009). As LuxLeaks disclosed information about ATRs associated with low 
litigation risks, we are the first to show that there is at least no negative or even a positive effect 
on firm value in such a setting. 
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With these results, we also contribute to the available literature on tax transparency. 
Lately, public scrutiny, such as in the case of Starbucks5, increased disclosure (see also Dyreng, 
Hoopes, and Wilde, 2016). Additionally, policymakers try to increase the amount of tax 
information a corporation has to disclose. However, investors seem to reward low levels of 
disclosure as they shy away from providing the public with corporate details (Robinson and 
Schmidt, 2013). Nevertheless, we can show that credible disclosure about tax certainty is not 
detrimental and may even be beneficial for MNCs. 
Lastly, the unique setting of LuxLeaks allows us to draw clearer conclusions with regard 
to reputational effects as we can – in contrast to previous research – eliminate the influence of 
litigation risk. Our rather positive capital market reaction suggests that reputational risks are 
balanced or even outweighed by positive effects. This is in line with prior studies highlighting 
that investors barely consider reputational concerns (Gallemore et al., 2014). 
  
                                                 
5
 The Guardian (2015, December 15), available at https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/ dec/15/starbucks-
pays-uk-corporation-tax-8-million-pounds. 
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Abstract:  
This empirical study analyzes persistence of tax avoidance. For decades, the well-known 
undersheltering puzzle, i.e., why not all firms equally engage in tax avoidance, has occupied 
tax research. Identifying common determinants and efforts by policymakers to hinder the 
reduction of taxes did not solve the problem. My results do not only confirm previous academic 
and common belief that some corporations always avoid more taxes than others, they 
furthermore identify a high impact of firm fixed effects. The majority of variation in tax 
avoidance in a panel of corporations is time-invariant. Thus, research can identify additional 
determinants and policymakers can change tax laws, the level of tax avoidance might 
nevertheless remain constant for these corporations. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Exploiting loopholes in tax systems is perfectly legal, however, not every company 
equally engages in tax avoidance. Over the past decade, this so-called undersheltering puzzle 
(Weisbach, 2002) has become one of the fundamental questions in tax research. Why do some 
corporations avoid more taxes than others? Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) have called for more 
papers on the determinants of tax avoidance. Many attempts by researchers worldwide to 
answer this question have generated a number of factors that are supposed to explain variation 
in corporate tax avoidance. However, have those studies and the identified determinants really 
moved us toward solving the undersheltering puzzle? Given the multitude of determinants were 
decisive, how could it be possible to still enhance the academic knowledge about corporate tax 
avoidance to ultimately provide a more thorough understanding of undersheltering? 
My goal in this paper is to address these questions. More precisely, I examine corporate 
tax avoidance over time to identify whether persistent corporations, whose level of tax 
avoidance stays the same, exist. In doing so, I can show that there is a certain persistence to the 
undersheltering puzzle. Though, more interestingly, I also investigate the reason behind 
persistent tax avoidance. Thereby, I am able to provide some understanding of what prior 
determinants seem to miss. 
Previous research on the undersheltering puzzle contains the underlying assumption of 
tax avoidance being variable. Rational behavior as well as tradeoff theory suggest that 
corporations optimize their tax planning by weighing associated costs and benefits. This implies 
that each corporation can achieve any level of tax avoidance if desired. Academics find that, 
for example, if the ownership structure is adjusted (Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin, 2010), 
multinational activity in tax havens is increased (Dyreng and Lindsey, 2009), or profitability is 
changed (Rego, 2003), the level of tax avoidance will alter. The identified determinants are 
based on cross-sectional differences between firms. However, the aspect of time is not fully 
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included. My later analysis6 depicts a picture in which it seems to be implausible that common 
determinants explain persistent tax avoidance. Mean tax avoidance appears to be rather constant 
whereas the determinants vary significantly. Therefore, beyond the scope of prior literature, I 
investigate the unobserved time-invariant effect.  
Not only academic researchers, but also the general public as well as policymakers 
should be keen to learn more about the persistence of tax avoidance. Over the past years, it has 
always been the same couple of corporations enclosed in the headlines of worldwide news 
concerning the legal and potentially illegal reduction of taxes. Even though, a general trend 
towards tax avoidance exists (Dyreng, Hanlon, Maydew, and Thornock, 2017b), some 
corporations seemingly have a better chance of success in reducing their effective tax rates 
(ETRs). It appears as if there are some good and some bad corporations with regard to the 
reduction of tax payments. This reinforces the public opinion of tax unfairness and the criticism 
accompanied with it. National policymakers regularly make an effort to reduce this apparent 
unfairness of some corporations not paying their share of taxes by implementing new laws and 
regulations. Recently, several countries jointly produced actions to further restrain base erosion 
and profit shifting (BEPS) of multinational corporations. However, the gap between 
corporations is still economically meaningful and thus, requires further explanation. 
Using a sample of 9,054 U.S. corporations from 1987 till 2015, I find that some 
corporations show persistent, i.e., they hardly deviate from their priorly reported, levels of tax 
avoidance. I define persistence as reporting in the same level of the tax avoidance distribution 
as before. More precisely, this means that the corporation belongs again to the 25 % of 
corporations with the highest (second highest, and so on) level of tax avoidance. I employ 
consolidated financial statement information from Compustat North America to calculate the 
respective tax avoidance measure. ETRs capture the overall level of tax avoidance including 
                                                 
6
 Cf. figure 2 in section 2.3. 
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any form of tax reduction. The results are consistent for different definitions of ETRs as well 
as alternative identification strategies of persistent corporations. Thereby, I can show that 
persistence is a phenomenon worthy to be further investigated. My subsequent analyses show 
that the reason behind persistence are firm fixed effects, i.e., unobserved time-invariant firm-
specific characteristics determining the level of tax avoidance. As my results specify, one aspect 
thereof is the industry a corporation operates in. The relevance of firm fixed effects stands out 
in a parametric variance decomposition. 96.3 % of the explained variation in tax avoidance is 
attributable to firm fixed effects even if a battery of control variables is included in the same 
regression. The latter’s influence decreases as coefficients are altered and lose statistical 
significance. 
Although a complete answer to the undersheltering puzzle is also well beyond the scope 
of this paper, I nevertheless advance academic knowledge by investigating the persistence of 
tax avoidance. My paper offers several contributions. First, my results add to the available 
knowledge about general persistence of tax avoidance by raising awareness of this 
circumstance. Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008) as well as Guenther, Matsunaga, and 
Williams (2017) show some persistence of ETRs which is especially pronounced for the highest 
levels of tax avoidance and Abdul Wahab and Holland (2015) find evidence on persistence of 
book-tax differences. Overall, I can confirm previous findings. However, I aim to offer a more 
comprehensive understanding of persistence while prior evidence is rather limited. Those 
studies’ main focus is either the development of a new ETR measure (Dyreng et al., 2008) or 
the implications for firm risk (Guenther et al., 2017). This paper, on the contrary, focusses on 
persistence and the reasoning behind it. Economically speaking, this new evidence of 
persistence may also be of interest to policymakers who battle against tax avoidance. By 
providing a general understanding of persistence, I offer a new basis for anti-tax avoidance 
measures as persistent tax avoiders might have to be tackled differently or, more drastically 
speaking, might not change at all implying that any attempts of regulation could be in vain. 
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Second, I expand the available literature on costs and determinants of tax avoidance by 
adding the dimension of time to the well-known undersheltering puzzle. In addition to common 
determinants, such as size, profitability, multinational activities, or availability of intangible 
assets, time-invariant firm-specific characteristics need to be considered. Previous determinants 
can solely contribute to the undersheltering puzzle by explaining parts of the variable tax 
avoidance. However, a good part of the corporation’s tax avoidance is not variable and thus, 
leads to a persistent level of tax avoidance. The identified influence of firm fixed effects 
suggests that some corporations can hardly adjust their level of tax avoidance, irrespective of 
associated costs and benefits of tax structures. Consequently, literature on costs of tax 
avoidance (e.g. cost of equity by Goh, Lee, Lim, and Shevlin (2016) or stock price crash risk 
by Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011)) might have to differentiate between persistent and non-persistent 
corporations. The same is true for the growing field of tax risk literature that finds mixed 
evidence on the association of tax risk and the level of tax avoidance (Dyreng, Hanlon, and 
Maydew, 2017a; Brooks, Godfrey, Hillenbrand, and Money, 2016). In additional analyses, my 
study shows that not all corporations are subject to high tax risk, as persistence significantly 
reduces the respective tax risk. 
Third, my results are relevant to all prior and future analyses of determinants of tax 
avoidance. Given the importance of the unobserved time-invariant component, prior estimates 
that do not account for the firm-specific effect are likely misspecified. According to Hsiao 
(2003), it is questionable to draw inferences from those specifications as they might be 
inconsistent or meaningless. The inclusion of firm fixed effects (as a potential alternative to 
address omitted variables) enhances the common ordinary least squares (OLS) approach in 
order to identify marginal effects of determinants of tax avoidance with greater confidence. 
Moreover, more refined empirical setups may be needed to further enhance academic 
knowledge. Generally speaking, the examination of exogenous shocks might be the only source 
to learn more about the identified, but otherwise unobservable, effect. 
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The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes prior literature 
and develops the hypotheses. In section 2.3, I present the data and perform some explorative 
analyses. Section 2.4 explains the research methodologies and discusses the respective results. 
Section 2.5 concludes.  
2.2 Hypotheses Development 
Tax avoidance includes anything that reduces a corporation’s taxes (Dyreng et al., 2008; 
Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). Over the last couple of years, many researcher have investigated 
this broad concept with regard to determinants and consequences of tax avoidance. A common 
feature of the different strands of literature is the assumption of corporate tax avoidance being 
variable. Kim, McGuire, Savoy, and Wilson (2016) find that corporations converge to their 
optimal target level of tax avoidance by approximately 70 % over three years. This is in line 
with rational behavior and tradeoff theory suggesting that corporations weigh benefits and (tax 
as well as non-tax) costs associated with tax avoidance in making decisions about their tax 
planning (Scholes et al., 2016).7 Thus, changing tax strategies and alternating levels of tax 
avoidance within one corporation over time appear to be highly plausible (Hoopes, Mescall, 
and Pittman, 2012). 
Accordingly, over the past decades, a trend towards tax avoidance has emerged as ETRs 
of multinational as well as domestic corporations decreased continuously (Dyreng et al., 
2017b). On the one hand, this may simply be due to declining statutory tax rates worldwide as 
a result of tax competition between countries (Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano, 2008). On 
the other hand, corporations may overall engage in increased tax avoidance activities. Prior 
                                                 
7
 These costs of tax avoidance include, for example, financial reporting considerations and implementation costs 
(Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001), reputational costs (Gallemore, Maydew, and Thornock, 2014), the inability to 
repatriate and invest foreign earnings as well as potential political and regulatory costs (Armstrong, Blouin, 
Jagolinzer, and Larcker, 2015), and increased cost of capital (Cook, Moser, and Omer, 2017). Furthermore, altering 
the level of tax avoidance directly raises adjustment costs, such as tax advisor, foundation of new subsidiaries, 
restructuring of business model and ownership structure, or research and development to generate intellectual 
property. 
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literature suggests that ETRs can be influenced by changing known determinants, such as hiring 
a new executive officer (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2010). 
An obvious consequence of tax avoidance is the increase in tax risk, because today’s 
aggressiveness could negatively affect tomorrow’s tax outcomes due to, for example, penalties 
and back taxes (Dyreng et al., 2017a; Saavedra, 2017). Generally, tax risk is the uncertainty 
regarding future tax payments (Blouin, 2014) and defined as the volatility of ETRs as volatility 
measures the dispersion of outcomes (Brealey and Myers, 1991). Evidence on the relation 
between tax avoidance and tax risk is mixed. Dyreng et al. (2017a) as well as Brooks et al. 
(2016) provide evidence of an association between low ETRs and tax risk or uncertain tax 
positions. Saavedra (2017) and Guenther et al. (2017), however, find that higher ETRs are 
associated with greater tax risk. Apparently irrespective of the level of tax avoidance, there 
appears to be tax risk which results in changing ETRs. 
Tradeoff theory, increased tax avoidance, and tax risk suggest variable ETRs. 
Nevertheless, the frequently mentioned concept of tax unfairness offers a contrary view on the 
variability of tax avoidance. I.e., some corporations are always able to avoid taxes whereas 
others have hardly any chance of reaching the same low tax payments. Put differently, relative 
to the average level of tax avoidance some corporations appear to report always below average 
and others always above average. This phenomenon of heterogeneity has been puzzling 
researchers worldwide and is thus dubbed the undersheltering puzzle (Weisbach, 2002).  
The just described persistence is well-known in other fields of research. Some studies 
consider temporal correlation in earnings as an indicator of accounting quality (Sloan, 1996) 
and Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) consider the impact of the initial capital structure on 
today’s capital structure and find that corporations tend to keep their capital structures as 
initially chosen for decades. With regard to tax avoidance, there is, however, only limited 
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evidence on persistence. To the best of my knowledge, there are only few studies that remotely 
address this research question.8 
Plesko and Weber (2009) descriptively examine time series properties of tax return data. 
Dyreng et al. (2008) analyze U.S. corporations over a ten-year period and examine the 
persistence of cash effective tax rates finding that there is some asymmetric persistence, i.e., 
CASH ETRs of tax aggressive corporations are more persistent than those of non-tax aggressive 
corporations. The main focus of their study, however, is the development of the long-run ETR 
measure and descriptive in nature. Therefore, the results with regard to persistence of tax 
avoidance are rather preliminary. Further results by Guenther et al. (2017) suggesting more 
persistence in the low-ETR segment as well focus on the implications for firm risk. Another 
study by Abdul Wahab and Holland (2015) provides some evidence for persistence of book-tax 
differences of UK corporations from 2005-2010. Each corporation has its own particular target 
level of tax avoidance (Kim et al., 2016), from which - once reached - a corporation does not 
want to deviate. 
Taking into consideration these studies, tax avoidance appears to have a certain 
persistence, at least for some corporations. Aiming to raise awareness of this phenomenon 
through providing a more thorough examination of persistence and thereby enhancing the 
academic knowledge about corporate tax avoidance, I investigate the data with regard to the 
following hypothesis: 
H1. The level of corporate tax avoidance is persistent over time. 
Beyond the results of prior literature, it is a question of interest why some corporations 
exhibit a persistent level of tax avoidance. One possible explanation may be the already 
                                                 
8
 Some studies that investigate the influence of firm-specific determinants on tax avoidance use prior year control 
variables, such as size or return on assets in t
-1 (e.g. Chen et al., 2010; Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker, 2012; 
Chyz, Leung, Li, and Rui, 2013). However, these studies do not make precise inferences with regard to persistence. 
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mentioned costs of tax avoidance and the resulting dilatoriness in adjusting tax strategies.9 A 
simple example such as some corporations employing tax optimal financial structures (Desai, 
Foley, and Hines, 2004; Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodème, 2008) might clarify this argument. 
In order to save taxes, interest should be taxed in a low-tax jurisdiction and deducted in a high-
tax jurisdiction. Thus, the corporation needs a subsidiary in a low-tax country and capital that 
is raised on the respective capital market. Some corporations face lower barriers than others 
due to their business model or structure that is already in place implying corporations that 
already engage in tax avoidance can more easily stay tax aggressive in subsequent years and 
vice versa. This implies slowly but indeed changing tax avoidance behavior. A second, more 
challenging and rigorous explanation is the following: I argue that an important part of firm-
specific tax avoidance determinants, and thereby of the level of tax avoidance, is invariable.  
This is in line with media coverage of news about tax avoidance according to which it 
seems to be always the same couple of corporations, such as Amazon, Apple, Google, and 
Starbucks, that report ETRs well below average. Academic literature also provides evidence of 
cross-sectional variation in tax avoidance as only some corporations benefit from tax planning 
(Dyreng et al., 2008; Griffith, Miller, and O’Connell, 2014; Heckemeyer and Overesch, 2017) 
and only multinational corporations are able to shift income and intangible assets to tax havens 
or low-tax countries (Hines and Rice, 1994; Dharmapala and Riedel, 2013; DeSimone, Mills, 
and Stomberg, 2014; Dyreng and Markle, 2016). Even policymakers advance the view that only 
a certain kind of corporations report lower ETRs than others. Recently, the organization for 
                                                 
9
 This theory could be tested by regressing a tax avoidance measure on its lagged value as it would measure the 
impact of a corporation’s previous tax avoidance in determining future tax avoidance ( =  +

	
 +			 +  +	). If a corporation had infinite costs of adjustment, i.e., 
perfectly persistent level of tax avoidance, the coefficient of interest would equal 1. Unfortunately, in a context of 
dynamic panel data in which the number of observations (N) is considerably larger than the number of employed 
time periods (T), there may be a correlation between the lagged variable and the error term (Nickell, 1981). Neither 
the inclusion of further observations nor further common regressors can mitigate that downward bias. Possible 
alternatives to slightly reduce the bias are, for example, increasing the number of time periods as the bias is of 
order 1/T, taking subsamples in which N is no longer larger than T (Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Sul, 2014), or 
employing lagged variables as instruments for the potentially biased estimator (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982). As 
the bias cannot yet be completely eliminated with today’s knowledge, I refrain from including the analyses and 
leave this investigation to future research. 
33 
 
economic cooperation and development (OECD) has launched its action plan against BEPS 
(OECD, 2015) trying to suppress tax avoidance. Their main focus obviously is multinational 
corporations hinting at a distortion of tax avoidance opportunities. However, the ETRs of 
domestic corporations decrease simultaneously to those of multinationals (Dyreng et al., 
2017b). Thus, other firm-specific characteristics must be influential. 
A multitude of empirical studies investigates such firm-specific characteristics trying to 
identify the determinants of tax avoidance. The determinants include but are not limited to 
location of subsidiaries (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2006; Dyreng and Lindsey, 2009), foreign 
activities (Rego, 2003), ownership (Chen et al., 2010), manager compensation (Armstrong et 
al., 2012), political costs and connections (Mills, Nutter, and Schwab, 2012; Kim and Zhang, 
2016), labor unions (Chyz et al., 2013), and business models (Higgins, Omer, and Phillips, 
2015). Additionally, different key figures within the financial data, such as size, leverage, or 
profitability, are employed to explain differences in ETRs (e.g. Gupta and Newberry, 1997; 
Plesko, 2003). Even though, there is this large number of work on the determinants of tax 
avoidance, till today, the question of why some corporations avoid more taxes than others is 
still puzzling.  
Several issues may be causal for the unanswered problem. First, prior literature is often 
at odds regarding correlation of tax avoidance and common determinants. For example, the 
correlation of size and tax avoidance can be positive (Plesko, 2003) or negative (Chen et al., 
2010). The latter also find a negative correlation for profitability whereas Rego (2003) finds a 
positive impact of return on assets on tax avoidance. Second, researchers who regress a measure 
of tax avoidance on different determinants certainly explain parts of variation in tax avoidance. 
Nevertheless, it is unclear how much of the overall variation is revealed. Thus, clear inferences 
with regard to magnitude of effects are challenging. My study, therefore, examines the actual 
impact of common determinants in various specifications. Third and maybe most importantly, 
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many empirical studies10 moreover disregard unobserved time-invariant firm-specific 
characteristics. Put differently, they do not account for firm fixed effects. However, if long-
term tax avoidance (Dyreng et al., 2008) is valued more than short-run fluctuations, the impact 
of existing, yearly changing determinants should be low compared to time-invariant factors. 
Furthermore, if the majority of variation in tax avoidance is determined by firm fixed effects, 
their influence will obviously generate a rather stable level of tax avoidance (if anything, only 
a small portion remains variable). This implies that the time-invariant component might explain 
why some corporations seemingly always avoid more taxes whereas others cannot reach those 
low tax payments. Consequently, firm fixed effects offer an explanation of persistent tax 
avoidance. I test the following hypothesis:  
H2. The level of tax avoidance is widely explained by time-invariant firm-specific 
characteristics (firm fixed effects). 
2.3 Sample Description 
2.3.1  Data Selection 
In my analyses, I apply the following sample selection criteria to test the hypotheses.11 
To maximize the coverage of this study, I impose minimal requirements on the available data. 
I start with all corporations covered by the database Compustat North America in the years from 
1987 till 2015. There are a total of 31,919 firms and 357,428 firm-year observations. To 
increase comparability of the data, I only investigate U.S. firms. Firms outside of the U.S. face 
different taxing and reporting rules. Thus, non-U.S. firms and firms reporting in currencies 
other than U.S. Dollars are deleted. Duplicate observations are also dropped from the dataset 
as they distort the results.  
                                                 
10
 Among others Armstrong et al. (2012), Chen et al. (2010), Dyreng et al. (2017b), Dyreng and Lindsey (2009), 
Higgins et al. (2015), Plesko (2003), and Rego (2003) do not employ firm fixed effects in their regression. 
11
 The sample development is summarized in table A1 of the appendix. 
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Aiming to investigate the persistence of tax avoidance, I require financial data 
information to calculate measures of tax avoidance. Following accounting literature, the 
variable of interest in this study is a corporation’s ETR (e.g. Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009; Hanlon 
and Heitzman, 2010). As it is computed using consolidated financial statements, it shows the 
overall level of tax avoidance. A low ETR implies high tax avoidance as the corporation seems 
to pay less taxes than corporations with higher ETRs. As a broad measure, ETR captures “any 
form of tax reduction relative to pretax accounting income, whether through tax sheltering, 
location decisions, income shifting, tax preferences within the tax code, or rule changes” 
(Dyreng et al., 2017b, p. 442). In my main analyses, I implement the to firms most important 
tax avoidance measure: GAAP ETR (Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, and Shroff, 2014), defined as 
tax expenses over pretax income. The latter is adjusted for special items. I require non-missing 
components as well as positive pretax income because negative ETRs are difficult to interpret. 
Furthermore, I exclude ETRs above 1 and below 0 mainly to limit the influence of outliers.12 
GAAP ETR is based on annual data and includes current and deferred taxes. It captures non-
conforming tax avoidance. However, I acknowledge that it neither captures conforming tax 
avoidance nor deferral strategies. Therefore, inferences on the corporation’s tax avoidance need 
to be interpreted carefully as GAAP ETR might underestimate the level of tax avoidance. 
Deferral strategies, for example, are included in CASH ETR. Thus, I also use CASH ETR as 
well as FOREIGN ETR in later robustness checks. All three measures are commonly applied 
in previous literature on determinants of tax avoidance. CASH ETR is calculated as income 
taxes paid over pretax income, FOREIGN ETR as foreign income taxes divided by foreign 
pretax income. Using alternative tax avoidance measures changes my sample size as all data 
requirements are then based on the alternative measure.13 
                                                 
12
 Furthermore, by excluding values above 1 and below 0, I implicitly control for a potential bias due to one-time 
reconciliation issues as a result of abnormal activities including business dispositions (Phillips, 2003; Abdul 
Wahab and Holland, 2015). The exclusion of firm-year data with negative pretax income (leading to negative 
ETRs) enhances interpretation of the effective tax rate measure (Dyreng et al., 2008). 
13
 Table A2 of the appendix presents the distribution of those two alternative tax avoidance measures. 
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However, for my main analyses, I want to keep the sample size and composition constant. 
Thus, I delete firm-year observations, in which any of my control variables is missing (see 
table A3 of the appendix for a list of controls and their definition). Furthermore, I require each 
observation in my sample to have an available GAAP ETR in the prior year. Only by doing so, 
I can investigate persistence. I identify persistence in tax avoidance in my sample by defining 
PERSCORP as corporations whose ETR is in the same quartile as in the previous year. Quartiles 
are formed based on a year average ETR. Using this definition, I capture the persistence of a 
corporate’s tax avoidance level relative to the average tax avoidance level of the U.S. market. I 
obtain data for 9,054 firms with 65,939 firm-year observations that can be used for my analyses. 
Please note that the first year in my sample is 1988 due to the last requirement. 
2.3.2 Explorative Investigation of the Sample 
In this section, I investigate the selected sample with regard to my two hypotheses. 
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics. Panel A shows the distribution of GAAP ETR for 
all firms as well as for persistent corporations. The mean GAAP ETR amounts to 31.8 % and 
for persistent corporations to 30.7 %.  
Figure 1. Distribution of DEV ETR 
 
Notes: Figure 1 presents the distribution of DEV ETR. It differentiates between 
persistent and non-persistent corporations according to the definition of 
PERSCORP. The x-axis shows the values of DEV ETR. The y-axis represents 
the respective fraction. Variables are defined in table A3 of the appendix.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Distribution of effective tax rates 
  
# of 
observations Mean Std. dev. 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile 
All Firms       
     GAAP ETR 65,939 0.3179 0.1291 0.2709 0.3484 0.3860 
     DEV ETR 65,939 0.0023 0.1222 -0.0301 0.0005 0.0325 
        
Persistent Corporations      
     GAAP ETR 36,065 0.3073 0.1409 0.2564 0.3480 0.3880 
     DEV ETR 36,065 0.0012 0.0627 -0.0127 0.0004 0.0145 
       
Panel B: Common determinants of effective tax rates 
 All Firms Persistent Corporations 
  
# of 
observations Mean Std. dev. 
# of 
observations Mean Std. dev. 
SIZE 65,939 6.0417 2.1455 36,065 6.0199 2.1815 
SALES 65,939 5.9861 2.0378 36,065 5.9544 2.0793 
RD 65,939 0.0222 0.0490 36,065 0.0217 0.0484 
LEV 65,939 0.2298 0.1914 36,065 0.2271 0.1936 
CAPINT 65,939 0.3293 0.2574 36,065 0.3371 0.2646 
INTANG 65,939 0.1136 0.1671 36,065 0.1087 0.1644 
CAPEX 65,939 0.2475 0.1805 36,065 0.2478 0.1815 
ADVEX 65,939 0.0090 0.0228 36,065 0.0090 0.0229 
ROA 65,939 0.1012 0.0797 36,065 0.1086 0.0824 
NOL 65,939 0.1555 0.3624 36,065 0.1540 0.3609 
MNE 65,939 0.3058 0.4607 36,065 0.2915 0.4545 
GROWTH 65,939 0.1571 0.3066 36,065 0.1558 0.2917 
Notes: Table 1 shows descriptive statistics. Panel A presents the distribution of effective tax rates. It shows the 
values for the yearly ETR as well as the difference in ETRs relative to the average to reflect possible persistence 
of ETRs. Panel B shows the values for control variables. Variables are defined in table A3 of the appendix. 
However, more interesting for the purpose of this paper are the values of DEV ETR. To 
calculate DEV ETR, I first subtract the year average ETR from GAAP ETR to get the 
RELATIVE ETR for each observation. This computation is similar to the known statistical 
concept of variance. In a second step, however, I subtract prior year’s RELATIVE ETR from 
the current RELATIVE ETR. Therefore, DEV ETR reflects the change in GAAP ETR 
compared to the average. As table 1 shows DEV ETR is close to 0 (0.0023) for all firms hinting 
at general persistence. As expected, the value averages even lower for persistent corporations, 
namely, with 0.0012, at only half of the overall value. Taking a look at the percentiles, DEV 
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ETR is always smaller for persistent corporations. With regard to hypothesis H1, the shown 
values imply a certain persistence of tax avoidance. Accordingly, figure 1 shows the distribution 
of DEV ETR for persistent as well as non-persistent corporations revealing that, quite 
obviously, the values of DEV ETR are closer to 0 for persistent corporations. These results 
imply that the group of persistent corporations really reports ETRs that do not change as much 
as those of non-persistent corporations. 
Panel B of table 1 presents descriptive statistics for firm characteristics that prior 
literature commonly applies as possible determinants of ETRs. As persistent corporations 
exhibit no obvious difference to the overall sample, it has to be assumed that common 
characteristics alone do not explain why corporate tax avoidance seems to be persistent for 
some corporations. 
Table 2. Industries 
  All Firms 
Persistent Corporations 
(PERSCORP) 
  # of firms % of firms # of firms % of firms 
Food 282 3.11 % 152 3.02 % 
Mines 94 1.04 % 55 1.09 % 
Oil 425 4.69 % 249 4.96 % 
Clothes 189 2.09 % 107 2.13 % 
Durables 263 2.90 % 137 2.73 % 
Chemicals 167 1.84 % 94 1.87 % 
Consumer 248 2.74 % 130 2.59 % 
Construction 360 3.98 % 186 3.70 % 
Steel 129 1.42 % 70 1.39 % 
Fabricated Products 88 0.97 % 43 0.86 % 
Machinery 1,192 13.17 % 630 12.54 % 
Cars 129 1.42 % 65 1.29 % 
Transportation 346 3.82 % 189 3.76 % 
Utilities 443 4.89 % 266 5.29 % 
Retail 648 7.16 % 378 7.52 % 
Financial 600 6.63 % 354 7.04 % 
Other 3,451 38.12 % 1,920 38.21 % 
  9,054 100.00 % 5,025 100.00 % 
Notes: Table 2 presents the industry distribution. I use the 17 industry classification according to Fama and French. 
Additionally, the table shows how many persistent corporations operate in which industry. Variables are defined 
in table A3 of the appendix.  
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Table 2 presents further information for my sample regarding industries of the included 
corporations. Considering 17 different industries14 also leads to no apparent differences 
between the overall sample and persistent corporations. Thus at first sight, industry 
classification seems not to be the driving determinant with regard to persistence of tax 
avoidance, either. 
Figure 2. Average ETR and Determinants over Time 
 
Notes: Figure 2 shows the yearly average values of selected financial statement data over my sample period for 
the full sample on the left-hand side and persistent corporations only on the right-hand side. Both graphs include 
the values of LEV, NOL, GROWTH, and MNE as potential determinants of tax avoidance. Corporate tax 
avoidance is plotted by GAAP ETR. Variables are defined in table A3 of the appendix. 
Nevertheless, previous literature generally applies this set of determinants calculated 
from financial statement data as they are supposed to explain corporate tax avoidance. 
However, figure 2 implies that those simple OLS regressions of ETRs – the most used measure 
of tax avoidance – are likely to be misspecified. The diagram depicts average values of GAAP 
ETR for the full sample as well as for persistent corporations only over time. The lines of GAAP 
ETR are practically horizontal. This signifies hardly any change in the level of corporate tax 
avoidance. I acknowledge that this only depicts the average and variation is possible. Yet, 
common determinants, compared to my measure of tax avoidance, experience huge in- and 
declines over the same time period. Consider this: if GROWTH of 10 % (0.1) leads to an ETR 
                                                 
14
 The industry classification is based on the 17 different industries from Fama and French. Updated industry 
classification can be downloaded from http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/ 
changes_ind.html. 
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of roughly 0.3 in one year, why should next year’s ETR of again 0.3 be explained by GROWTH 
of 0.2? Even leverage (red line), which appears to be relatively constant, varies a lot more than 
GAAP ETR does. Thus, their explanatory power with regard to the level of tax avoidance 
becomes questionable. It appears to be likely that there is something unobservable and highly 
time-invariant which explains the level of tax avoidance. This suggests a first support for my 
hypothesis H2, with which I aim to enhance academic knowledge with regard to this question 
of (non-) variation of tax avoidance. 
2.4  Analyses and Discussion of Results 
2.4.1 Raising further Awareness of Persistence of Tax Avoidance 
Following the developed hypothesis H1, I aim to make clear to academics and 
policymakers that the level of corporate tax avoidance is persistent over time. Some 
corporations are always able to avoid more taxes relative to the average level of tax avoidance 
whereas others never reach the same low tax payments. Considering the data, I get a first hint 
of support for this hypothesis by performing a non-parametric variance decomposition of tax 
avoidance. More precisely, I calculate the within- and between-firm variation of GAAP ETR. 
The estimates are 9.1 % and 13.0 %, respectively, for the whole sample. Thus, the between-
firm variation is roughly 40 % larger than the within-firm variation. Intuitively, this suggests 
that the level of tax avoidance varies more across firms than within firms over time. This is 
consistent with hypothesis H1. Limiting the computation to persistent corporations only, the 
estimates are 7.3 % and 14.8 %, respectively. In this case, the between-firm variation is even 
twice as large as the within-firm variation. A within-firm variation of 0 would imply perfect 
persistence of tax avoidance. 
To further examine the indicated persistence of tax avoidance, I take a closer look at the 
definition of PERSCORP. I calculate the probability that a firm that is in a certain ETR quartile 
in one year will remain in the same quartile in the subsequent period. Quartiles are formed 
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based on the yearly average GAAP ETR. Table 3 presents the probabilities of reporting in one 
GAAP ETR quartile based on the previous GAAP ETR quartile. The diagonal serves as a 
measure of persistence as it shows the probability of remaining in the same quartile. The first 
row/column presents corporations that reported tax aggressive ETRs (lowest quartile of the 
distribution, i.e., lots of tax avoidance), whereas the fourth row/column represents the highest 
quartile of the distribution, i.e., high ETRs and hardly any tax avoidance. The highest 
probabilities can be found on the diagonals for all specifications. This again suggests support 
for hypothesis H1, i.e., persistence of tax avoidance. Across all quartiles, the probability of 
remaining in the same quartile is above 50 %, e.g. a likelihood of 59.5 % of staying in the lowest 
quartile of the distribution. A likelihood of 25 % implies the absence of persistence whereas a 
likelihood of 100 % implies perfect persistence. 
Table 3. Probability of Reporting in the Same Quartile 
PRIOR 
QUARTILE 
(Current) QUARTILE   
1 2 3 4 Total 
1 59.49 % 21.79 % 8.99 % 9.73 % 100.00 % 
2 15.69 % 51.54 % 21.87 % 10.89 % 100.00 % 
3 6.36 % 21.16 % 51.90 % 20.58 % 100.00 % 
4 7.12 % 12.43 % 23.38 % 57.08 % 100.00 % 
Total 20.12 % 27.13 % 27.83 % 24.91 % 100.00 % 
Notes: Table 3 presents for GAAP ETR probabilities of remaining in the same QUARTILE. It considers the ETR 
quartile of the previous reporting year. The first quartile always represents the lowest ETRs of the distribution. 
The diagonal serves as an indicator of persistent tax avoidance. Variables are defined in table A3 of the appendix.  
Table 3 basically represents my previously employed definition of PERSCORP. 
However, the amount of persistent corporations obviously depends on the definition. Thus, to 
strengthen my findings I consider two alternative definitions of persistent corporations focusing 
on the limitations of my previous analysis.15 As a first alternative, I consider firms as persistent 
if the change in RELATIVE ETR is smaller than 5 %. Previously, corporations that are right at 
                                                 
15
 Of course, it is possible to apply even further definitions, such as quintiles or deciles instead of quartiles, always 
in the same quartile, or the volatility of ETR. VOLATILITY is a well-established measure of tax risk, which I 
consider in an additional analysis in section 2.4.3. However, I do not think that it would be helpful to show 
umlimited definitions of PERSCORP as the exact magnitude of persistence still remains a matter of definition. 
The ones I provided should already confirm that persistence is present to a certain extent. 
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the border of one quartile would not be captured by PERSCORP if even a slight change put 
them in the next quartile of the ETR distribution. This problem is avoided by directly taking the 
magnitude of the change into account. Second, I define persistent corporations as those 
corporations that always or never report below the yearly average. Always/never implies that 
all firm-year observations meet the criteria. Consequently, the definition captures long-term 
instead of the previous short-term persistence. A graphical representation can be found in 
figure A1 of the appendix. 15.2 % of the firms in my sample never report below average and 
8.4 % of the sample always report below average. The dummy variable PERSCORP is 
consequently set to 1 for those corporations in all firm-year observations. 
Table 4. Differences in DEV ETR using Various Definitions of PERSCORP 
Panel A: GAAP ETR 
 N Difference Std. err. 
Same Quartile as Before 65,939 0.0863*** 0.0007 
Change smaller than 0.05 65,939 0.0761*** 0.0012 
Always Above/Below Average 65,939 0.0216*** 0.0009 
    
Panel B: CASH ETR    
  N Difference Std. err. 
Same Quartile as Before 58,700 0.1421*** 0.0010 
Change smaller than 0.05 58,700 0.1320*** 0.0022 
Always Above/Below Average 58,700 0.0457*** 0.0015 
        
Panel C: FOREIGN ETR 
  N Difference Std. err. 
Same Quartile as Before 19,905 0.1264*** 0.0017 
Change smaller than 0.05 19,905 0.1186*** 0.0035 
Always Above/Below Average 19,905 0.0271*** 0.0023 
Notes: Table 4 presents the results of two-sample t-tests, which estimate the difference in DEV ETR between 
persistent and non-persistent corporations. I compute the difference for alternative definitions of PERSCORP. 
Panel A considers the main sample using GAAP ETR whereas panel B and C consider the CASH ETR sample 
and the FOREIGN ETR sample, respectively. Variables are defined in table A3 of the appendix. *, **, and *** 
show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
To statistically show that some corporations exhibit persistent levels of tax avoidance 
regardless of the definition, I estimate a two-sample t-test, in which I compare DEV ETR of 
persistent and non-persistent corporations. Panel A of table 4 presents the results using the three 
alternative definitions. Panel B and C employ alternative tax avoidance measures as robustness 
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checks. Consistently positive and highly significant differences between the two groups signify 
that persistent corporations exhibit lower changes in ETR compared to the yearly average. More 
precisely, other corporations deviate, on average, more from their prior RELATIVE ETR than 
persistent corporations. This suggests support for my hypothesis H1 as at least a certain group 
of corporations achieves a level of tax avoidance that appears to be persistent over time. 
Even though I cannot precisely determine the magnitude of persistence and certainly 
many corporations are not persistent, the overall implication offers – at least partly – support 
for hypothesis H1, which states that tax avoidance is persistent over time. This circumstance 
can no longer be neglected and should be further investigated. With my subsequent analyses of 
hypothesis H2, I aim to provide a more thorough understanding of persistence by trying to 
explain the reason behind persistent tax avoidance. 
2.4.2 Identifying the Reason behind Persistent Tax Avoidance 
In figure 2 (cf. section 2.3), I considered the average values of GAAP ETR as well as of 
selected common determinants. The implication of that figure is both troubling and interesting. 
First, it is troubling because it suggests that traditional control variables do not appear to account 
for much of the corporate tax avoidance level. Second, it is interesting because it suggests that 
an important factor is missing from existing specifications. This factor must contain a 
significant time-invariant component. The presence of this mostly unobserved determinant of 
tax avoidance suggests that previous parameter estimates may be deteriorated by omitted 
variable bias (Arellano, 2003; Hsiao, 2003). To investigate the importance of this time-invariant 
factor, I use two different sets of tests. 
As a first analysis, I present the results of estimating corporate tax avoidance regressions 
using a simple OLS approach that ignores most firm-specific effects as well as the results of a 
more refined approach in which firm fixed effects are included. Before I include firm fixed 
effects, I already account for some time-invariant firm-specific effects by including industry 
fixed effects as those are often applied in previous studies. Thereby, I can rule out that the time-
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invariant component is completely captured by a firm’s industry. I estimate several variations, 
as specified in table 5, of equation (1). 
	 	! =  + 
		 +  +	  (1) 
As tax avoidance measure, I mostly use GAAP ETR. However, as robustness checks I 
also employ CASH ETR and FOREIGN ETR. Furthermore, to concentrate on the level of tax 
avoidance more abstractly, I use QUARTILE in some specifications instead of the continuous 
ETR measures. Common determinants are the set of variables explained in table A3 of the 
appendix. Most prior literature on tax avoidance employs those determinants, a subset thereof 
or similar variables, as control variables. Using the same variables basically replicates the 
results of previous studies. This feature enables me to directly compare those results with my 
fixed effects regression. FE are fixed effects. In all my regressions, I consider year fixed effects. 
Depending on the specification, I either add industry fixed effects or firm fixed effects. The 
latter completely eliminates all time-invariant heterogeneity between firms and thus, perfectly 
captures the missing time-invariant factor. 
The results in specification (1) and (2) of table 5 illustrate that most common 
determinants are highly statistically significant, regardless of the model specification. Yet, 
leverage, intangibles, and capital expenditures lose their significance. This suggests that their 
impact on tax avoidance is captured by firm fixed effects implying that these determinants are 
rather stable over time as well. Column (3) shows the sensitivity of estimated magnitudes to the 
specification. It presents by how many percent the point estimator changes if I add firm fixed 
effects instead of industry fixed effects. Some determinants gain impact whereas others exhibit 
declining estimators. On average, the change consists of an increase by 37.6 %. Column (6) 
considers the regressions with QUARTILE as dependent variable. The results are comparable 
as the change amounts to 54.5 % and again intangibles as well as capital expenditures lose their 
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significance. It becomes apparent that the inclusion of firm fixed effects changes coefficients 
and thus, the results of common analyses. 
Table 5. Parameter Sensitivities to Firm Fixed Effects 
Variables GAAP ETR Change QUARTILE Change 1 2 3 4 5 6 
SIZE -0.0052** 0.0227*** 536.5 % -0.1090*** 0.1360*** 224.8 % 
 (0.0022) (0.0032)   (0.0158) (0.0265)   
SALES 0.0109*** -0.0084*** -177.1 % 0.1280*** -0.0637** -149.8 % 
 (0.0022) (0.0032)   (0.0161) (0.0268)   
RD -0.3780*** -0.1420*** -62.4 % -3.839*** -1.1900*** -69.0 % 
 (0.0220) (0.0506)   (0.1720) (0.3890)   
LEV -0.0227*** -0.0063 -72.2 % -0.0059 0.0389 759.3 % 
 (0.0067) (0.0074)   (0.0495) (0.0595)   
CAPINT -0.0128* 0.0197* 253.9 % -0.1000* 0.2370*** 337.0 % 
 (0.0070) (0.0106)   (0.0532) (0.0872)   
INTANG 0.0374*** -0.0055 -114.7 % 0.3170*** 0.0193 -93.9 % 
 (0.0071) (0.0096)   (0.0578) (0.0817)   
CAPEX 0.0262*** -0.0024 -109.2 % 0.2330*** -0.0310 -113.3 % 
 (0.0058) (0.0048)   (0.0439) (0.0389)   
ADVEX -0.0486 0.0493 201.4 % -0.5060 0.3480 -168.8 % 
 (0.0381) (0.0628)   (0.3480) (0.5690)   
ROA 0.1910*** 0.3340*** 74.9 % 1.9710*** 3.3290*** 68.9 % 
 (0.0164) (0.0151)   (0.1200) (0.1160)   
NOL -0.0208*** -0.0127*** -38.9 % -0.1730*** -0.1210*** -30.1 % 
 (0.0021) (0.0020)   (0.0164) (0.0155)   
GROWTH -0.0112*** -0.0054** -51.8 % -0.0654*** -0.0235 -64.1 % 
 (0.0023) (0.0023)   (0.0179) (0.0196)   
MNE -0.0067*** -0.0074*** 10.4 % -0.2030*** -0.1080*** -46.8 % 
 (0.0022) (0.0025)   (0.0186) (0.0211)   
Year FE       
Industry FE       
Firm FE       
N 65,939 65,939   65,939 65,939   
Adj. R2 0.077 0.456   0.095 0.414   
Notes: Table 5 shows the results of OLS regressions with GAAP ETR and QUARTILE as dependent variables. 
For each measure of tax avoidance, different sets of parameter estimates are presented to show the additional 
impact of including firm fixed effects (Firm FE). Year FE is year fixed effects and Industry FE is industry fixed 
effects. Also shown is the percent change in the magnitude of the coefficient when implementing Firm FE instead 
of Industry FE. The constant is not reported. Robust standard errors clustered by firms are shown in parentheses. 
Variables are defined in table A3 of the appendix. *, **, and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 
1 %, respectively. 
Robustness checks are presented in table A4 to A6 of the appendix. In table A4, I use 
CASH ETR and FOREIGN ETR as dependent variables. Even though estimates change, 
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inferences remain basically constant. In table A5 and A6, I consider only persistent corporations 
using alternative definitions of PERSCORP. Inferences are similar to the full sample. However, 
the impact of the unobservable time-invariant component is even more striking (cf. the columns 
regarding GAAP ETR of table A5). Most coefficients actually decline in magnitude moving to 
the firm fixed effects regression. On average, the decline consists of 81.1 %. Solely SIZE, ROA, 
and MNE exhibit increasing magnitudes.  
It can be concluded that irrespective of the specification, the inclusion of firm fixed 
effects generally leads to changes in influence of other determinants (either through loss of 
significance or alternating magnitudes). Furthermore, the explanatory power (adjusted R-
squared) of the regression increases. These effects are due to capturing previously unobserved 
time-invariant components and removing the between variation, only some of which is also 
captured by common determinants. Nonetheless, it is still unclear precisely how important this 
firm-specific effect is. 
As a second test, I turn to a parametric variance decomposition of tax avoidance, which 
allows me to identify how much of the variation is attributable to which determinant. I do so by 
estimating modifications of equation (1) in an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA). Table 6 
presents the results. Each column represents a different model specification for level of tax 
avoidance measured by GAAP ETR. Following the research design of Lemmon et al. (2008), 
the shown values correspond to the fraction of the total Type III partial sum of squares for a 
certain specification. That is, I divide the partial sum of squares for each parameter by the total 
partial sum of squares across all parameters. Thereby, I force the columns to sum to 100 %. For 
example, if I only insert firm fixed effects into the estimation, 100 % of the explained variation 
is attributable to them.  
Firm fixed effects alone result in an adjusted R-squared of 0.918 (specification (1)), that 
is they capture 92 % of the variation in GAAP ETR. Neither the combination of year and 
industry fixed effects (specification (2)) nor the additional inclusion of common determinants 
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(specification (5)) can reach the same explanatory power. Despite the impact of firm fixed 
effects, it should be noted that common determinants alone exhibit an adjusted R-squared of 
0.833 (specification (4)). E.g. profitability (ROA) appears to be quite an important determinant 
whereas ADVEX has basically no impact. However, if firm fixed effects are included almost 
all variation is attributable to them, i.e., 96 % in specification (6). Thus, firm fixed effects also 
capture the variation previously explained by common determinants. Robustness tests in 
table A7 of the appendix with CASH ETR and FOREIGN ETR as alternative tax avoidance 
measures confirm this implication. 
Table 6. Parametric Variance Decompositions 
Variables GAAP ETR 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Firm FE 100.0 % . 99.9 % . . 96.3 % 
Year FE . 94.3 % 0.1 % . 67.9 % 0.1 % 
Industry FE . 5.7 % . . 6.7 % . 
SIZE . . . 1.3 % 1.0 % 0.1 % 
SALES . . . 12.5 % 1.9 % 0.1 % 
RD . . . 0.2 % 9.8 % 0.1 % 
LEV . . . 5.6 % 0.1 % 0.0 % 
CAPINT . . . 14.0 % 0.1 % 0.0 % 
INTANG . . . 2.7 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 
CAPEX . . . 29.2 % 0.8 % 0.0 % 
ADVEX . . . 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 
ROA . . . 32.5 % 7.0 % 2.9 % 
NOL . . . 0.2 % 4.1 % 0.3 % 
GROWTH . . . 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.0 % 
MNE . . . 1.8 % 0.5 % 0.1 % 
Adj. R2 0.918 0.860 0.918 0.833 0.867 0.922 
Notes: Table 6 presents a variance decomposition for various model specifications with GAAP ETR as dependent 
variable. Adjusted R-squares are shown at the bottom. I compute the Type III partial sum of squares for each 
parameter in the model and then normalize each estimate by the sum across all parameters. This way, I force each 
column to sum to 100 %. For example, in specification (4), 1.3 % of the explained variation captured by the 
included determinants can be attributed to SIZE. FE are fixed effects. Variables are defined in table A3 of the 
appendix. 
Applying the results of the two different kinds of tests applied in this section on my 
hypothesis H2, I find strong support suggesting that the level of tax avoidance is widely 
determined by a time-invariant effect. Thus, corporations exhibit various firm-specific 
characteristics that are (close to) time-invariant. Consequently, they remain constant over time 
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and as they have a highly significant influence on the level of corporate tax avoidance, the level 
of corporate tax avoidance remains constant as well. 
Table 7. Parametric Variance Decompositions with Detailed Industries 
GAAP ETR 49 Industries SIC Codes 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Firm FE . . 94.0 % . . 88.5 % 
Industry FE 28.7 % 18.4 % 1.5 % 92.0 % 72.6 % 6.6 % 
Year FE 71.3 % 54.0 % 1.0 % 8.0 % 6.1 % 1.1 % 
SIZE . 1.9 % 0.3 % . 0.0 % 0.3 % 
SALES . 2.6 % 0.0 % . 0.1 % 0.0 % 
RD . 5.1 % 0.0 % . 3.7 % 0.0 % 
LEV . 0.3 % 0.0 % . 0.1 % 0.0 % 
CAPINT . 0.0 % 0.0 % . 0.3 % 0.0 % 
INTANG . 0.1 % 0.0 % . 0.0 % 0.0 % 
CAPEX . 0.8 % 0.0 % . 0.4 % 0.0 % 
ADVEX . 0.1 % 0.0 % . 0.1 % 0.0 % 
ROA . 10.7 % 2.9 % . 11.6 % 3.1 % 
NOL . 5.5 % 0.2 % . 4.9 % 0.2 % 
GROWTH . 0.1 % 0.0 % . 0.0 % 0.0 % 
MNE . 0.3 % 0.1 % . 0.2 % 0.1 % 
Adj. R2 0.863 0.868 0.923 0.872 0.876 0.923 
Notes: Table 7 presents a variance decomposition for various model specifications with GAAP ETR as dependent 
variable to examine the influence of a corporation’s industry. In specifications (1) to (3), I employ the Fama and 
French 49 different industries classification. Specifications (4) to (6) consider directly the reported SIC codes. 
Adjusted R-squares are shown at the bottom. I compute the Type III partial sum of squares for each parameter in 
the model and then normalize each estimate by the sum across all parameters. This way, I force each column to 
sum to 100 %. For example, in specification (2), 1.9 % of the explained variation captured by the included 
determinants can be attributed to SIZE. FE are fixed effects. Variables are defined in table A3 of the appendix. 
Having identified the significant impact of an unobserved component, the next logical 
empirical task consists of further defining this time-invariant firm-specific effect. One possible 
aspect that hardly changes is the business model proxied by the industry of a corporation. It is 
quite interesting, however, that industry fixed effects appear to capture only a fraction of what 
firm fixed effects do. In specification (5) of table 6, only 6.7 % of the explained variation are 
attributable to industry fixed effects. This would imply that the business model alone does not 
explain tax avoidance and that other aspects are influential. Considering a slightly more narrow 
industry classification, i.e., 49 instead of 17 different industries, as shown in specification (1) 
to (3) of table 7 is consistent with this inference. Applying a very detailed industry classification 
(SIC codes), which is supposed to better capture the differences in business models, increases 
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the impact of industry fixed effects. Thus, industry / the business model is certainly one aspect 
of the time-invariant component but as firm fixed effects (specification (6)) capture yet more 
of the variation, more research needs to be done to identify unobserved aspects. I suggest 
researchers focus on exogenous shocks that reveal until then unknown effects to move academic 
knowledge forward. 
2.4.3 Additional Tests Regarding Persistence of Tax Avoidance 
Persistent Corporations and Tax Risk 
In this section, I examine the influence of persistent tax avoidance on tax risk, two closely 
related concepts. For several reasons, tax avoidance may lead to higher uncertainty regarding 
future tax payments (Blouin, 2014). Nevertheless, shareholders want their corporations to take 
appropriate risks (Rego and Wilson, 2012) meaning that corporations should reduce their tax 
payments to optimize the profit. Prior studies provide evidence of an association between low 
ETRs and tax risk or uncertain tax positions (Dyreng et al., 2017a; Brooks et al., 2016). 
Guenther et al. (2017), however, find that higher ETRs are associated with greater tax risk. With 
my analysis, I aim to show that this mixed evidence may be partly due to persistence of tax 
avoidance. 
Table 8. Distribution of VOLATILITY 
  
# of 
observations Mean Std. dev. 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile 
All Firms 35,971 0.0955 0.0828 0.0374 0.0718 0.1273 
   
     
Persistent Corporations  
     
     Same Quartile 16,754 0.0659 0.0682 0.0221 0.0448 0.0834 
     Always > / < Avg. 4,157 0.0483 0.0533 0.0108 0.0345 0.0674 
     Change < 0.05 2,107 0.0360 0.0559 0.0030 0.0143 0.0448 
Notes: Table 8 presents descriptive statistics of VOLATILITY as tax risk measure. Tax risk is defined as the three-
year CASH ETR volatility. Values are presented for the full sample conditional on data availability as well as for 
persistent corporations. I differentiate between the different definitions of PERSCORP. Variables are defined in 
table A3 of the appendix. 
Tax risk is generally defined as the volatility of ETRs as volatility measures the 
dispersion of outcomes and thus, depicts the involved uncertainty (Brealey and Myers, 1991). 
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Following prior literature, I use the standard deviation of annual CASH ETRs over three years. 
The measure captures the volatility of income taxes or tax payments relative to pretax income 
and thus, measures the uncertainty of a corporation’s ETR.16 Table 8 indicates that tax risk is 
especially low for persistent corporations. Due to the nature of tax risk’s definition, the result 
is little surprising. Nevertheless, persistent corporations impact the overall measured tax risk. 
To clarify this implication empirically, I regress the indicator of persistent corporations 
PERSCORP on tax risk, as presented in equation (2). Its coefficient indicates how tax risk of 
those corporations reacts in relation to corporations with less persistent levels of tax avoidance. 
I expect significantly negative point estimators as they indicate a reduction in tax risk. 
"##$ =  + 
	%&'% + 		 + FE +     (2) 
Table 9. Tax Risk Analyses 
Dependent Variable: 
VOLATILITY 
Same Quartile as Before Change < 0.05 
1 2 3 4 
PERSCORP -0.0373*** -0.0372*** -0.0331*** -0.0324*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0019) 
Controls     
Year FE     
Firm FE     
N 35,971 34,386 12,559 35,971 
Adj. R2 0.397 0.391 0.380 0.358 
Notes: Table 9 presents the results of the tax risk analyses. It shows the impact of PERSCORP on tax risk measured 
as three-year CASH ETR volatility. Specification (1) shows the results of the main regression. Specifications (2) 
and (3) consider subsamples: non-financials and multinationals only, respectively. In specification (4), I apply an 
alternative definition of PERSCORP as specified. Controls include common determinants as applied in previous 
analyses and listed in the appendix. FE are fixed effects. The constant is not reported. Robust standard errors 
clustered by firms are shown in parentheses. All variables are defined in table A3 of the appendix. *, **, and *** 
show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
Table 9 presents the results of the regression. In specification (1), the point estimate for 
PERSCORP is negative and significant implying that persistent tax avoidance reduces tax risk. 
Robustness checks, in which I limit the analyses to subsamples of non-financials or 
                                                 
16
 Some studies rely on unrecognized tax benefits (UTBs) to measure tax risk (e.g. Dyreng et al., 2017a). However, 
it is not clear whether UTBs can be used interchangeably to tax rate volatility as future payments associated with 
UTBs are predictable (Ciconte, Donohoe, Lisowsky, and Mayberry, 2016). Thus, it does not clearly capture the 
intention of tax risk. Guenther et al. (2017) find no strong relation of UTBs and future tax rate volatility. For these 
reasons, I do not employ UTBs. 
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multinationals only, confirm the result. Also applying an alternative definition of PERSCORP 
is in line with the result in specification (1). The previously applied long-term definition of 
reporting always above or below average cannot be used as the coefficient is omitted due to the 
inclusion of firm fixed effects. Overall, the results show that persistent corporations exhibit 
lower tax risk. Taking that into account might be a first step to generate clearer results with 
regard to tax risk and tax avoidance. 
Worldwide Persistence 
In the following additional analysis, I aim to provide first evidence on whether 
persistence of tax avoidance is a U.S. phenomenon or whether it can be found worldwide. If 
persistence is present globally, the importance of this paper’s implications is even more striking. 
To examine corporations worldwide, I use the database Compustat Global covering more than 
100 countries. Keeping all other data requirements constant, I receive a global sample in which 
I can identify persistent corporations based on their level of tax avoidance. 
Looking at the descriptive statistics for this sample as presented in table 10 it becomes 
clear that persistent corporations exhibit lower changes in GAAP ETR compared to the average 
even in the global context. That is, DEV ETR of persistent corporations is, on average, 
5 percentage points lower than of non-persistent corporations.  
Table 10. Distribution of Global Effective Tax Rates 
  
# of 
observations Mean Std. dev. 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile 
All Firms       
     GAAP ETR 212,898 0.2786 0.1629 0.1640 0.2671 0.3642 
     DEV ETR 212,898 0.0086 0.1371 -0.0360 0.0052 0.0500 
        
Persistent Corporations       
     GAAP ETR 126,926 0.2763 0.1729 0.1500 0.2669 0.3776 
     DEV ETR 126,926 0.0034 0.0752 -0.0196 0.0033 0.0259 
Notes: Table 10 presents descriptive statistics of GAAP ETR for the global sample, i.e., corporations covered by 
the database Compustat Global. Values are presented for the full sample conditional on data availability as well 
as for persistent corporations. Variables are defined in table A3 of the appendix. 
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Repeating further steps of the previous analyses also leads to the conclusion that there is 
a certain worldwide persistence. For example, the diagonal of table 11 shows values between 
52.4 % and 68.6 % implying that more than half of the worldwide corporations report the same 
level of tax avoidance as before. Consequently, the results of this paper may affect academic 
researchers and policymakers all over the world. However, it should be noted that a more careful 
examination of each country on its own is necessary to draw precise inferences. 
Table 11. Probability of Reporting in the Same Quartile in the Global Context 
PRIOR 
QUARTILE 
(Current) QUARTILE   
1 2 3 4 Total 
1 64.03 % 22.92 % 7.62 % 5.43 % 100.00 % 
2 16.87 % 52.36 % 22.34 % 8.43 % 100.00 % 
3 5.37 % 18.70 % 54.71 % 21.21 % 100.00 % 
4 4.17 % 7.33 % 19.88 % 68.61 % 100.00 % 
Total 22.17 % 25.84 % 26.69 % 25.30 % 100.00 % 
Notes: For the global sample, table 11 presents for GAAP ETR probabilities of remaining in the same QUARTILE. 
It considers the ETR quartile of the previous reporting year. The first quartile always represents the lowest ETRs 
of the distribution. The diagonal serves as an indicator of persistent tax avoidance. Variables are defined in table A3 
of the appendix. 
2.5  Conclusion 
Many researchers so far have attempted to solve the undersheltering puzzle. However, to 
the best of my knowledge, the time-invariant component – until today – has been mostly 
neglected. Adding this dimension to common analyses, I find a certain persistence of the 
undersheltering puzzle. For various definitions, I find that some corporations tend to report the 
same level of tax avoidance as before. This finding is in line with the general belief of tax 
unfairness and that always the same couple of corporations are able to avoid taxes, but 
contradicts the commonly applied assumption of tax avoidance being completely variable. Even 
though perfect persistence does not exist, this aspect of tax avoidance is worth to be investigated 
as it affects future analyses. 
Well-known determinants of tax avoidance seem to not explain the difference between 
persistent and non-persistent corporations. Thus, I perform further analyses to identify the 
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reason of persistence.17 I investigate the influence of unobserved time-invariant firm-specific 
characteristics, i.e., firm fixed effects. Including them leads to higher explanatory power of the 
regression by simultaneously changing or even reducing the influence of common 
determinants. This implies a very high impact of firm fixed effects on persistence of tax 
avoidance. Including this factor in an analysis of covariance (as executed in table 6) reveals that 
over 96 % of the explained variation can be attributed to them. 
Obviously, a limitation of this paper is that the results depend on the definition of 
persistence. However, results are robust to several alternative definitions. Thus, some 
corporations are inherently tax avoiders whereas others are not, irrespective of altering common 
determinants. If policymakers do not consider this aspect in their efforts of hindering tax 
avoidance, their regulation attempts will most likely be in vain. My results on persistence of tax 
avoidance do not only advance the academic knowledge about the undersheltering puzzle, they 
also have implications for future research on determinants of tax avoidance. First, other research 
should consider my results in order to identify marginal effects with greater confidence as the 
inclusion of firm fixed effects affects estimators. Second, my paper raises the desire to learn 
more about the details of time-invariant firm-specific characteristics as this study only provides 
a first examination of the undersheltering puzzle and its persistence over time. An investigation 
thereof might require exogenous shocks to identify the otherwise unobservable factors. Until 
then, the question of which corporations exactly are persistent and which, on the contrary, are 
able to continuously vary their tax avoidance level remains. A subsequent analysis in future 
research will certainly move us further towards solving the undersheltering puzzle. 
                                                 
17
 Please note that even though common determinants do not explain persistent tax avoidance, they might still be 
highly relevant with regard to the remaining variable part of tax avoidance. 
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Appendix 
Figure A1. Probability of Reporting Below Average Level of Tax Avoidance 
 
Notes: Figure A1 presents in percent how many corporations report how often below average. 
Values are computed by taking the ratio of number of years in which GAAP ETR is below average 
GAAP ETR of that year and the total number of observations per firm. On the x-axis, 1 represents 
that the corporation always reports below average whereas 0 indicates a very non-tax aggressive 
corporation. Variables are defined in table A3 of the appendix. 
Table A1. Data Development 
Description   Firms Firm-Years 
Compustat North America 1987-2015 31,919 357,428 
Non-duplicate U.S. firms 21,742 222,452 
Non-missing GAAP ETR 13,178 99,792 
Non-missing Controls 11,532 86,700 
Available PRIOR ETR 9,054 65,939 
Notes: Table A1 presents the sample selection process. Numbers show the quantity of firms included as well as 
the amount of corresponding firm-year observations. 
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Table A2. Descriptive Statistics of Alternative Tax Avoidance Measures 
Panel A: Distribution of cash effective tax rates 
  
# of 
observations Mean 
Std. 
dev. 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile 
All Firms       
     CASH ETR 58,700 0.2759 0.1794 0.1447 0.2773 0.3770 
     DEV ETR (Cash) 58,700 0.0151 0.1899 -0.0649 0.0078 0.0930 
        
Persistent Corporations       
    CASH ETR 27,298 0.2475 0.1865 0.0741 0.2508 0.3647 
    DEV ETR (Cash) 27,298 0.0036 0.0867 -0.0271 0.0023 0.0335 
       
Panel B: Distribution of foreign effective tax rates 
  
# of 
observations Mean 
Std. 
dev. 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile 
All Firms       
     FOREIGN ETR 19,905 0.2998 0.1793 0.1789 0.2875 0.3931 
     DEV ETR (Foreign) 19,905 0.0061 0.1762 -0.0606 0.0031 0.0716 
        
Persistent Corporations       
     FOREIGN ETR 10,051 0.2815 0.1933 0.1360 0.2685 0.3884 
     DEV ETR (Foreign) 10,051 0.0034 0.0899 -0.0271 0.0012 0.0302 
Notes: Table A2 shows descriptive statistics for the CASH ETR (panel A) and FOREIGN ETR (panel B) sample 
which are used in robustness checks. Table A2 presents the distribution of effective tax rates. It shows the values 
for the yearly ETR as well as the difference in ETRs relative to the average to reflect possible persistence of ETRs. 
Variables are defined in table A3 of the appendix. 
Table A3. Variable Definitions 
Tax Avoidance Measures 
GAAP ETR txt / (pi - spi), i.e., income taxes divided by pretax income, 
adjusted for special items (set to 0 if missing); exclude outliers 
CASH ETR txpd / pi, i.e., income taxes paid divided by pretax income; 
exclude outliers 
FOREIGN ETR txfo / pifo, i.e., foreign income taxes divided by foreign pretax 
income; exclude outliers 
RELATIVE ETR Difference between current year’s ETR and year average ETR 
DEV ETR RELATIVE ETR – RELATIVE ETR
-1, i.e., change in 
RELATIVE ETR 
QUARTILE Dummy variable which takes value between 1 and 4 according 
to which quartile of the distribution the ETR is located in. 
Quartiles are formed based on a year average ETR. 1 
represents the lowest and 4 the highest ETRs. 
PRIOR ETR / 
QUARTILE 
Prior indicates that the respective value from the prior year, 
i.e., from t-1, is taken 
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Identification of Persistent Corporations 
PERSCORP Indicator variable equal to 1 if today’s ETR is in the same 
quartile as PRIOR ETR 
or, if specified: 
a) Indicator variable equal to 1 if corporation always or 
never reports ETR below yearly average 
b) Indicator variable equal to 1 if change in RELATIVE 
ETR is smaller than 5 % 
  
Common Determinants 
SIZE log (at), i.e., logarithm of total assets 
SALES log (sale), i.e., logarithm of total sales 
RD (Research and 
Development) 
xrd / at, i.e., research and development expense (set to 0 if 
missing) divided by total assets  
LEV (Leverage) (dlc + dltt) / at, i.e., debt in current and long-term liabilities 
(set to 0 if missing) divided by total assets; exclude LEV>1 
CAPINT (Capital 
Intensity) 
ppent / at, i.e., net property, plant, and equipment (set to 0 if 
missing) divided by total assets 
INTANG (Intangibles) intan / at, i.e., total intangible assets (set to 0 if missing) 
divided by total assets 
CAPEX (Capital 
Expenditure) 
capx / ppent, i.e., amount spent on capital assets (set to 0 if 
missing) divided by property, plant, and equipment 
ADVEX (Advertising 
Expense) 
xad / sale, i.e., advertising expenses (set to 0 if missing) 
divided by total sales 
ROA (Return on Assets) pi / at, i.e., pretax income divided by total assets 
NOL (Net Operating 
Loss) 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if tax-loss carryforward (tlcf) at 
the end of the previous year is bigger than current tlcf 
MNE (Multinational 
Entity) 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if pretax foreign income (pifo) or 
absolute value of foreign tax expense (txfo) is greater than 0 
GROWTH sale / (sale - sale
-1), i.e., increase in total sales 
Notes: Table A3 presents variable definitions for all variables used throughout my analyses. All financial statement 
data are acquired from the database Compustat. Compustat data items are reported in italics. All continuous control 
variables are winsorized at the 1 % levels of their respective distribution. 
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Table A4. Parameter Sensitivities using Alternative Tax Avoidance Measures 
Variables CASH ETR Change FOREIGN ETR Change 1 2 3 4 5 6 
SIZE -0.0329*** -0.0391*** 18.8 % -0.0243*** -0.0120 -50.6 % 
 (0.0024) (0.0049)   (0.0055) (0.0085)   
SALES 0.0418*** 0.0673*** 61.0 % 0.0258*** 0.0125 -51.6 % 
 (0.0025) (0.0050)   (0.0058) (0.0092)   
RD -0.2800*** 0.1300 -146.4 % -0.1220*** -0.1280 4.9 % 
 (0.0290) (0.0843)   (0.0410) (0.0780)   
LEV -0.0907*** -0.0430*** -52.6 % -0.0008 0.0196 255.0 % 
 (0.0079) (0.0108)   (0.0131) (0.0172)   
CAPINT -0.0465*** -0.0141 -69.7 % -0.0228 0.0477 309.2 % 
 (0.0079) (0.0150)   (0.0191) (0.0310)   
INTANG 0.0473*** 0.0239* -49.5 % 0.0565*** -0.0323 -157.2 % 
 (0.0090) (0.0141)   (0.0156) (0.0234)   
CAPEX -0.0147** 0.0259*** 276.2 % -0.0124 -0.0097 -21.8 % 
 (0.0067) (0.0076)   (0.0146) (0.0149)   
ADVEX 0.0292 -0.0369 226.4 % 0.0113 0.1980 165.2 % 
 (0.0493) (0.0923)   (0.0932) (0.1400)   
ROA -0.1270*** -0.4260*** 235.4 % -0.1040*** -0.1710*** 64.4 % 
 (0.0181) (0.0213)   (0.0247) (0.0268)   
NOL -0.0751*** -0.0451*** -39.9 % -0.0117*** -0.0107*** -8.5 % 
 (0.0026) (0.0028)   (0.0037) (0.0034)   
GROWTH -0.0509*** -0.0319*** -37.3 % -0.0330*** -0.0034 -89.7 % 
 (0.0033) (0.0038)   (0.0075) (0.0074)   
MNE 0.0055** -0.0147*** 367.2 %       
 (0.0027) (0.0036)         
Year FE       
Industry FE       
Firm FE       
N 58,700 58,700   19,905 19,905   
Adj. R2 0.116 0.35   0.056 0.395   
Notes: Table A4 shows the results of OLS regressions with CASH ETR and FOREIGN ETR as dependent 
variables. Applying alternative tax avoidance measures, the results serve as robustness tests to table 5. Different 
sets of parameter estimates are presented to show the additional impact of including firm fixed effects (Firm FE). 
Also shown is the percent change in the magnitude of the coefficient when implementing Firm FE instead of 
Industry FE. FE are fixed effects. The constant is not reported. Robust standard errors clustered by firms are shown 
in parentheses. Variables are defined in table A3 of the appendix. *, **, and *** show significance at the level of 
10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
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Table A5. Parameter Sensitivities considering only Persistent Corporations 
Variables GAAP ETR  Change QUARTILE  Change 1 2 3 4 5 6 
SIZE -0.0083** 0.0180*** 316.9 % -0.1500*** 0.0895** -159.7 % 
 (0.0033) (0.0044)   (0.0227) (0.0350)   
SALES 0.0190*** 0.0049 -74.2 % 0.1960*** 0.0394 -79.9 % 
 (0.0033) (0.0045)   (0.0232) (0.0356)   
RD -0.5470*** -0.2680*** -51.0 % -5.1860*** -2.0570*** -60.3 % 
 (0.0311) (0.0750)   (0.2320) (0.5410)   
LEV -0.0587*** -0.0210** -64.2 % -0.2390*** -0.0442 -81.5 % 
 (0.0103) (0.0105)   (0.0731) (0.0816)   
CAPINT -0.0156 0.0076 -148.7 % -0.1320* 0.0847 -164.2 % 
 (0.0105) (0.0151)   (0.0748) (0.1160)   
INTANG 0.0659*** -0.0282** -142.8 % 0.5110*** -0.2230* -143.6 % 
 (0.0111) (0.0143)   (0.0870) (0.1140)   
CAPEX 0.0526*** 0.0114* -78.3 % 0.4060*** 0.0639 -84.3 % 
 (0.0085) (0.0069)   (0.0624) (0.0519)   
ADVEX -0.0349 -0.0172 -50.7 % -0.2240 -0.0649 -71.0 % 
 (0.0578) (0.0883)   (0.4970) (0.8040)   
ROA 0.1380*** 0.1700*** 23.2 % 1.2720*** 1.7980*** 41.4 % 
 (0.0236) (0.0189)   (0.1640) (0.1400)   
NOL -0.0349*** -0.0174*** -50.1 % -0.2780*** -0.1610*** -42.1 % 
 (0.0032) (0.0029)   (0.0239) (0.0219)   
GROWTH -0.0222*** -0.0064** -70.1 % -0.1550*** -0.0374 -75.9 % 
 (0.0036) (0.0033)   (0.0262) (0.0245)   
MNE -0.0014 -0.0103*** 735.7 % -0.2050*** -0.1340*** -34.6 % 
 (0.0035) (0.0034)   (0.0282) (0.0297)   
Year FE       
Industry FE       
Firm FE       
N 36,065 36,065  36,065 36,065   
Adj. R2 0.127 0.679  0.138 0.665 
  
Notes: Table A5 shows the results of OLS regressions with GAAP ETR and QUARTILE as dependent variables 
for persistent corporations only. For each measure of tax avoidance, different sets of parameter estimates are 
presented to show the additional impact of including firm fixed effects (Firm FE). Year FE is year fixed effects 
and Industry FE is industry fixed effects. Also shown is the percent change in the magnitude of the coefficient 
when implementing Firm FE instead of Industry FE. The constant is not reported. Robust standard errors clustered 
by firms are shown in parentheses. Variables are defined in table A3 of the appendix. *, **, and *** show 
significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
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Table A6. Parameter Sensitivities using Alternative Definitions of Persistence 
GAAP ETR 
Always Above/Below 
Avg. Change Change < 0.05 Change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
SIZE -0.0079 0.0026 -132.9 % -0.0054 0.0218*** 503.7 % 
 (0.0055) (0.0041)   (0.0061) (0.0081)   
SALES 0.0215*** 0.0014 -93.5 % 0.0316*** 0.0041 -87.0 % 
 (0.0055) (0.0040)   (0.0060) (0.0077)   
RD -0.6650*** -0.0999 -85.0 % -0.7910*** -0.0976 -87.7 % 
 (0.0561) (0.0818)   (0.0627) (0.5010)   
LEV -0.0617*** 0.0088 -114.3 % -0.1390*** -0.0285 -79.5 % 
 (0.0159) (0.0104)   (0.0198) (0.0234)   
CAPINT -0.0443** -0.0133 -70.0 % -0.0456** -0.0052 -88.6 % 
 (0.0175) (0.0138)   (0.0199) (0.0283)   
INTANG 0.0617*** -0.0084 -113.6 % 0.0913*** -0.0334 -136.6 % 
 (0.0190) (0.0176)   (0.0248) (0.0369)   
CAPEX 0.0870*** -0.0110* -112.6 % 0.1150*** 0.0177 -84.6 % 
 (0.0127) (0.0067)   (0.0176) (0.0141)   
ADVEX 0.1190 0.0414 -65.2 % -0.0585 -0.1680 287.2 % 
 (0.0980) (0.0784)   (0.1360) (0.2070)   
ROA 0.0458 -0.0340 -174.2 % 0.1820*** 0.0816** -55.2 % 
 (0.0374) (0.0227)   (0.0484) (0.0395)   
NOL -0.0293*** -0.0008 -97.3 % -0.0559*** -0.0249*** -55.5 % 
 (0.0057) (0.0032)   (0.0068) (0.0094)   
GROWTH -0.0105** -0.0012 -88.6 % -0.0177** -0.0067 -62.1 % 
 (0.0048) (0.0029)   (0.0070) (0.0053)   
MNE 0.0127* -0.0022 -117.3 % 0.0444*** 0.0064 -85.6 % 
 (0.0072) (0.0046)   (0.0075) (0.0112)   
Year FE       
Industry FE       
Firm FE       
N 15,548 15,548   7,394 7,394  
Adj. R2 0.143 0.877   0.312 0.913   
Notes: Table A6 shows the results of OLS regressions with GAAP ETR as dependent variable for persistent 
corporations only. Applying alternative definitions of PERSCORP, the results serve as robustness tests to table 5 
and table A5. Different sets of parameter estimates are presented to show the additional impact of including firm 
fixed effects (Firm FE). Also shown is the percent change in the magnitude of the coefficient when implementing 
Firm FE instead of Industry FE. FE are fixed effects. The constant is not reported. Robust standard errors clustered 
by firms are shown in parentheses. Variables are defined in table A3 of the appendix. *, **, and *** show 
significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
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Table A7. Variance Decompositions using Alternative Tax Avoidance Measures 
Variables CASH ETR FOREIGN ETR 1 2 3 4 
Firm FE . 93.0 % . 98.2 % 
Industry FE 6.8 % . 17.9 % . 
Year FE 39.4 % 0.0 % 54.4 % 0.4 % 
SIZE 9.4 % 1.0 % 8.6 % 0.1 % 
SALES 12.3 % 1.1 % 7.0 % 0.0 % 
RD 3.2 % 0.0 % 2.6 % 0.1 % 
LEV 2.6 % 0.0 % 1.3 % 0.1 % 
CAPINT 0.6 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.3 % 
INTANG 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 
CAPEX 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 
ADVEX 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.2 % 0.0 % 
ROA 1.9 % 2.7 % 2.4 % 0.6 % 
NOL 20.7 % 1.6 % 4.2 % 0.2 % 
GROWTH 3.0 % 0.2 % 1.3 % 0.0 % 
MNE 0.0 % 0.1 % . . 
Adj. R2 0.730 0.802 0.744 0.839 
Notes: Table A7 presents a variance decomposition for various model specifications as robustness tests to the main 
results in table 6. I apply alternative measures of tax avoidance: CASH ETR and FOREIGN ETR. Adjusted R-
squares are shown at the bottom. I compute the Type III partial sum of squares for each parameter in the model 
and then normalize each estimate by the sum across all parameters. This way, I force each column to sum to 100 %. 
FE are fixed effects. Variables are defined in table A3 of the appendix. 
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Abstract:  
Our empirical study tests the effect of special tax deals on tax avoidance of multinational 
corporations. In 2014, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists published 
confidential documents identifying hundreds of firms worldwide that had benefited from 
advance tax rulings. We find that after engaging in an advance tax ruling in the tax haven 
Luxembourg, firms have lower worldwide effective tax rates compared to non-ruling firms. The 
results are robust even if we mitigate a potential bias via propensity score matching. 
Consequently, this study gives evidence for corporate tax avoidance through special tax deals 
in the form of advance tax rulings.  
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3.1 Introduction 
Over the last decades, multinational corporations (MNCs) could benefit from various tax 
planning opportunities. In recent years, several countries have additionally offered special tax 
deals. For example, Ireland granted tax benefits to Apple for many years. In August 2016, 
Apple’s special tax deals in Ireland were classified by the European Commission as illegal state 
aid resulting in $ 14.5 billion in back taxes.18 This tax deal seems to be no exceptional case. In 
2013, 32 of the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries 
and several non-OECD countries offered advance tax rulings (ATRs) (OECD, 2013). 
Generally, ATRs provide MNCs with certainty about the application of tax law. Nevertheless, 
lately, they appear to have become agreements in which fiscal authorities secure complex tax 
avoidance structures to some MNCs. In line with that, the European Commission and the OECD 
initiative against base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) released actions to restrain certain 
types of ATRs (European Commission, 2015; OECD, 2015a). We are, to the best of our 
knowledge, the first to analyze the actual – until today unknown – effect of tax deals on MNCs’ 
worldwide tax avoidance. This may be primarily due to the fact that information about ATRs 
is usually not disclosed by firms or tax authorities as many countries have tax secrecy. 
However, in 2014, the event known as Luxembourg Leaks (LuxLeaks) has astonished 
governments, corporations, and the public worldwide. The International Consortium of 
Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) released tax documents of over 340 MNCs, including 
Accenture, Coach, H.J. Heinz, Procter & Gamble, Vodafone, and Volkswagen (ICIJ, 
2014a/2014b).19 The New York Times described Luxembourg’s ‘role as a haven for hundreds 
of companies seeking to drastically reduce their tax bills’.20 Considering this dissemination of 
                                                 
18
 The New York Times (2016, August 30), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/31/technology/apple-
tax-eu-ireland.html?_r=0. 
19
 For a complete list of the involved firms see the database of the ICIJ (2014c): 
http://www.icij.org/project/luxembourg-leaks/explore-documents-luxembourg-leaks-database. 
20
 The New York Times (2014, November 6), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/07/world/europe/ 
head-of-european-commission-under-pressure-over-luxembourg-tax-revelations.html?_r=4. 
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confidential tax deals with the Luxembourg tax authority, we analyze the impact of special tax 
deals on the worldwide taxes of MNCs using a broad sample of firms. 
These special tax deals in the form of ATRs are under suspicion of increasing tax 
competition. In the past, tax competition between countries caused decreasing corporate tax 
rates worldwide (Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano, 2008; Overesch and Rincke, 2011) and 
many countries offered additional refined tax incentives to MNCs, such as tax holidays. 
Nowadays, ATRs seem to be widely used and the most intriguing method to attract MNCs. 
ATRs are of particular interest for tax avoidance of MNCs because sophisticated international 
tax avoidance structures like transfer pricing, hybrid finance, or disregarded entities are 
typically associated with a high risk of tax litigations (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2017). 
Furthermore, ATRs can include additional agreements with the country issuing the ATR. Thus, 
ATRs may comprise complex tax structures leading to almost no tax payments (ICIJ, 
2014a/2014c). As they additionally provide ex ante certainty about the benefit of such 
structures, MNCs might even engage in tax structures which they would usually refrain from.  
In our analysis, we attempt to estimate the magnitude of this - supposably - distortion of 
competition. We examine tax avoidance associated with special tax deals of MNCs by 
investigating the additional tax avoidance of firms that engage in an ATR compared to MNCs 
that do not. More precisely, we consider the sample of ruling firms detected by the ‘LuxLeaks’ 
publications and test whether effective tax rates (ETRs) are significantly smaller if a firm has 
employed an ATR. We use ETRs as a well-established measure of worldwide tax payments of 
a firm. A low ETR indicates reduced corporate tax payments. Thus, we expect smaller ETRs of 
MNCs that obtain ATRs in Luxembourg. We thereby provide an estimate of the worldwide tax 
reduction of an MNC due to a single tax deal. 
Well-known firms identified by LuxLeaks are able to reduce their worldwide tax 
expenses significantly. We include the data of 136 ruling firms, i.e., firms that engaged in 
ATRs, which were issued and signed by fiscal authorities between 2002 and 2010, and were 
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exposed by the ICIJ. Our empirical analysis of data taken from Compustat North America and 
Compustat Global shows that the additional effect of ATRs on the multinationals’ ETRs 
consists of a strong short-term decline by about 4 percentage points. However, over a three-
year period the decline still amounts to an economically meaningful decline of 2 percentage 
points. Considering a mean ETR of 28 %, this leads to an average reduction of taxes by 7 %. 
This significant reduction implies that firms avoid taxes through tax planning strategies legally 
assured by ATRs. Hence, we find empirical evidence for the criticism that accompanied 
Luxembourg Leaks.  
We also consider subsamples to compare MNCs from different countries. In accordance 
with the main results, we conclude that - irrespective of their location - MNCs benefit from 
ATRs. In additional analyses, we further find that firms which are usually less likely to engage 
in tax avoidance benefit especially from ATRs as they exhibit a clear long-term effect. 
Moreover, we combine propensity score matching and difference-in-differences estimation to 
mitigate the arising endogeneity concern. By selecting very similar MNCs, we reduce the threat 
that spurious results obtain from differences between the groups unrelated to the treatment. The 
matched-sample analysis is consistent with our main results that through ATRs, multinationals 
can avoid more taxes than they can without getting an ATR. 
Our study makes several contributions to prior literature and public debates. First, it 
relates to previous literature that analyzes tax avoidance and for example profit shifting – as 
one of the possible tax avoidance structures – of MNCs (for overviews Hanlon and Heitzman, 
2010; Dharmapala, 2014). A broad literature provides evidence for significant profit shifting 
activities of MNCs (e.g. Hines and Rice, 1994; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008). Moreover, a few 
studies investigate to what extent tax planning strategies like tax haven usage or proxies for 
well-known profit shifting channels affect the overall tax payments of an MNC (Dyreng and 
Lindsey, 2009; Markle and Shackelford, 2012a/2012b). However, the effect of ATRs on the 
scope of tax avoidance is unexplored. As MNCs arranged similar structures within the ATRs, 
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we confirm previous results about tax avoidance with the difference that ruling firms operate 
under certainty. Tax certainty may lead to increased tax avoidance. Consequently, the 
magnitude derived in this study provides first insight into tax avoidance under certainty. 
Second, our study contributes to the general discussion on ATRs. Finding a significant 
reduction in ETRs, our results should be of interest for policymakers. ATRs are issued in many 
countries and in general, there is nothing offensive about tax certainty. However, LuxLeaks 
implies that ATRs may be used for means of tax abuse. Through our analyses, we offer a better 
understanding of the impact of certain ATRs on the scope of tax avoidance. The criticism of 
ATRs may be, at least with regard to Luxembourg ATRs, justified. 
Related to that, our results also contribute to the recent debate on BEPS (OECD, 2015b), 
through which fiscal authorities aim to close loopholes. However, ATRs, as issued in 
Luxembourg, supposably deprive Luxembourg as well as other countries of their tax revenue 
as Luxembourg does not fully make use of its taxing right. The European Commission, 
consequently, released a ‘Tax Transparency Package’ to restrain MNCs - and the respective 
fiscal authorities - from exploiting this type of ATRs in the future (European Commission, 
2015). Moreover, the final BEPS report released by the OECD includes a special action against 
ATRs (OECD, 2015a). Our study relates to this development as it explores the extent of tax 
avoidance through ATRs in Luxembourg. Our results suggest that in Luxembourg, MNCs 
successfully employed ATRs to reduce their overall tax payments and that Luxembourg acted 
as a tax haven (see also Marian, 2017). As the tax payments were legally assured through an 
ATR, our findings imply that not only MNCs need to comply with the rules, but also fiscal 
authorities have to collaborate as their behavior influences tax avoidance of MNCs.21 
                                                 
21
 In addition to the recent case of Apple in Ireland (as mentioned before), possible illegal state aid through ATRs 
of Amazon, Starbucks, and McDonalds in Luxembourg and the Netherlands has also caught the attention of the 
European Commission, cf. The New York Times (2015, December 3), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/04/business/eu-opens-inquiry-into-possible-mcdonalds-tax-breaks-in-
luxembourg.html?_r=0. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the 
ATRs detected by LuxLeaks and develop our hypothesis. Section 3.3 describes our data and 
the research design. Empirical results of our main analysis as well as additional tests are 
presented and discussed in section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes.  
3.2 Background and Hypothesis Development 
3.2.1 Advance Tax Rulings and Luxembourg Leaks 
An advance tax ruling is an agreement between a tax authority and a taxpayer about the 
application of tax law regarding a special arrangement (OECD, 2015a).22 The ATR binds tax 
authorities to comply with the tax arrangements set out in the ATR, whereby the taxpayer 
obtains clarity and certainty in advance. Thus, before activities are started or a certain structure 
is established, the consequences of the tax planning are known (Givati, 2009; Diller, 
Kortebusch, Schneider, and Sureth, 2017; Hoke, 2015). Generally, ATRs are supposed to 
reduce tax avoidance or fraud through the increased certainty. However, an ATR does not only 
provide legal certainty and transparency. With regard to tax competition, a taxpayer like a MNC 
might also benefit from reduced corporate tax payments, i.e., special tax benefits which will be 
granted ex ante by the fiscal authority (Diller et al., 2017; Sheppard, 2015). 
A 2013 OECD report reveals that 32 of the OECD countries and several non-OECD 
countries offer ATRs (OECD, 2013), but only recently, ATRs have been in the center of public 
discussion because several hundred confidential documents were published online by the ICIJ 
(ICIJ, 2014c). Unlike the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, in most European countries, fiscal 
authorities do not disclose information about issued ATRs. However, in late 2014, tax 
documents of over 340 MNCs became publicly available. Most of the confidential documents 
                                                 
22
 ATRs are in some ways similar to advance pricing agreements (APAs). De Waegenaere, Sansing and 
Wielhouwer (2007) examine APAs and what circumstances increase the likelihood of engaging in an APA. 
However, they do not relate APAs to the ETRs of MNCs. Further, APAs generally represent documents to which 
several fiscal authorities agree and are especially used to determine transfer prices. The in this study examined 
ATRs have been signed only by Luxembourg fiscal authority and comprise more versatile tax planning structures. 
Thus, from them, we can infer if tax planning structures in one country can affect the worldwide corporate ETR.  
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represent ATRs, which were issued between 2002 and 2010, and indicate sophisticated tax 
planning activities in Luxembourg (ICIJ, 2014a/2014c).  
Technically, ATRs are written affirmations of planned tax structures. Elaborate, tax-
motivated structures, mostly proposed by the Big Four accountancy firm PwC and signed by 
Luxembourg tax administration, imply a distortion of competition and thus, possibly illegal 
state aid as selected MNCs gain certainty about unnaturally low tax payments through secret 
tax deals (Christians, 2014; Soong Johnston and Parillo, 2014). Obviously, ATRs are 
advantageous for MNCs: This study focusses on the reduced tax payments whereas Huesecken, 
Overesch, and Tassius (2017) show an increase in firm value associated with ATRs. However, 
Luxembourg also benefits from signing the documents. It attracts business and tax revenue as 
defined in the ATR.23 Considering the frequent lack of real economic activities (Hoke, 2015), 
ATRs might even be a matter of aggressive tax avoidance. 
The documents can be downloaded from the database provided by the ICIJ (ICIJ, 2014c). 
The released documents explain the used tax structures and Marian (2017) as well as Hardeck 
and Wittenstein (2017) analyze them in detail. Among other schemes to avoid taxes, some 
ruling firms set up finance companies in Luxembourg. Equipping those with equity via hybrid 
financing, such as participation rights, has the advantage that the capital can be classified as 
equity in the host country of the parent company whereas in Luxembourg, it can be seen as 
debt. The finance company gives intra-company loans to other subsidiaries in high-tax countries 
where the interest expenses are tax deductible. In Luxembourg, payments to the parent company 
are classified as interest and equally tax deductible - ideally reducing the tax base to zero, 
whereas the host country of the parent company does not tax the payment because it is deemed 
as intra-company dividend. Other ruling firms use fund structures in which the profit is shifted 
                                                 
23
 At this point, it should be noted that ATRs, in general, are nothing illegal or offensive. However, if a state uses 
them to act as a tax haven and to offer special tax avoidance structures to certain MNCs, the usage of these 
discriminatory ATRs may be investigated and restricted as the European Commission recently did (European 
Commission, 2015). For a timeline of events associated with LuxLeaks compare figure A1 of the appendix. 
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to a Luxembourg investment fund, because according to Luxembourg law, funds are mostly 
tax-exempt. Yet other ATRs display the application of intellectual property which is held in a 
Luxembourg subsidiary. 80 % of the in Luxembourg received royalty payments are tax-exempt 
due to the available ‘IP-Box’ in Luxembourg tax law. While the general structures may also be 
available to MNCs without an ATR, ATRs often consist of even more elaborate structures and 
additionally warrant unconventional agreements, such as transfer prices that are not in line with 
market terms and maximum tax bases irrespective of the earned profit.24 Luxembourg state aid 
legally assuring major reductions of tax payments embodies that the analyzed ATRs serve as 
tax avoidance structure for MNCs and allows us to investigate their impact on MNCs’ 
worldwide ETRs. 
3.2.2 Prior Literature and Hypothesis 
Tax planning activities of MNCs have received a lot of attention in recent years. MNCs 
employ very different strategies to avoid taxes: A broad literature provides evidence for income 
shifting (see Hines and Rice, 1994; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008; Heckemeyer and Overesch, 
2017) and tax optimal financial structures (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2004; Huizinga, Laeven, 
and Nicodème, 2008). Moreover, MNCs establish subsidiaries in tax haven countries (Desai, 
Foley, and Hines, 2006) or locate patents in countries offering a special tax treatment 
(Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012; Griffith, Miller, and O’Connell, 2014).  
The previous literature has also investigated the influence of certain tax planning tools 
on the worldwide tax avoidance of a MNC. This literature refers to ETRs taken from financial 
accounting data as a measure of tax avoidance. Several studies analyze the influence of firm-
specific characteristics (Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Plesko, 2003; Chen, Chen, Cheng, and 
Shevlin, 2010) and provide insight into the impact of foreign activities and international tax 
planning (Collins and Shackelford, 1995/2003; Rego, 2003). Only a few studies investigate the 
                                                 
24
 This structure, applied by Amazon, is investigated by the European Commission as it might represent illegal 
state aid (Soong Johnston and Parillo, 2014). 
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influence of selected tax planning strategies. Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) and Markle and 
Shackelford (2012a/2012b) test proxies for well-known profit shifting channels as determinants 
of tax avoidance. We contribute to this strand of literature as we analyze the impact of ATRs 
on the scope of tax avoidance. Even though similar structures – as described above – have been 
used in ATRs, the reduced litigation risk may impact the magnitude of tax avoidance. 
Studying the relation of tax avoidance and tax uncertainty, Dyreng et al. (2017) reveal 
that income shifting to tax havens increases uncertainty. ATRs, however, provide legal 
certainty. Diller et al. (2017) find a high demand for ATRs and show how their availability 
attracts tax aggressive MNCs. We expect that reaching tax certainty is not the only reason for 
MNCs to get an ATR. In fact, we expect that by having an ex ante acceptance of their tax 
structure, MNCs can implement tax structures that are otherwise associated with high risk of 
tax litigations. Without an ATR those MNCs would potentially have to fear a tax audit and 
consequently, might refrain from engaging in aggressive tax planning. However, managers, 
supported by their tax advisor, most likely saw the chance in Luxembourg to get their tax 
planning accepted even though the structures seem to be highly tax-motivated. Therefore, from 
the MNC’s perspective, the intention behind an ATR strikes as being additional tax avoidance.  
Taking into account previous literature, we study whether and to what extent ATRs affect 
worldwide corporate tax avoidance of MNCs. We hypothesize that ETRs of MNCs employing 
ATRs are significantly smaller than those of firms that do not get an ATR. 
3.3 Research Design and Sample 
3.3.1 Data and Sample Selection 
Our starting point are the 345 ruling firms identified by the ICIJ as mentioned in 
section 3.2.1. We manually searched for the ultimate parent.25 To augment our sample, we 
                                                 
25
 During the observed period, we identify several cases of mergers and acquisitions, for which, if data is available, 
we keep all affected firms. We expect tax aggressiveness to be extended to the acquiring firm as well as to the 
newly created entity in case of a merger.  
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derive consolidated financial statement information from two databases: Compustat North 
America and Compustat Global. By merging the two datasets,26 we acquire data for 164 ruling 
firms. We consider only financial years that ended between January 2000 and December 2014. 
Thus, we get 60,452 firms, of which 162 represent ruling firms, or 564,563 and 2,197 firm-year 
observations, respectively. Imposing the following data requirements, which we need for our 
regression analyses, we are left with a total of 5,774 firms (136 ruling firms) or 35,312 (1,240) 
firm-year observations (see table A2 of the appendix for detailed data development). 
For our treatment group (ruling firms), we require available ruling documents so that we 
can identify the year of the ATR. Since tax avoidance mostly involves the exploitation of 
different tax jurisdictions, we limit our sample to MNCs. By default, all ruling firms are MNCs 
due to their additional activity in Luxembourg. A few ruling firms are headquartered in 
Luxembourg. For those, we manually check their Internet presence to ensure their 
multinationality. Following Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) and Atwood, Huston, and Wallace 
(2013), we identify the control group (non-ruling firms) as multinational if they have a non-
missing and non-zero foreign income tax. As this variable is not available in Compustat Global, 
we extract the respective data items from Compustat Global Legacy, which provides financial 
data till 2008.27 We classify a firm as a MNC if it is considered to be multinational in a previous 
firm-year (Atwood et al., 2012). Tax avoidance opportunities highly depend on a country’s tax 
law. Therefore, we require our control group to be headquartered in the same countries as the 
considered ruling firms.  
Financial statement information is needed to compute the tax avoidance measures as well 
as additional variables for regression analyses. Hence, we require that each firm-year 
observation has comprehensive financial data. Firm-years with missing variables are excluded. 
                                                 
26
 Prior to the merge, we require non-missing values for company identifier (gvkey), year (fyear), and industry 
format (indfmt), as the two datasets are merged based on these variables. We delete duplicate observations. 
27
 According to Atwood, Drake, Myers, and Myers (2012) Japanese firms have unreasonably often missing foreign 
tax and can consequently not be identified as multinationals. Therefore, we delete Japanese firms from our sample. 
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For the control variables, we need non-missing values for the respective described 
components.28 Loss firms usually have different tax planning incentives than profitable firms. 
Thus, we limit our sample to firms having a positive pretax income. 
Following accounting literature, we use the ETR as an ex post measure of tax avoidance 
(e.g. Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009; Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2010; Markle and Shackelford, 
2012a/2012b). Information to compute our ETR measures is taken from the consolidated 
financial statements of MNCs. Consequently, the ETR considers the overall effects of tax 
avoidance structures in different countries and does not refer to one single subsidiary. 
Backward-looking, the ETR evaluates the worldwide tax expenses of a firm and thus, indicates 
the level of employed tax avoidance. A lower ETR implies higher tax avoidance as the firm 
seems to have tax planning structures that reduce the income taxes more effectively compared 
to firms with higher ETRs.29  
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variables Treatment Group Control Group 
N Mean Std. dev. N Mean Std. dev. 
GAAP ETR  1,240 0.28 0.14 34,072 0.28 0.15 
SIZE  1,240 9.49 2.25 34,072 6.75 2.04 
ROA  1,240 0.08 0.08 34,072 0.10 0.28 
CAPINT  1,240 0.31 0.26 34,072 0.35 0.27 
LEV  1,240 0.07 0.10 34,072 0.05 0.08 
RD   1,240 0.02 0.03 34,072 0.02 0.05 
CASH ETR  858 0.25 0.15 26,080 0.24 0.17 
FOREIGN ETR 362 0.30 0.17 11,453 0.29 0.17 
Notes: Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for all variables included in our main regression analyses. Variables are 
defined in table A1 of the appendix. 
In our main analysis, we focus on a firm’s GAAP ETR as dependent variable. We define 
GAAP ETR as tax expenses divided by pretax income and adjust the latter for extraordinary 
items. In accordance with previous studies, we delete a firm-year if the numerator or 
                                                 
28
 Please refer to section 3.3.3 for a description of the control variables. 
29
 The ETR used in this study is not to be confused with the effective tax rate as described in King and Fullerton 
(1984) and Devereux and Griffith (1998) who define it differently as a forward-looking measure. 
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denominator of the ETR is negative and to limit the influence of outliers, we exclude ETRs 
smaller than 0 and greater than 1. Finally, we exclude the observations of the specific year the 
ATR was signed from our analysis. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for several firm characteristics.30 The descriptive 
statistics show that the 136 firms of our sample identified as ruling firms are, compared to our 
full sample, rather large and thus, represent a relevant part of the available market volume. 
Overall, treatment and control group are comparable regarding firm characteristics. Ruling 
firms have a lower capital intensity and a higher short-term leverage than the control group. 
Their profitability is slightly lower. The presented values are reasonable and as prior literature 
(see section 3.3.3) presents ambiguous results, this gives us no clear indication regarding 
possible tax avoidance behavior. 
Table 2 provides additional information regarding the ruling firms. It exposes that most 
ruling firms are headquartered in the United States (34.6 %), followed by the United Kingdom 
(16.2 %), and Germany (6.6 %). 33.8 % of the ruling firms belong to the financial sector and 
still 9.6 % can be classified as dealing with pharmaceutical products.31 Some MNCs signed 
more than one ATR with Luxembourg fiscal authority. In most of our later analyses, we, 
however, only consider each MNC’s first ATR. 
                                                 
30
 A correlation matrix of the variables is provided in table A3 of the appendix. 
31
 We apply the Fama and French classification of 17 industry codes. Updated industry classification can be 
downloaded from http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/changes_ind.html. 
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Table 2. Overview of Firms  
Country 
Frequency 
Industry 
Frequency Year of 
Ruling 
Fre-
quency Ru-ling 
Non-
R. 
Ru-
ling 
Non-
R. 
Australia 5 27 Food 6 176 2002 1 
Belgium 4 8 Mining & Minerals 2 106 2003 2 
Bermuda 1 44 Oil and Petroleum   2004 1 
Canada 5 171 Products 5 158 2005 1 
Switzerland 8 27 Textiles, Apparel &    2006 2 
Germany 9 169 Footware 4 163 2007 2 
Finland 1 15 Consumer Durables 2 204 2008 25 
France 5 48 Chemicals 1 140 2009 82 
Hong Kong 1 801 Drugs, Soap, Prfums,    2010 55 
Ireland 9 60 Tobacco 13 182   
Iceland 1 0 Construction and       
Israel 1 52 Construction Materials 4 203    
Italy 5 28 Steel Works 1 87    
Luxembourg 4 14 Fabricated Products 2 47    
Netherlands 1 51 Machinery and     
Norway 1 62 Business Equipment 10 879    
Philippines 1 3 Automobiles 3 96    
Russia 2 5 Transportation 2 202    
Sweden 2 34 Utilities 1 46    
Taiwan 1 16 Retail Stores 3 240    
United   Banks, Insurance  
 
   
Kingdom 22 870 Companies   
 
   
United States 47 3,133 & Other Financials 46 627    
   Other 31 2,082     
Total 136 5,638   136 5,638   171 
Notes: Table 2 gives an overview of descriptive information of the in the analyses considered ruling firms and 
non-ruling (Non-R.) firms as it summarizes the country of the headquarter and the industry. The industry 
classification is based on the 17 different industries from Fama and French. The years in which ATRs have been 
signed by Luxembourg tax administration are also displayed. Note that ‘Year of Ruling’, based on the database 
provided by the ICIJ, does not equal the later employed indicator variable RULING FIRM & PERIOD as it 
accounts for firms that requested more than one ATR. 
3.3.2 Explorative Analyses 
As discussed in section 3.2.2, we expect a causal relationship between rulings and tax 
avoidance. While table 1 does not support significant differences in the ETR of ruling firms and 
non-ruling firms, a closer look at the development of the data over time in figure 1 indicates a 
first support for our hypothesis.  
Figure 1 illustrates the mean GAAP ETRs for ruling and non-ruling firms from 1999 
until 2014. The starting point for the GAAP ETRs of both groups lies at approximately 36 %. 
Seen in the long term, the GAAP ETR of ruling firms decreases only slightly more than that of 
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non-ruling firms. However, there is a remarkable gap between the two groups in the years 2009 
to 2011. Interestingly, most Luxembourg ATRs have been issued between 2008 and 2010 
(94.7 % of the 136 ruling firms’ published tax rulings).32 Therefore, the explorative analysis 
suggests a short-term treatment effect on ruling firms. Considering that both groups behave 
again similarly by the end of the observed period, a long-term effect seems less probable. 
Figure 1. GAAP ETR – Development over Time 
 
Notes: Figure 1 presents the mean values for GAAP ETR as tax avoidance measure in each observed year. It 
differentiates between ruling and non-ruling firms to show the differences in development over time. Variables are 
defined in table A1 of the appendix. 
Figure 2 also provides mean values of GAAP ETR for ruling and non-ruling firms. Here, 
we further distinguish between years 2009 to 2011 and other periods when almost no ruling 
became effective. We consider the years 2009 to 2011 as the likely ruling period33, because 
most ATRs were issued in 2008 to 2010. Moreover, we assume that the effect of a new ATR 
emerges in the year after the corresponding ruling. Figure 2 depicts that the mean GAAP ETR 
                                                 
32
 We manually checked all available ruling documents published by the ICIJ. As illustrated in table 2, the 136 
ruling firms of our sample engaged in a total of 171 ATRs, of which 25, 82 and 55 were issued in 2008, 2009, and 
2010, respectively. The remaining 9 rulings divide into 2002 to 2007. Note that in our analyses the ruling effect 
can occur after 2010 due to our definition of RULING PERIOD. Please refer to section 3.3.3 for a detailed 
explanation of RULING PERIOD. 
33
 We acknowledge that applying the exact ruling period (RULING PERIOD) would enhance the accuracy of the 
depicted mean ETRs. However, by employing the likely ruling period, we are able to compare the ETRs of 
treatment and control group in relation to the (likely) date of the ATR. Note that otherwise, by definition of 
RULING PERIOD, there would be only a non-ruling period for the control group. 
0,2
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0,32
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0,38
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for ruling firms decreases by 4.5 percentage points from 29.1 % to 24.6 % in the period in which 
rulings are the most likely. In the same period that is from 2009 to 2011, the mean GAAP ETR 
for non-ruling firms also decreased compared to other years, but the reduction amounts only to 
2.2 percentage points. Ruling firms clearly experience a more distinctive decline in ETR. The 
additional effect indicates again a relationship between ATRs and tax avoidance. 
Figure 2. GAAP ETR – Mean Values 
 
Notes: Figure 2 presents the mean values of GAAP ETR for ruling and non-ruling firms. It 
considers the values of the likely ruling period that is years 2009 to 2011, because most ATRs 
were issued in 2008 to 2010 (we expect an effect in the year after the ruling). All other years 
are unlikely ruling periods. Variables are defined in table A1 of the appendix. 
Defining ruling period more precisely, i.e., accounting for each firm’s individual first 
time ruling, leads to a significant decrease in GAAP ETR by 5.8 percentage points from 28.2 % 
to 22.4 %. Consequently, tax avoidance seems to be very pronounced for ruling firms during 
the respective ruling period implying that MNCs exploit this legally assured Luxembourg tax 
shelter. This explorative analysis of our sample strongly hints at a relationship between ATRs 
and tax avoidance and thus, offers a first endorsement of our expectation that engaging in an 
ATR allows to considerably reduce the firm’s ETR. Nevertheless, to provide convincing 
evidence a multivariate data analysis is needed. Therefore, in section 3.4, as described in the 
29.1% 29.0%
24.6%
26.8%
RULING FIRM NON-RULING FIRM
Unlikely Ruling Period Likely Ruling Period (2009-2011)
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subsequent research design, we will use regression analyses to further identify the effect of 
ATRs on tax avoidance. 
3.3.3 Research Design 
In accordance with our research question, we test the effect of ATRs in Luxembourg on 
tax avoidance by applying a fixed effects panel regression model. Equation (1) represents our 
standard empirical model that analyzes tax avoidance, defined as a decreasing ETR, through 
ATRs of firm i in year t.  
 =  + 
	()*+,	*!	&	%*'	   
+		&*. 	+ 	/	' 	+ 	0	%*+ +	1	)" + 2		 
	+	3		44  + 		44  +         (1) 
 RULING FIRM & PERIOD is an indicator variable, which equals 1 if ATRs of that firm 
have been uncovered by ICIJ and the ATR is expected to be effective during the year t. We 
account for the fact that ATRs have been issued in different years by manually checking the 
available documents for the date of the MNC’s first ATR. If a firm signed more than one ATR, 
we consider only the first ATR. RULING FIRM & PERIOD is our variable of interest. Its 
coefficient 
	captures the additional tax avoidance of ruling firms if the ATR is effective 
compared to non-ruling firms and the general time trend. We expect a significant negative 
effect, which would signify an increase in tax avoidance of ruling firms after the respective 
ATR and thus, support our hypothesis. Furthermore, in all our regressions, we include year 
fixed effects to control for the general time trend in tax avoidance and business cycle effects. 
Moreover, due to differing tax avoidance opportunities across industries (Balakrishnan, Blouin, 
and Guay, 2017), we include industry fixed effects according to the Fama and French 
classification of 17 different industry groups. In most specifications, we, however, consider 
firm fixed effects to completely eliminate time-invariant heterogeneity between the firms.  
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In our main analysis, we assume that the ATR is effective only in the year after the ATR 
was signed by the fiscal authority.34 Considering further years as ruling period makes it more 
difficult to clearly identify an effect of ATRs as other events or additional tax planning may 
affect our results. Nevertheless, in additional analyses, we further explore a potential long-term 
effect and test the robustness of our results to alternative definitions of the ruling period.  
Furthermore, we consider several determinants of tax avoidance that have been 
considered in previous literature.35 We consider SIZE measured as the logarithm of total assets. 
We have no clear prediction regarding the influence of SIZE on the ETR, because prior studies 
reveal a positive correlation (Plesko, 2003; Rego, 2003; Wang, 1991; Zimmermann, 1983) as 
well as a negative correlation (Chen et al., 2010). 
The variable ROA (return on assets) is a measure of profitability and defined as the 
quotient of pretax income and total assets. Profitable firms have higher incentives to engage in 
tax avoidance resulting in a negative correlation between tax avoidance, i.e., ETRs and 
profitability (Chen et al., 2010; Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Plesko, 2003). However, some 
studies find a positive correlation (Rego, 2003). 
CAPINT measured as property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets might also 
influence the ETR.36 A high level of capital intensity can cause a reduction in taxes due to 
higher depreciations (Gupta and Newberry, 1997). However, higher depreciations also affect 
pretax income, which can mitigate the negative correlation (Plesko, 2003). Higher capital 
intensity can further signify less mobility of taxable income. 
We further consider LEV,37 which is measured as the quotient of liabilities and total 
assets. Leverage also has an ambiguous influence on tax avoidance (Markle and Shackelford, 
                                                 
34
 We exclude the specific year of the ATR from our analysis as ATRs have been issued at different points of time 
during the year and thus, it is not clear whether or not we can already expect an effect of the ATR. 
35
 Compare table A1 of the appendix for variable definitions and table 1 for descriptive statistics of the variables. 
Further note that we require non-missing values for all components of the variables unless otherwise indicated. 
36
 We exclude observations with capital intensity higher than 1. 
37
 We exclude observations with leverage higher than 1. 
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2012b; Chen et al., 2010). According to prior research, high leverage results in deductibility of 
interest expenses and reduces tax expenses but it also reduces the pretax income (Hanlon and 
Heitzman, 2010). 
RD is defined as research and development expenses divided by total assets and set to 0 
if missing. The variable indicates high mobility of income (Grubert, 2003; Harris, 1993). 
Consequently, higher RD allows for more profit shifting opportunities and we expect a negative 
correlation between RD and the ETR. 
3.4 Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Regression Analyses 
The following empirical analyses test our research question as they explore the effect of 
engaging in an ATR in Luxembourg on tax avoidance of MNCs. We anticipate ruling firms to 
avoid taxes more effectively than non-ruling firms as we assume ATRs to be a method of 
corporate tax avoidance. Our main estimation results are presented in table 3. Robust standard 
errors clustered by firms are applied in all our analyses. Table A4 of the appendix shows that 
estimates with standard errors clustered by industry are consistent with reported results. 
In specifications (1) to (3), we use GAAP ETR as dependent variable. Specification (1) 
reports results considering only year and industry fixed effects as control variables. In 
specification (2), we add other determinants of tax planning as described in section 3.3.3. 
Specification (3) repeats the analysis of specification (2), however, instead of industry fixed 
effects, we apply firm fixed effects. Consequently, the variable RULING FIRM is omitted.38 
                                                 
38
 In further tests (cf. table A4 of the appendix), we employ additional control variables, such as a measure of 
income mobile (dummy for pharmaceuticals, computers, and services), of intangibles (intangible assets scaled by 
total assets), and of sales growth (increase in net turnover divided by last year’s net turnover). Furthermore, we 
control for the statutory tax rate (as found in the worldwide corporate tax summaries of PwC, KPMG, and EY) of 
the MNC’s home country and include squares of the employed variables. The measured effect on tax avoidance 
remains significant and the magnitude is mostly consistent with results reported in table 3. For the sake of clarity, 
we did not include the additional controls in our main analyses as some are similar to the ones already shown and 
others drastically reduce sample size due to data availability.  
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In all three specifications, the coefficient of RULING FIRM & PERIOD is negative and 
statistically significant. As we account for the possible downward trend over time by including 
year fixed effects in all our regression analyses, the results can be interpreted to imply that 
ruling firms’ GAAP ETR decreased significantly after the ATR. The magnitude of tax 
avoidance that the 136 considered ruling firms achieve by applying ATRs lies at a reduction of 
ETR by approximately 4 percentage points (coefficient: -0.0403). Considering the worldwide 
mean ETR of 28 % as displayed in table 1, this represents roughly 14 % less taxes that a 
corporation had to pay after engaging in an ATR. Looking for example at the case of Procter & 
Gamble, which reports an ETR of 29.7 % in the year prior to the ATR (implying $ 4.37 billion 
of income taxes)39, the approximate ETR reduction of 4 percentage points generates tax savings 
amounting to $ 590 million, ceteris paribus. Thus, the economic relevance of the detected effect 
becomes obvious as it enables MNCs to substantially reduce their tax expenses. The results are 
consistent with our hypothesis. Across all specifications, our results suggest that the ATR 
allows the MNC to implement successful tax avoidance strategies. The coefficient of RULING 
FIRM remains insignificant over specifications (1) and (2). Thus, we identify no general 
difference regarding the ETR between ruling and non-ruling firms irrespective of the ATR. 
In specifications (2) and (3), GAAP ETR is significantly and positively related to SIZE 
and CAPINT, but negatively related to ROA. Applying firm fixed effects yields a positive 
association with LEV. As we had no clear predictions, these findings are consistent with 
expectations from prior literature. Regarding RD in specifications (2) and (3), we find, as 
expected, a negative relation with our tax avoidance measure. Firms with high research & 
development are able to avoid more taxes. 
                                                 
39
 Data is taken from the 2007 annual report of Procter & Gamble, available at 
http://www.pginvestor.com/Cache/1001181146.PDF?O=PDF&T=&Y=&D=&FID=1001181146&iid=4004124. 
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Table 3. Main Regression Analyses 
Variables GAAP ETR add. rulings 2y. prior 2y. later CASH ETR FOREIGN ETR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
RULING FIRM & 
PERIOD 
-0.0441*** -0.0468*** -0.0403*** -0.0370*** -0.0190 -0.0013 -0.0277* -0.0159 
(0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0104) (0.0100) (0.0124) (0.0180) (0.0168) (0.0229) 
 
 
        
 
   
RULING FIRM 0.0069 -0.0068      
 
   
  
(0.0071) (0.0074)      
 
   
SIZE    0.0056*** 0.0144*** 0.0144*** 0.0145*** 0.0139*** 0.0179*** 0.0046 
 
 
  (0.0008) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0045) (0.0069) 
ROA    -0.0297*** -0.0582*** -0.0582*** -0.0583*** -0.0582*** -0.0916** -0.0865** 
 
 
  (0.0113) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0387) (0.0351) 
CAPINT    0.0148** 0.0283** 0.0283** 0.0277** 0.0273** 0.0448*** 0.0256 
 
 
  (0.0061) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0168) (0.0288) 
LEV    -0.0825*** 0.0748*** 0.0749*** 0.0755*** 0.0758*** 0.1010*** 0.0363 
 
 
  (0.0175) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0195) (0.0254) (0.0426) 
RD    -0.1680*** -0.0356 -0.0357 -0.0344 -0.0377 0.3520*** 0.1940 
 
 
  (0.0292) (0.0702) (0.0702) (0.0703) (0.0702) (0.0899) (0.1490) 
Year FE           
Industry FE       
 
  
Firm FE          
N  35,312 35,312 35,312 35,307 35,296 35,304 26,938 11,815 
Ruling Firms  136 136 136 136 136 136 66 26 
Adj. R2   0.028 0.042 0.436 0.436 0.435 0.435 0.337 0.394 
Notes: Table 3 presents the results of our main OLS regressions. Specifications (1) to (6) of table 3 present the results with GAAP ETR as dependent variable. In specifications (1) 
and (2), we apply year fixed effects as well as industry fixed effects and add general (SIZE, ROA, CAPINT, LEV) and international (RD) determinants of tax avoidance. In 
specification (3), we use firm fixed effects. In specification (4), the effect of a firm engaging in additional ATRs is accounted for by including the year following such an ATR 
in RULING FIRM & PERIOD. Specifications (5) and (6) shift the year of the ATR by two years. Specifications (7) and (8) use alternative measures of tax avoidance. In 
specification (8), the sample is limited to U.S. firms due to availability of data. The constant is not reported. Robust standard errors clustered by firms are shown in parentheses. 
FE are fixed effects. Variables are defined in table A1 of the appendix. *, **, and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively.
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In additional analyses, we perform several robustness tests to ensure the credibility of 
our main results.40 We consider the same sample as before and as described in section 3.3.1. 
Furthermore, we employ the same regression as in specification (3), i.e., using the same control 
variables and firm fixed effects. 
In specification (4), we account for the fact that some ruling firms requested more than 
one ATR. RULING FIRM & PERIOD is therefore also set to 1 for the year after each ATR if 
a firm signed additional ATRs.41 This definition assumes that each ATR affects the MNC’s tax 
avoidance. The result for the variable of interest is still negative and highly significant. 
Moreover, the magnitude of the point estimator (-0.0370) is very similar to our main result in 
specification (3) (-0.0403). 
With specifications (5) and (6), we test whether RULING FIRM & PERIOD truly 
captures the effect of the revealed ATRs. As placebo tests, we shift the year of the first ATR by 
two years in each direction.42 All other assumptions remain unchanged compared to our original 
definition of RULING FIRM & PERIOD. We expect no significant estimation coefficients. The 
results are consistent with our expectation and thus, suggest support for our hypothesis. 
As prior literature has applied diverse definitions of ETR as tax avoidance measure 
(Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2008; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; Hope, Ma, and Thomas, 
2013), we consider CASH ETR and FOREIGN ETR in specifications (7) and (8) of table 3. We 
expect a significant increase in tax avoidance (i.e., lower ETR) regardless of the chosen tax 
avoidance measure. 
We now also require non-missing values for different variables according to the 
alternative definitions.43 Requiring data for CASH ETR, which is the quotient of income taxes 
                                                 
40
 Results of additional robustness tests are shown in table A4 of the appendix. For example, most ATRs have been 
signed in 2009 and 2010. Limiting the sample to those firms confirms prior results.  
41
 If the year of the ATR does not simultaneously represent a year after another ATR, RULING FIRM & PERIOD 
is set to missing for that observation. As a result, our sample size is reduced by 5 observations. 
42
 Our sample size changes slightly as now other firm-year observations are set to missing. 
43
 Again, outliers, ETR<0 and ETR>1, are excluded.  
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paid and pretax income (Dyreng et al., 2008), reduces our sample in specification (7). The 
coefficient of interest is still significant (-0.0277). In specification (8), following Hope et al. 
(2013), we consider FOREIGN ETR, which is defined as foreign income taxes divided by 
foreign pretax income. Due to data availability, we limit our sample to firms headquartered in 
the U.S.. The result still indicates a negative relation between RULING FIRM & PERIOD and 
ETR (-0.0159), however, it is insignificant. The insignificance may be the result of the strongly 
decreased sample size as a re-estimation of the same sample using GAAP ETR also becomes 
less significant (cf. table A4 of the appendix). All things considered, the results in 
specifications (7) and (8) are in line with our expectation and are consistent with previous 
results as well as with our hypothesis.  
Our results suggest that by engaging in an ATR in Luxembourg, MNCs are able to 
significantly reduce their ETR compared to non-ruling firms, i.e., a single beneficial tax deal in 
a small tax haven can impact the worldwide corporate ETR. We conclude that ATRs represent 
a legally assured tax avoidance structure for MNCs. In subsequent sections we execute cross-
sectional analyses to further explore the identified effect and provide additional information on 
who benefits from ATRs. 
3.4.2 MNCs from Different Countries 
As described in section 3.3.1, most ruling firms are headquartered in the United States, 
followed by European countries like the United Kingdom or Germany. In recent years, in 
particular, U.S. MNCs, such as Apple Inc., Amazon Inc., and Wal-Mart Stores Inc., have been 
publicly criticized for their aggressive tax avoidance (e.g. Sheppard, 2015).44 Prior research 
suggests an influence of differing home country tax systems (Atwood et al., 2012). Due to, for 
example, different applicable CFC legislations, firms headquartered in the European Union 
                                                 
44
 See also BloombergBusiness (2015, June 17), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-
17/wal-mart-has-76-billion-in-overseas-tax-havens-report-says, and The New York Times (2012, April 28), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/business/apples-tax-strategy-aims-at-low-tax-states-and-
nations.html. 
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(EU) cannot as easily apply some of the known aggressive tax planning structures. However, 
having an available tax avoidance opportunity in its geographic center, EU firms might be able 
to engage in additional tax avoidance. 
Table 4. MNCs from Different Countries 
Dependent Variable: 
GAAP ETR 
U.S. Sample U.S. vs EU U.S. vs GBR U.S. vs DE 
1 2 3 4 5 
RULING FIRM &  -0.0332** -0.0460** -0.0335** -0.0328* -0.0350** 
PERIOD (0.0167) (0.0219) (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0169) 
 
 
  
  
 
  
RULING FIRM & 
PERIOD x NON-US 
    0.0088 0.0003 -0.0158 
    (0.0221) (0.0246) (0.0355) 
 
 
  
  
 
  
SIZE  0.0092** 0.0087* 0.0099*** 0.0121*** 0.0096** 
 
 
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0037) (0.0039) (0.0043) 
ROA  -0.1100*** -0.1100*** -0.1630*** -0.1450*** -0.1110*** 
 
 
(0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0322) (0.0301) (0.0245) 
CAPINT  0.0150 0.0164 0.0347** 0.0207 0.0254 
 
 
(0.0181) (0.0182) (0.0154) (0.0167) (0.0163) 
LEV  0.0724*** 0.0729*** 0.0688*** 0.0734*** 0.0558** 
 
 
(0.0261) (0.0262) (0.0224) (0.0233) (0.0245) 
RD  -0.0536 -0.0587 -0.1110 -0.0997 -0.0957 
 
 
(0.1070) (0.1070) (0.0780) (0.0843) (0.0906) 
NOL  -0.0047 -0.0044  
  
    (0.0029) (0.0029)  
  
Year FE       
Firm FE       
N  17,419 17,311 27,291 24,183 19,919 
Ruling Firms 46 34 110 69 56 
Adj. R2   0.392 0.391 0.389 0.393 0.378 
Notes: Table 4 analyzes the effect of ATRs on MNCs from different countries. Specifications (1) and (2) account 
for U.S. firms only. Specification (2) accounts for the possible influence of a newly created Luxembourg 
subsidiary. Specifications (3) to (5) show the effect of ATRs on non-U.S. firms compared to U.S. firms. The 
variable NON-US includes European, British, and German firms in specification (3), (4), and (5), respectively. 
Other variables are defined in table A1 of the appendix. FE are fixed effects. The constant is not reported. Robust 
standard errors clustered by firms are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 
5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
In table 4, we therefore analyze subsamples including firms from different countries. At 
first, we consider only U.S. firms and then, compare European, British, and German firms to 
the U.S. sample. The U.S. sample, examined in specification (1), includes 46 ruling firms. The 
point estimate for RULING FIRM & PERIOD is negative and significant (-0.0332). Hence, the 
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result for U.S. firms implies a decrease in GAAP ETR by approximately 3.3 percentage points 
and thus, an increase in tax avoidance, which is consistent with our main findings. 
Given that our data solely consists of Luxembourg ATRs, one might argue that the 
measured effect is highly influenced by having a Luxembourg, i.e., a tax haven subsidiary. To 
ensure that we measure only the additional effect of ATRs on tax avoidance, we manually check 
the subsidiaries45 of the U.S. firms in the years prior to and the year of the ATR. Excluding 
firms that first reported a Luxembourg subsidiary in the year of the ATR, we detect a similar 
significant effect in specification (2). As expected, we find evidence that U.S. firms, which are 
usually known for their aggressive tax planning, also exploit this tax avoidance structure and 
reduce their tax payments through ATRs in Luxembourg. 
Specifications (3) to (5) compare non-U.S. firms to the just considered U.S. sample. 
Throughout all three specifications, the point estimate for RULING FIRM & PERIOD is 
negative and significant suggesting an increase in tax avoidance by more than 3 percentage 
points, which is consistent with the result in specification (1). An interaction term (RULING 
FIRM & PERIOD x NON-US) presents possible differences between the MNCs from different 
countries. We find no significant difference between the MNCs from different countries as the 
employed interaction term remains insignificant in specifications (3) to (5) of table 4. Neither 
the EU as a whole nor firms from large economies (Germany and United Kingdom) exhibit 
significant differences. The results are consistent with our expectation that firms headquartered 
in the EU also take advantage of Luxembourg ATRs as method of tax avoidance. The results 
indicate that MNCs benefit from ATRs in all subsamples irrespective of the corresponding 
headquarter location, suggesting that the decision to employ an ATR is not influenced by the 
home country tax system. Results in table A5 of the appendix are in line with this suggestion 
as they show no significant difference between countries who employ the worldwide tax system 
                                                 
45
 Subsidiary information is taken from Exhibit 21 of form 10-k, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html. 
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and countries employing the territorial tax system.46 The varying tax planning opportunities 
seem to have no influence with regard to the effectiveness of ATRs. 
3.4.3 Long-Term Effect of Advance Tax Rulings 
So far, we have identified a short-term effect of ATRs on tax payments of MNCs. If we 
consider more than one post-ruling year, clear identification of an effect of ATRs becomes more 
difficult. Similar to event study analyses, other unobserved events or even additional tax 
planning activities of the firms included in our control group could affect the analyzed tax 
avoidance measures. Furthermore, MNCs change over time. Consequently, the structure 
assured by the ATR may no longer achieve the optimum or MNCs are no longer able to 
effectively employ the set structure. However, intuitively, one would expect ATRs to last for 
several years. Thus, considering that it is not absolutely clear for how long an ATR might affect 
the firm’s ETR, we modify our original model as described in section 3.3.3 by using ceteris 
paribus two alternative long-term definitions of the variable RULING FIRM & PERIOD. 
We repeat the analysis as shown in specification (3) of table 3 for the respective 
alterations and the sample derived in section 3.3.1. None of the modifications change the 
number of ruling firms in our treatment group. The results of the additional analyses are 
reported in table 5. In specifications (1) and (2), we expand our previous short-term definition, 
which sets RULING FIRM & PERIOD equal to 1 for the year after the first ATR. In 
specification (1), we include the year in which the ATR was signed as there may be already a 
slight effect immediately after the request was signed by fiscal authorities as well as the third 
year. It tests if the ATR is effective within three years. Consistent with our hypothesis, the 
coefficient of RULING FIRM & PERIOD is negative and significant. Inferences as well as the 
point estimator (-0.0187) decrease in absolute values compared to our short-term result in 
specification (3) of table 3. Nevertheless, the result shows that all ruling firms reached tax 
                                                 
46
 We consider the in our sample represented countries if they apply the same tax system throughout the observed 
time period. 
93 
 
payments over a three-year period that are on average 1.9 percentage points lower than those 
of firms that did not employ ATRs. 
In specification (2), we propose an even longer effect of ATRs on tax avoidance. The 
dummy variable RULING FIRM & PERIOD is set to 1 for all years after the respective ATR. 
The point estimate for the variable of interest is negative but statistically insignificant. An 
interesting question is whether this concerns all MNCs or if some firms might actually benefit 
for a long period of time. In specifications (3) to (8), we therefore execute some cross-sectional 
sample splits. 
Most ATRs in our sample have been issued during the financial crisis. During these 
times, financial firms were more likely to suffer profit setbacks which could explain a lower 
ETR. For the same reason, they might have needed ATRs only for means of tax certainty. 
Consequently, we expect no long-term effect on the ETR. Consistent with that expectation, we 
find a negative and significant point estimator (-0.0300) only for non-financial firms in 
specification (4) of table 5. In specifications (5) and (6), we analyze subsamples of non-financial 
firms by considering business-to-consumer (B2C) and business-to-business (B2B) firms.47 We 
identify a long-term reduction of ETRs for B2C firms of more than 5 percentage points 
(-0.0512). 
                                                 
47
 Industries are based on the Fama and French 17 industries classification, where B2C includes industries 1 (food), 
4 (textiles, apparel, and footware), 5 (consumer durables), 7 (drugs, soap, perfums, and tobacco), 12 (automobiles), 
and 15 (retail stores), and B2B industries 2 (mining and minerals), 3 (oil and petroleum products), 6 (chemicals), 
8 (construction and construction materials), 9 (steel works), 10 (fabricated products), 11 (machinery and business 
equipment), 13 (transportation), and 14 (utilities). 
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Table 5. Potential Long-Term Effect of ATRs 
Dependent Variable: 
GAAP ETR 
3 years long-term financial non-financial B2C B2B capital intensive non-cap. intensive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
RULING FIRM & 
PERIOD 
-0.0187* -0.0162 0.0202 -0.0300** -0.0512** 0.0138 -0.0399*** 0.0111 
(0.0098) (0.0108) (0.0188) (0.0124) (0.0200) (0.0172) (0.0112) (0.0191) 
 
 
       
    
SIZE  0.0142*** 0.0142*** 0.0083 0.0148*** 0.0127** 0.0183*** 0.0173*** 0.0132*** 
 
 
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0073) (0.0034) (0.0060) (0.0058) (0.0045) (0.0042) 
ROA  -0.0584*** -0.0584*** -0.2450*** -0.0526*** -0.0358* -0.0487 -0.0443** -0.0775** 
 
 
(0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0587) (0.0184) (0.0188) (0.0308) (0.0222) (0.0316) 
CAPINT  0.0273** 0.0273** 0.0923 0.0258** 0.0005 0.0480*** 0.0459*** 0.0168 
 
 
(0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0829) (0.0125) (0.0244) (0.0180) (0.0141) (0.0282) 
LEV  0.0755*** 0.0753*** 0.0351 0.0857*** 0.0985** 0.1150*** 0.0930*** 0.0625** 
 
 
(0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0466) (0.0212) (0.0420) (0.0350) (0.0289) (0.0261) 
RD  -0.0355 -0.0357 0.4070* -0.0423 -0.0655 -0.1060 -0.0514 -0.0220 
    (0.0702) (0.0702) (0.2130) (0.0708) (0.1850) (0.1100) (0.0921) (0.1040) 
Year FE          
Firm FE          
N  35,399 35,399 4,160 31,239 7,420 12,063 18,556 16,843 
Ruling Firms 136 136 46 90 31 28 63 73 
Adj. R2   0.435 0.435 0.570 0.410 0.458 0.387 0.403 0.461 
Notes: Table 5 presents the results of full sample and cross-sectional OLS regressions with GAAP ETR as dependent variable and long-term definitions of RULING FIRM & 
PERIOD. Specifications (1) and (2) employ the full sample and expand the period in which the ATR affects the MNC’s ETR. Specification (1) shows the three-year effect 
including the year of the first ATR. Specification (2) additionally includes all following years. Specifications (3) to (8) present cross-sectional sample splits to further explore 
the long-term effect as proposed in specification (2). Industries are based on the Fama and French 17 industries classification, where B2C includes industries 1, 4, 5, 7, 12, and 
15, and B2B industries 2, 3, 6, 8 to 11, 13, and 14. Specifications (7) and (8) are formed based on the mean value of CAPINT. Thus, capital intensive firms are firms with 
CAPINT>0.31. Robust standard errors clustered by firms are shown in parentheses. The constant is not reported. FE are fixed effects. Variables are defined in table A1 of the 
appendix. *, **, and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively.
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Usually, MNCs with mobile income are able to shift income and thus, avoid taxes more 
easily. In specifications (7) and (8), we differentiate MNCs according to their level of capital 
intensity. We consider a firm as capital intensive if the value of CAPINT is above the mean of 
all ruling firms (0.31). Interestingly, we find a long-term reduction of ETRs of 4 percentage 
points only for capital intensive firms (-0.0399). This implies that ATRs might have been used 
especially by MNCs that do not have the chance of tax avoidance under normal circumstances. 
Overall, our results suggest that ATRs are in fact effective for three years. Certain MNCs, 
surprisingly those that are usually expected to engage in less tax avoidance, achieve an even 
longer effect. Even though we show some support for a long-term effect (three years) of about 
2 percentage points, we might still underestimate the effect of ATRs. Its true magnitude and 
length may be even bigger, because we cannot guarantee that the control group does not include 
firms that have also signed an ATR in Luxembourg or somewhere else. 
3.4.4 Matched-Sample Analysis 
A restriction to our standard empirical model might be the potential endogeneity of a 
firm’s status as ruling firm. As presented in equation (1), we expect that if a firm decides to get 
an ATR, the ATR will influence the firm’s tax avoidance. Admittedly, the MNC’s existing tax 
avoidance strategy might as well influence the decision to become a ruling firm. Having noticed 
that possibly only tax aggressive firms request an ATR, we account for this potential self-
selection bias in a matched-sample analysis. 
Propensity score matching is a feasible technique to address the potential bias caused by 
selection on observables (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Titus, 2007).48 Its notion is to select a 
control group (non-ruling firms) that is as similar to the treatment group (ruling firms) as 
                                                 
48
 The self-selection bias has been discussed extensively in prior research (e.g. Tucker, 2010). Many studies 
implement either an instrumental variable or apply the two-step Heckman procedure using Inverse Mill’s Ratio 
(Dwenger and Steiner, 2012; Badertscher, Katz, and Rego, 2013). Basically, both methods require an instrument, 
which explains the potentially endogenous variable, but has no effect on the dependent variable. This requirement 
equals the major limitation as it is difficult to have a consistent estimator, i.e., a variable that neither correlates 
with the outcome nor with any unobservables (Heckman, 1997; Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000; Heckman and Li, 
2004). 
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possible. For the selection, we employ firm characteristics that are commonly known to 
describe a MNC’s tendency towards tax avoidance. Results of two-sample t-tests of the 
employed variables are shown in table A6 of the appendix. They indicate mostly highly 
significant differences between treatment and control group. Solely the tests for ROA and 
CAPINT fall just short of being significant. However, generating two almost identical groups 
via matching, we expect them to have or rather develop the same tax planning behavior. 
Consequently, ruling firms are not more tax aggressive than non-ruling firms. The only 
difference between the groups lies in the treatment decision, i.e., engaging in an ATR or not. 
Since the assumption is to have two equally tax aggressive groups, the results show the effect 
of ATRs on tax avoidance. 
However, as propensity score matching selects the control group based on observable 
variables only, omitted variables may negatively influence the matching quality and 
subsequently our result. To mitigate this problem, we combine propensity score matching with 
a difference-in-differences approach, because the latter accounts for time-invariant 
unobservables (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd, 1998), 
which in our setting, may be the tax advisor or the executive’s preference regarding tax 
certainty. Thus, we select a control group, which is as similar as possible to our ruling firms, 
via propensity score matching. Then, we apply difference-in-differences on the newly matched 
sample to estimate the effect of ATRs on tax avoidance of MNCs.  
With respect to propensity score matching, we further decrease our original sample by 
imposing another prerequisite. As we match in the year prior to the ATR and compare that 
year’s ETR with the ETR the year after the ATR, we require available observations in those 
two years. This restricts our treatment group to 70 ruling firms, however, we are left with a 
balanced panel for the subsequent difference-in-differences analysis. 
According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), the first step of propensity score matching 
involves a probit model to estimate the propensity score, i.e., the probability of becoming a 
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ruling firm. In the matching sample, all ATRs as well as mergers and acquisitions took place 
between 2003 and 2011. As we match based on the year before, we estimate the propensity 
score for the years 2002 to 2010. We include the previously used and discussed determinants 
of tax avoidance in the probit regression. Additionally, we include an indicator of income 
mobile industries.49 The regression results (cf. table A7 of the appendix) show the influence of 
the different firm characteristics on the propensity score and thus, the likelihood of being a 
ruling firm. It seems that mainly large and profitable firms engage in ATRs.50 
In the second step, we apply one-to-five nearest neighbor matching and thus, match each 
ruling firm to a maximum of five non-ruling firms depending on how many suitable neighbors 
can be found. The match occurs based on the propensity score derived in the first step in the 
year directly preceding the ATR. We require a difference in propensity scores of less than 
0.02.51 Further, we ensure that only observations from the same year as well as only firms 
headquartered in the same country will be matched.52 The overall good matching quality is 
verified in table 6. Comparing the means of the matching variables between ruling and non-
ruling firms before and after the matching, it shows that for most characteristics the bias has 
been drastically reduced. 
                                                 
49
 We use SIC codes to compute the variable (De Simone, Mills, and Stomberg, 2014) and classify the following 
three-digit SIC codes as income mobile industries: 283 (Pharmaceutical), 357, 367, 737 (Computers) and 738 
(Services). 
50
 In table A8 of the appendix, we repeated our subsequent one-to-five nearest neighbor matched-sample analysis 
with a focus on large and profitable firms by additionally including the squares of SIZE and ROA in the propensity 
score. Results are similar to the ones reported in table 7 (significant estimator of 0.030), matching quality, however, 
decreases. 
51
 According to Austin (2011), the optimal caliper width lies at 20 % of the standard deviation of the propensity 
score and calipers equal to 0.02 or 0.03 show superior performance. Following Lunt (2014) who states that the 
caliper should not be too low in order to avoid additional selection bias by drastically reducing the available control 
group, we set the width to 0.02. However, further results in table A8 of the appendix based on the chosen one-to-
five nearest neighbor matching are robust to applying no caliper or widths of 0.01 (20 % of the standard deviation) 
and 0.03. 
52
 Additional tests (cf. table A8 of the appendix), in which we only ensure same-year observations or additionally 
ensure that firms from the same industry are matched, provide results that are roughly consistent with the reported 
results in table 7. However, changing the propensity score decreases matching quality and thus, results do not as 
well mitigate the potential bias. 
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Table 6. One-to-Five Nearest Neighbor Matching Quality 
Nearest 
Neighbor 1:5 
  Mean  Bias t-test 
  Treated Control Bias Reduction t p>t 
SIZE Unmatched 9.7971 6.8743 144.4 %  12.22 0.000 
 Matched 9.6690 9.6672 0.1 % 99.9 % 0.01 0.996 
ROA Unmatched 0.0877 0.1050 -15.9 %  -1.06 0.287 
 Matched 0.0902 0.0892 0.9 % 94.3 % 0.08 0.939 
CAPINT Unmatched 0.3453 0.3595 -5.3 %  -0.45 0.654 
 Matched 0.3551 0.3615 -2.4 % 55.4 % -0.13 0.899 
LEV Unmatched 0.0626 0.0484 19.7 %  1.52 0.128 
 Matched 0.0643 0.0653 -1.4 % 92.7 % -0.07 0.942 
INCOME 
MOBILE 
Unmatched 0.1714 0.1774 -1.6 %  -0.13 0.896 
Matched 0.1765 0.1694 1.9 % -18.7 % 0.11 0.914 
RD Unmatched 0.0157 0.0215 -15.2 %  -1.13 0.258 
  Matched 0.0161 0.0161 0.0 % 99.8 % 0.00 0.998 
Notes: Table 6 compares the means of the relevant matching characteristics between ruling and non-ruling firms 
before and after the matching. The control group is determined by the propensity score in the year prior to the 
ATR. The results are formed on one-to-five nearest neighbor matching requiring a difference in propensity score 
of less than 0.02. Variables are defined in table A1 of the appendix. 
Via propensity score matching, we find a total of 303 matching partners for the 70 ruling 
firms. In our next step, we test the effect of ATRs in this setting. Table 7 presents the difference-
in-differences results with robust standard errors clustered by firms. The first row represents 
the one-to-five nearest neighbor matching with GAAP ETR as dependent variable. The column 
‘Baseline’ compares the ETRs of ruling and non-ruling firms in the matching year. We do not 
find a significant difference. This is consistent with our assumption that matched ruling and 
non-ruling firms are equally tax aggressive prior to the ATR and consequently, the possible 
self-selection bias is mitigated. The column ‘Follow Up’ presents the difference between the 
two groups in the year after the ATR. The point estimate (-0.043) indicates that ruling firms 
have significantly smaller ETRs after the ruling than non-ruling firms. The last column 
describes the actual difference-in-differences estimator, which is negative and significant. The 
coefficient (-0.034) suggests a decline of the ETR by about 3.4 percentage points if an ATR 
was signed. The result is consistent with findings in our prior analyses and with our hypothesis. 
To assure that our result is not based on the chosen matching algorithm, we additionally 
test one-to-one nearest neighbor matching, which results in a significant coefficient of -0.053, 
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and kernel matching, which gives us a much bigger sample size (21,655 observations in the 
control group) as it uses weighted averages of the control firms. Kernel matching also yields a 
similar, negative, and significant result (-0.024). 
Table 7. Difference-in-Differences Results after Matching 
GAAP ETR Baseline Follow Up Diff-in-
Diff Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) 
1:5 NN 0.271 0.262 -0.008 0.277 0.234 -0.043*** -0.034** 
    (0.015)    (0.014) (0.014) 
1:1 NN 0.268 0.262 -0.006 0.294 0.234 -0.060*** -0.053** 
    (0.021)    (0.022) (0.021) 
Kernel 0.282 0.262 -0.020 0.278 0.234 -0.044*** -0.024** 
      (0.013)     (0.011) (0.012) 
Notes: Table 7 presents difference-in-differences (Diff-in-Diff) results after one-to-five, one-to-one nearest 
neighbor, and kernel matching by showing the mean outcome (GAAP ETR as defined in table A1 of the appendix) 
for the treated and control group before and after the ATR as well as its difference. The treatment group includes 
70 observations and the control group 303, 68, and 21,655 respectively. ‘Baseline’ refers to the year preceding the 
ATR and ‘Follow Up’ to the year directly following the ATR. Robust standard errors clustered by firms are shown 
in parentheses. *, **, and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
 Moreover, the results are robust to alternative tax avoidance measures as respective 
results in table A8 of the appendix show similar, significant coefficients for CASH ETR. 
Applying FOREIGN ETR or limiting the GAAP ETR sample to U.S. firms results in very few 
left treatment observations and thus, insignificant difference-in-differences estimators. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Tax avoidance has been discussed extensively in prior research. Contrariwise, tax 
avoidance through ATRs is widely unexplored. Recently, the ICIJ has attracted notice to ATRs 
by releasing hundreds of secret tax deals with Luxembourg tax authorities. The European 
Commission launched a ‘Tax Transparency Package’ and the OECD initiative against BEPS 
addressed ATRs in its final reports. In line with the public criticism of LuxLeaks and a certain 
type of ATRs, we expect that MNCs can enhance their tax avoidance by engaging in an ATR. 
Using fixed effects panel regressions, we examine the reduction in ETRs that ruling firms 
experience after their respective ATR compared to non-ruling firms. The LuxLeaks data 
provides us with the necessary information about firms imvolved in ATRs. Imposing our data 
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requirements, we finally include the data of 136 ruling firms. Our empirical analysis shows that 
the additional effect of ATRs in Luxembourg on the multinationals’ ETRs consists of a decline 
by about 4 percentage points. The result might be biased due to possible endogeneity. To 
mitigate this limitation, we perform a matched-sample analysis which yields consistent results. 
The identified short-term effect may, nevertheless, be a minimum effect as we may 
underestimate its impact due to a slightly imperfect control group. That means the true 
magnitude and length of the effect of ATRs on tax avoidance may be even more pronounced. 
Additional analyses suggest that after three years, the effect still amounts to almost 2 percentage 
points. A longer effect can, however, only be identified for business-to-consumer and capital 
intensive firms. Nevertheless, the significant reduction implies that MNCs avoid taxes through 
ATRs and thus, exploit the legally assured tax structures. Moreover, the results hint at a 
distortion of competition as Luxembourg acts as tax haven through administrative practices for 
selected MNCs. Our findings are robust to different firm-level control variables and diverse 
robustness tests. Consequently, we conclude that MNCs use ATRs in tax havens as a method 
of tax avoidance. Although our results consider the unique case of LuxLeaks, policymakers 
should be generally aware that some MNCs together with fiscal authorities exploit ATRs to 
drastically reduce their tax payments.
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Appendix 
Figure A1. Timeline of Events Associated with LuxLeaks 
 
Notes: Figure A1 shows a timeline with events that are associated with LuxLeaks. The actual revelation of 
documents took place on November 5th and December 9th 2014. 
Table A1. Variable Definitions 
Tax Avoidance Measures 
GAAP ETR txt / (pi – xi), i.e., income taxes divided by pretax income, 
adjusted for extraordinary items (set to 0 if missing); exclude 
outliers 
CASH ETR txpd / pi, i.e., income taxes paid divided by pretax income; 
exclude outliers 
FOREIGN ETR txfo / pifo, i.e., foreign income taxes divided by foreign pretax 
income; exclude outliers 
 
Determinants of Tax Avoidance 
SIZE log (at), i.e., logarithm of total assets 
ROA (Return on Assets) pi / at, i.e., pretax income divided by total assets 
CAPINT (Capital 
Intensity) 
ppegt / at, i.e., total property, plant, and equipment divided by 
total assets; exclude CAPINT>1 
LEV (Leverage) dlc / at, i.e., debt in current liabilities divided by total assets; 
exclude LEV>1 
RD (Research & 
Development) 
xrd / at, i.e., research and development expense divided by total 
assets (set to 0 if missing xrd) 
NOL (Net Operating 
Loss) 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if tax-loss carryforward (tlcf) at the 
end of the previous year is bigger than current tlcf 
 
Identifier of Ruling Firms 
RULING FIRM Dummy, which is 1 if ATRs of the company were published by 
ICIJ, and 0 otherwise 
RULING FIRM & 
PERIOD 
Dummy, which equals 1 if the ATR of that ruling firm is 
expected to be effective in that year 
Notes: Table A1 shows variable definitions. Firm data is taken from Compustat North America and Compustat 
Global. Compustat data items are in italic. 
February 2015: 
Creation of TAXE 
Committee 
November 5th 2014: 
1st LuxLeaks publication 
October 2010: 
Discovery of 
documents 
Summer 2011: 
First press contact 
May 11th 2012: 
French TV 
broadcast 
April 2014: 
Begin of 
investigations 
December 9th 2014: 
2nd LuxLeaks 
publication 
March 2015: 
Tax Transparency 
Package 
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Table A2. Data Development 
Description All Firms Treatment Group Firms Firm-Years Firms Firm-Years 
ICIJ Ruling Firms - - 345 - 
Available in Databases - - 164 - 
Observed Time Period 60,452 564,563 162 2,197 
Available Ruling Document 60,450 564,533 160 2,167 
Delete Japanese Firms 56,034 515,905 158 2,142 
Delete Negative Pretax Income 44,584 334,973 156 1,816 
Non-Missing GAAP ETR 43,282 306,364 156 1,714 
Delete Outliers 43,071 301,484 156 1,683 
Non-Missing Control Variables 37,105 226,819 136 1,327 
MNCs from Treated Countries 5,774 35,399 136 1,327 
Exclude first year of ATR 5,774 35,312 136 1,240 
Notes: Table A2 plots the data development of the whole sample as well as of the treatment group, i.e., ruling 
firms. Variables are defined in table A1 of the appendix. 
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Table A3. Correlation Matrix 
Variable GAAP ETR 
CASH 
ETR 
FOREIGN 
ETR 
RULING 
FIRM 
RULING 
PERIOD SIZE ROA CAPINT LEV RD NOL Industry 
GAAP ETR 1.0000            
CASH ETR 0.3635 1.0000           
FOREIGN ETR 0.2975 0.2494 1.0000          
RULING FIRM -0.0346 -0.0027 -0.0030 1.0000         
RULING 
PERIOD -0.0321 -0.0077 -0.0096 0.2857 1.0000        
SIZE -0.0629 0.0027 -0.0551 0.2083 0.0756 1.0000       
ROA -0.0393 -0.0628 -0.0550 -0.0069 -0.0084 -0.0709 1.0000      
CAPINT 0.0281 0.0405 0.0409 -0.0198 -0.0141 0.0270 0.0171 1.0000     
LEV 0.0086 0.0261 0.0154 0.0985 0.0130 0.2072 -0.0610 -0.0453 1.0000    
RD -0.1968 -0.1697 -0.1107 -0.0448 -0.0133 -0.2209 0.0411 -0.1566 -0.1190 1.0000   
NOL -0.0426 -0.0927 -0.0524 -0.0060 0.0007 -0.0285 -0.0042 -0.0311 -0.0334 0.0673 1.0000  
Industry 0.0060 -0.0423 0.0324 -0.0073 0.0079 -0.0699 -0.0462 -0.2690 -0.0259 0.1297 0.0000 1.0000 
Notes: Table A3 shows a correlation matrix of all variables included in the main regression analyses as well as the additionally employed measures of tax avoidance. Furthermore, 
we include NOL in the matrix as an important variable for the U.S. subsample. Variables are defined in table A1 of the appendix. 
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Table A4. Robustness Tests to Main Analysis 
Dependent 
Variable: 
GAAP ETR 
Standard Errors Additional Controls Late ATR 
Re-
estimation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
RULING FIRM 
& PERIOD 
-0.0468*** -0.0403** -0.0397*** -0.0324*** -0.0285*** -0.0418*** -0.0304* 
(0.0107) (0.0148) (0.0119) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0114) (0.0167) 
           
RULING FIRM -0.0068          
 
 (0.0110)          
SIZE  0.0056*** 0.0144*** -0.0055*** 0.0056 0.0612*** 0.0146*** -0.0007 
 
 (0.0012) (0.0029) (0.0008) (0.0040) (0.0110) (0.0031) (0.0050) 
ROA  -0.0297*** -0.0582** -0.0246** -0.1330** -0.2650*** -0.0580*** -0.1250*** 
 
 (0.0058) (0.0243) (0.0106) (0.0526) (0.0229) (0.0196) (0.0239) 
CAPINT  0.0148 0.0283** 0.0160*** 0.0423** -0.0032 0.0280** -0.0035 
 
 (0.0168) (0.0112) (0.0059) (0.0169) (0.0445) (0.0124) (0.0210) 
LEV  -0.0825* 0.0748*** 0.0302* 0.0898*** 0.0462 0.0754*** 0.0600** 
 
 (0.0459) (0.0185) (0.0180) (0.0237) (0.0391) (0.0195) (0.0281) 
RD  -0.1680*** -0.0356 -0.3320*** -0.0306 0.1640 -0.0379 0.0267 
 
 (0.0520) (0.0437) (0.0325) (0.0874) (0.1020) (0.0701) (0.1250) 
INCOME 
MOBILE 
   -0.0151***       
   (0.0039)       
INTANGIBLES 
   0.0677*** 0.0188 0.0361    
 
    (0.0076) (0.0168) (0.0343)    
SALES 
GROWTH 
   -0.0006*** -0.0001 -0.0003    
   (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0021)    
STATUTORY 
TAX RATE 
   0.3340*** 0.1070 0.6300    
    (0.0187) (0.0743) (0.5030)    
Polynomials 
             
Year FE         
Industry FE        
Firm FE         
N  35,312 35,312 25,893 25,893 25,893 35,138 11,815 
Ruling Firms 136 136 102 102 102 119 26 
Adj. R2   0.042 0.436 0.084 0.381 0.389 0.437 0.404 
Notes: Table A4 shows the results of several robustness tests to our main analyses in table 3. Specifications (1) 
and (2) employ standard errors clustered by industry. In specifications (3) to (5), we include additional controls. 
Specification (6) performs the regression for a subsample of ruling firms that have signed their ATR in either 2009 
or 2010. Specification (7) re-estimates the FOREIGN ETR subsample with GAAP ETR as dependent variable. 
Robust standard errors clustered by firms are shown in parentheses, except for specifications (1) and (2). INCOME 
MOBILE is a dummy for pharmaceuticals, computers, and services. INTANGIBLES is defined as intangible assets 
over total assets. SALES GROWTH is the increase in net turnover divided by last year’s turnover. STATUTORY 
TAX RATE is the country’s corporate tax rate as found in the worldwide tax summaries of PwC, KPMG, and EY. 
Polynomials include the squares of all other variables in the regression. Other variables are defined in table A1 of 
the appendix. The constant is not reported. FE are fixed effects. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 
10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively. 
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Table A5. Worldwide versus Territorial Tax System 
Variable GAAP ETR 
1 2 
RULING FIRM &  -0.0426*** -0.0540*** 
PERIOD (0.0148) (0.0198) 
 
 
  
 
RULING FIRM &  PERIOD 
x WOLRDWIDE 
0.0056 0.0146 
(0.0209) (0.0247) 
 
 
  
 
SIZE  0.0147*** 0.0130*** 
 
 
(0.0031) (0.00334) 
ROA  -0.0579*** -0.0472*** 
 
 
(0.0196) (0.0162) 
CAPINT  0.0278** 0.0243* 
 
 
(0.0124) (0.0129) 
LEV  0.0768*** 0.0702*** 
 
 
(0.0195) (0.0211) 
RD  -0.0424 -0.0154 
    (0.0699) (0.0808) 
Year FE    
Firm FE    
N  35,060 29,295 
Ruling Firms 135 111 
Adj. R2   0.432 0.446 
Notes: Table A4 analyzes the effect of ATRs on MNCs headquartered 
in a country applying the worldwide tax system versus the territorial tax 
system. Specification (2) excludes the countries which switch their tax 
system in the sample period. Variables are defined in table A1 of the 
appendix. Robust standard errors clustered by firms are shown in 
parentheses. The constant is not reported. FE are firm fixed effects. *, 
**, and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, 
respectively. 
Table A6. Two-Sample T-Tests before Matching Procedure 
Variable Non-Ruling Firms Ruling Firms Two-Sample T-Test 
Mean Std. err. Mean Std. err. Difference Std. err. 
SIZE 6.7123 0.0134 9.9379 0.0902 -3.2256*** 0.0839 
ROA 0.1095 0.0035 0.0853 0.0032 0.0242 0.0216 
CAPINT 0.3486 0.0018 0.3332 0.0114 0.0154 0.0115 
LEV 0.0482 0.0005 0.0595 0.0028 -0.0113*** 0.0033 
INCOME MOBILE 0.1826 0.0025 0.1483 0.0141 0.0344** 0.0155 
RD 0.0223 0.0003 0.0137 0.0011 0.0086*** 0.0019 
Notes: Table A6 shows the results of two-sample t-tests before the matching to identify differences between ruling 
and non-ruling firms. Variables are defined in table A1 of the appendix. *, **, and *** show significance at the 
level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
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Table A7. Probit Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: RULING FIRM 
SIZE 0.294*** 
 (0.011) 
ROA 0.121*** 
 (0.040) 
CAPINT 0.209*** 
 (0.075) 
LEV -0.389 
 (0.282) 
INCOME MOBILE  0.275*** 
(0.066) 
RD -1.583** 
  (0.746) 
Notes: Table A7 presents the probit regression results 
used for the prediction of our propensity score. 
Dependent variable is a dummy variable which is defined 
as 1 for ruling firms. Variables are defined in table A1 of 
the appendix. *, ** and *** show significance at the level 
of 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively. 
Table A8. Robustness Tests to Diff-in-Diff after Matching 
Nearest 
Neighbor 1:5 
Baseline Follow Up Diff-in-
Diff Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) 
Large and 
Profitable 
0.269 0.262 -0.007 0.272 0.234 -0.037*** -0.030** 
   (0.015)    (0.014) (0.014) 
No Caliper 0.273 0.262 -0.011 0.276 0.234 -0.042*** -0.031** 
    (0.015)    (0.014) (0.014) 
Caliper of 0.01 0.269 0.262 -0.007 0.274 0.234 -0.039*** -0.032** 
    (0.015)    (0.014) (0.014) 
Caliper of 0.03 0.270 0.262 -0.008 0.276 0.234 -0.042*** -0.033** 
    (0.015)    (0.014) (0.014) 
Same Year 
Only 
0.271 0.262 -0.009 0.276 0.234 -0.042*** -0.033** 
   (0.015)    (0.014) (0.014) 
Same Industry 0.295 0.262 -0.033* 0.278 0.234 -0.044*** -0.010 
    (0.017)    (0.015) (0.015) 
CASH ETR 0.233 0.272 0.038* 0.250 0.233 -0.017 -0.055*** 
    (0.022)    (0.023) (0.028) 
FOREIGN 
ETR 
0.284 0.261 -0.023 0.290 0.260 -0.031 -0.008 
   (0.036)    (0.040) (0.044) 
U.S. Sample 0.306 0.261 -0.044** 0.305 0.232 -0.073*** -0.029 
      (0.019)     (0.021) (0.020) 
Notes: Table A8 presents difference-in-differences (Diff-in-Diff) results after one-to-five nearest neighbor 
matching by showing the mean outcome for the treated and control group before and after the ATR as well as its 
difference. The different rows represent robustness tests to the results presented in table 7. Group size as well as 
matching quality vary to the main analyses. Robust standard errors clustered by firms are shown in parentheses. 
Variables are defined in table A1 of the appendix. *, **, and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 
1 %, respectively. 
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Abstract: 
This study analyzes the capital market reaction to news about tax avoidance. As tax information 
is usually not published, little is known about the effects of disclosing tax avoidance. However, 
in the course of the event known as LuxLeaks, hundreds of tax documents were released. Unlike 
other events used in previous literature, the litigation risk, which is generally associated with 
tax avoidance, is considerably lower because these documents consist of advance tax rulings. 
Using an event study methodology, we find weak evidence for positive cumulated abnormal 
returns for the involved firms. Our results cast doubts on significant reputational effects and 
suggest that market participants reward unintended disclosure of tax avoidance. Further 
analysis suggests that the capital market especially rewards news about a firm’s additional 
engagement in tax avoidance that is associated with a low risk of litigation.  
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4.1 Introduction 
On November 5, 2014, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) 
published information about hundreds of advance tax rulings (ATRs) regarding multinational 
corporations (MNCs). This unexpected dissemination of confidential tax documents was 
publicly dubbed Luxembourg Leaks (LuxLeaks). Several years prior to the leak, the MNCs had 
signed private tax deals in the form of ATRs with the Luxembourg fiscal authority. As ATRs 
are usually not disclosed, the revelation provided new information to the capital market. Thus, 
this event offers a rare opportunity to scrutinize the capital market reaction to disclosure of tax 
avoidance. 
The unintended disclosure caused by the leak provides highly credible and realistic 
information of tax structures as MNCs had no chance of modifying the data. Consequently, 
having reliable information about tax avoidance, firm value should increase as tax avoidance is 
associated with additional after-tax profits. Nevertheless, tension is given as survey evidence 
suggests that managers who are often risk averse fear the risks of tax litigations as well as 
negative media coverage or even customer boycotts if details of tax avoidance strategies are 
available (Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, and Shroff, 2014). For this reason, voluntary disclosure is 
very scarce and the ATRs have not been disclosed in advance to the leak. 
Policymakers and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) recently try to increase tax transparency, whereas investors disapprove of this 
development. Yet, as so far only few tax information has been made public, little is known 
about the effects of disclosing tax avoidance details, irrespective of the form of disclosure. Prior 
literature provides some limited evidence on a negative effect of unintentionally disclosing 
particular tax avoidance structures. Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) as well as Gallemore, Maydew, 
and Thornock (2014) find weakly negative capital market reactions to the detection of tax 
shelters – an extremely aggressive form of tax avoidance associated with additional taxes and 
penalties. 
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Using the unique setting of the event LuxLeaks, we analyze the capital market reaction 
to news about particular tax avoidance structures not accompanied by high litigation risks or 
additional taxes. The disclosed tax avoidance structures are perfectly legal and provide tax 
certainty because all involved MNCs had signed ATRs. We apply an event study methodology 
to identify the capital market response to the unintended disclosure of tax avoidance structures. 
The LuxLeaks publications provide a large sample of hundreds of firms, all revealed as having 
engaged in tax planning structures like hybrid finance or transfer pricing associated with 
intellectual property (ICIJ 2014a/2014b). The high number of firms made tax planning behavior 
a particularly salient issue once the revelation was announced. Moreover, all firms were 
revealed on the same date. Therefore, media coverage was substantially higher than for a 
compilation of firms revealed on very different dates.  
Considering each MNC’s share prices around the particular event day (November 5, 
2014) and the development of its respective market, we calculate the cumulated abnormal 
returns. Thereby, we are able to show some evidence for a positive capital market reaction, i.e., 
a positive net effect on firm value. LuxLeaks firms achieved a return that was, on average, 
1.22 percentage points higher than the market. Our results suggest that possible reputational 
losses do not outweigh positive effects and that market participants reward credible information 
about sophisticated tax avoidance. Considering this result, unintended disclosure of tax 
planning with a low level of litigation risks, which changes the shareholders’ expectation, is 
certainly not detrimental and may even be beneficial for corporations. 
In additional tests, we find weak evidence for a more pronounced positive capital market 
reaction to LuxLeaks for firms with extraordinarily low effective tax rates (ETRs) and robust 
evidence for firms with extraordinarily high ETRs. The latter finding is in line with the 
argument that the capital market rewards new information about a firm’s commitment to tax 
avoidance, particularly if new information about involvement in tax planning is detected that 
had not already been disclosed by the fairly high ETR of these firms. The former finding is 
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consistent with the view that the capital market rewards information about tax certainty 
provided by an ATR for those MNCs that are perceived as particularly tax aggressive. 
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First, we extend 
the available literature on the impact of tax avoidance on firm value. One strand of literature 
suggests a positive effect on firm value. A recent study by Goh, Lee, Lim, and Shevlin (2016) 
confirms lower cost of equity for tax avoiding firms. Yet, prior studies by Desai and 
Dharmapala (2009) and Wilson (2009) find significant, positive effects only for the presence 
of strong corporate governance. Moreover, a few studies find positive value effects of particular 
sources of tax avoidance (Bryant-Kutcher, Guenther, and Jackson, 2012; Inger, 2014). While 
these studies consider only general information about a firm’s tax avoidance, another smaller 
strand of literature investigates the effects of unintentionally disclosing additional information 
about particular tax planning structures. Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) as well as Gallemore et al. 
(2014) analyze the capital market response to the dissemination of tax sheltering firms. 
Interestingly, they find insignificant or weakly negative effects on firm values. Furthermore, 
Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) find capital market losses only for tax sheltering firms with low 
ETRs, while for high-ETR firms, they find no negative capital market responses. Consequently, 
there is no mutual consent on the potential trend of disclosing additional information about tax 
avoidance on firm value. 
One explanation for negative effects or unclear results in prior studies might be the fact 
that news about particular tax avoidance often includes information about tax sheltering or tax 
litigation. Literature shows that uncertainty about future tax payments or penalties might 
reverse the positive valuation (Inger, 2014; Jacob and Schütt, 2015; Drake, Lusch, and 
Stekelberg, 2017). The LuxLeaks publications, however, address ATRs that reduce the 
litigation risk. ATRs represent binding tax deals between fiscal authorities and firms whose tax 
consequences are also set out in the ruling (OECD, 2015). Due to these specific properties of 
ATRs, LuxLeaks is, to the best of our knowledge, the first event that provides information about 
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a sample of MNCs that engaged in tax avoidance with a low level of litigation risk. Thus, our 
study is the first to show that there is at least no negative or even a positive effect on firm value 
in a setting with low litigation risks. Additionally, we show that the positive effect is most 
pronounced for MNCs at the lowest level of tax aggressiveness. MNCs, as argued by Hanlon 
and Slemrod (2009), are rewarded for their commitment to tax planning beyond their mere 
disclosure of ETRs in their financial accounts. 
Second, our results consequently contribute to the ongoing debate on tax transparency 
and disclosure. Currently, there is a lack of detail in disclosure which makes it difficult to assess 
the type of tax avoidance a MNC engages in. Aiming to improve transparency, policymakers 
worldwide are occupied with the OECD’s project on base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) 
and implementing a country-by-country reporting. Public scrutiny like this can lead to more 
disclosure (Dyreng, Hoopes, and Wilde, 2016). It is an interesting empirical task to identify the 
potential consequences for MNCs, as MNCs seem to dread regulatory changes regarding 
additional disclosure. Considering the Panama Papers, Omartian (2016) reveals that investors 
try to hinder increased transparency and Robinson and Schmidt (2013) find that investors 
reward low disclosure quality. However, we find no negative and some positive effects on firm 
value as the publicly available level of tax information, i.e., tax transparency, increases. Due to 
audits and regulations, mandatory disclosure provides a similarly credible and realistic picture 
as the investigated unintended disclosure. Thus, we cautiously infer from our results that it 
might – in contrast to previous belief – be beneficial for corporations if they are required to 
disclose further tax information. 
Third, we contribute to the literature on reputational costs and their effect on firm value. 
Popular sentiment, mirrored by excessive media coverage of tax-related scandals, generally 
disapproves of firms apparently not paying their fair share of taxes. Accordingly, worldwide 
news, which described LuxLeaks as Luxembourg rubber-stamping tax avoidance and MNCs 
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cutting their tax bills53, shaped a clearly negative image of the firms named by the ICIJ (ICIJ, 
2014a). In line with this notion, a recent survey among managers of U.S. firms suggests that 
managers consider potential reputational effects if tax avoidance is perceived as too aggressive 
(Graham et al., 2014). Interestingly, prior event studies of tax revelations show that investors 
barely contemplate reputational effects and find no overall evidence of shareholders perceiving 
tax sheltering as a corporate misdeed (Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009; Gallemore et al., 2014).54  
Generally, aggressive tax avoidance is also associated with risk, i.e., uncertainty about 
additional taxes and penalties (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2017; Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and 
Zhang, 2014). However, the through LuxLeaks revealed ATRs are accompanied by a 
substantially lower litigation risk. Consequently, any potentially negative capital market 
reaction must be attributed to negative effects other than additional taxes. This allows us to 
draw clearer conclusions with regard to reputational effects than prior literature. Nevertheless, 
our results also suggest that reputational effects are small. Finding no negative effects on firm 
value, we conclude that reputational damage does not outweigh the positive effects that tax 
avoidance exerts on firm value. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 4.2, we describe the 
LuxLeaks event in detail and develop our hypotheses according to prior literature. Section 4.3 
presents our data and research methodology. Empirical results are provided in section 4.4. 
Section 4.5 concludes.  
                                                 
53
 For example: The Guardian (2014, November 5), available at http://www.theguardian.com/business/ 
2014/nov/05/-sp-luxembourg-tax-files-tax-avoidance-industrial-scale, and The New York Times (2014, November 
6), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/07/world/europe/head-of-european-commission-under-
pressure-over-luxembourg-tax-revelations.html?_r=4. 
54
 An example is provided by Brooks, Godfrey, Hillenbrand, and Money (2016) who indicate that potential 
reputational losses do not even matter when a company’s name is mentioned in the context of a tax-related scandal. 
The media outcry about Starbucks’ drastically reduced ETR initially led to customer boycotts. However, within a 
short time, most customers returned and Starbucks’ business is now flourishing. Thus, even in the case of 
seemingly bottomless tax avoidance, reputational damage occurs only temporarily. 
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4.2 Event and Hypotheses Development 
4.2.1 Luxembourg Leaks 
On November 5, 2014, the ICIJ released, on its website, information about hundreds of 
ATRs – “a feature in the international tax system” (Christians, 2014, p. 1123) – regarding 
MNCs (ICIJ, 2014a/2014b). As the documents contained private tax deals between MNCs and 
Luxembourg fiscal authorities, the event became publicly known as LuxLeaks.55 In October 
2010, a former employee of PricewaterhouseCoopers discovered the documents, which would 
only be released later. His contact with the press led to a French TV broadcast in May 2012. 
Afterwards, it took almost two more years until the ICIJ began its investigation and another 
seven months until the documents and the names of the respective firms were finally published 
online. As most incidents are not clearly identified, we cannot use them in our event study 
design. Furthermore, although these incidents spread rumors throughout the capital market, 
they did not explicitly name the involved corporations. Importantly, the rumor did not hint at a 
later release of all involved MNCs. The French TV broadcast named only two MNCs included 
in our sample: GlaxoSmithKline and Wendel. Considering their share prices as well as those of 
the French leading index CAC40, we find no abnormal movements in the stock charts.56 
Following the leak on November 5, 2014, news reports quickly criticized Luxembourg 
who “rubber-stamped tax avoidance on an industrial scale”57 and acted “as a haven for hundreds 
of companies seeking to drastically reduce their tax bills”58. Marian (2017, p. 202) analyzes 
how Luxembourg became “a tax-haven by administrative practice”. In December 2014, a few 
                                                 
55
 Figure A1 of the appendix depicts the development prior to our event. 
56
 On May 11th, 2012, the French TV channel France 2 showed a report titled “Paradis Fiscaux: les petits secrets 
des grandes entreprises” (Tax Havens: the little secrets of the big companies), in which they cover some of the 
applied structures involved in the LuxLeaks documents. As the TV show did not include a list of firm names, and 
as the show was broadcast in French, we do not anticipate a reaction by global capital markets. 
57
 The Guardian (2014, November 5), available at http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/nov/05/-sp-
luxembourg-tax-files-tax-avoidance-industrial-scale. 
58
 The New York Times (2014, November 6), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/07/world/europe/head-
of-european-commission-under-pressure-over-luxembourg-tax-revelations.html?_r=4. 
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additional documents were made public. However, those represent only a small fraction of the 
total of 345 MNCs that were exposed.59  
The published tax documents contain commonly used tax structures, such as hybrid 
financing or use of intellectual property (a detailed description of the tax structures is provided 
by Marian, 2017). In the case of LuxLeaks, they were accompanied by ATRs, which had already 
been implemented between 2002 and 2010. By definition, ATRs “are specific to an individual 
taxpayer and provide a determination of the tax consequences of a proposed transaction on 
which the particular taxpayer is entitled to rely” (OECD, 2015, p. 47). Therefore, the revealed 
structures are approved by fiscal authority and consequently, are associated with low litigation 
risks. The Luxembourg Ministry of Finance clarifies that ATRs are legal documents that 
comply with the law.60 Thus, LuxLeaks released information about a sophisticated form of tax 
planning, i.e., legally assured tax avoidance, to the capital market. Put differently, the 
dissemination did not trigger additional taxes, as ATRs provide tax certainty. Hence, the event 
examined in this study captures the reaction to news about corporate tax avoidance, which will 
apparently persist in the future. 
As Huesecken and Overesch (2015) confirm, MNCs achieved a significant reduction in 
their worldwide ETRs after they agreed on an ATR. ETRs are disclosed as part of the financial 
reporting of a firm and provide some general information about the firm’s tax position. 
However, particular information about tax avoidance behavior is not disclosed. Moreover, 
Luxembourg does not disclose its issued ATRs to ensure financial privacy (Christians, 2014). 
Interestingly, the corporations do not voluntarily disclose that information either. The 
absence of any voluntary disclosure suggests that managers do not expect that benefits of 
additional disclosure of ATRs outweigh potential costs and risks. One explanation might be ex 
                                                 
59
 On December 9, 2014, only eight firms were newly revealed and for some, already mentioned firms additional 
documents became available.  
60
 Luxembourg Government (2014, November 7), available at http://www.gouvernement.lu/4160549/07-luxleaks-
EN. 
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ante uncertainty of costs (and benefits) associated with tax disclosure. Although previous 
literature finds it difficult to establish clear evidence about reputational costs (Gallemore et al., 
2014), the high media coverage of some tax planning structures causes particular reputational 
concerns. Moreover, voluntary disclosure of refined tax planning techniques might be perceived 
as boasting and thus, might be associated with exceptionally negative effects. Second, it is well-
known that managers are risk averse. Accordingly, they might value reputational risks and 
information benefits asymmetrically. Therefore, risk averse managers did not voluntarily 
disclose details about tax avoidance structures. 
Consequently, the revelation on November 5, 2014 provided the capital market with new 
information about the ATR usage of particular MNCs. We can therefore use this event - an 
unexpected dissemination of confidential tax documents - to capture capital market reactions to 
disclosure of tax avoidance.61 
4.2.2 Development of Hypotheses Regarding the Effect of Disclosing Tax 
Avoidance 
The LuxLeaks event provides a unique setting to analyze the capital market reaction to 
the disclosure of detailed tax planning structures. Shareholders’ reactions are essential for firms 
(Penno and Simon, 1986). Consequently, corporations aim to fulfill shareholders’ expectations, 
e.g. by increasing their earnings (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Beatty, Ke, and Petroni, 2002). 
Taxes obviously influence corporations’ earnings. Prior literature analyzes the market response 
to taxes and tax-related corporate decisions. Several studies investigate the influence of tax law 
changes (e.g., Ayers, Cloyd, and Robinson, 2002; Edwards and Shevlin, 2011). They find a 
decline in stock prices coinciding with the announcement of unfavorable tax laws. Their 
findings already suggest that less tax expenses are associated with higher firm value. Unlike 
                                                 
61
 A capital market reaction to a specific event can only be captured if the capital market does not anticipate the 
event (Doidge and Dyck, 2015) because investors only trade if they are provided with new information (Bauer and 
Klassen, 2017). Particularly changes in tax policies that allow or hinder tax planning are often widely anticipated. 
In contrast, we analyze the unexpected dissemination of confidential tax documents.  
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these studies, we do not investigate the effect of a fiscal reform but of the corporation’s 
conscious decision to engage in tax avoidance. 
Tax avoidance can increase firm value (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009; Wilson, 2009) and 
reduce cost of capital (Goh et al., 2016). Therefore, shareholders could reward any additional 
information about managers’ commitment to tax avoidance because lower tax expenditures 
increase the financial resources available for distribution. For example, Bryant-Kutcher et al. 
(2012) find increased firm value in relation to decreased foreign taxes. Inger (2014) detects 
significant effects on firm values for tax avoidance associated with stock options. Similarly, 
Chyz, Leung, Li, and Rui (2013) show that abnormal returns decrease if labor unions are 
elected, as they usually reduce the firm’s level of corporate tax avoidance. While these studies 
suggest a positive effect of information about tax avoidance on firm value, they could only 
consider the limited set of information about a firm’s tax pattern that is usually disclosed. A 
working paper by Wang (2011), however, suggests that investors place a higher price premium 
on tax avoidance if a firm is more transparent. Consequently, additional disclosure of particular 
details of a firm’s tax avoidance strategy might be associated with positive effects on firm value.  
Moreover, the capital market wants “the company to be optimally aggressive” (Hanlon 
and Slemrod, 2009, p.126). Put differently, shareholders want managers to reduce corporate tax 
payments without an exorbitant risk of additional costs, such as tax litigation and additional 
taxes. Rego and Wilson (2012) state that appropriate risks are desired. Our study reveals 
whether corporations can capitalize tax avoidance if they effectively manage potential litigation 
risks by ATRs. Prior literature shows that if tax avoidance adds uncertainty, the positive effects 
of reduced tax payments might be reversed (Inger, 2014; Jacob and Schütt, 2015). Drake et al. 
(2017) point out explicitly that tax risk moderates the positive valuation. Frischmann, Shevlin, 
and Wilson (2008) show that initial positive effects of disclosing uncertain tax benefits were 
reversed upon a later Senate inquiry into FIN 48 disclosures. Blaufus, Möhlmann, and Schwäbe 
(2016) find positive capital market reactions to tax avoidance but negative reactions to illegal 
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tax evasion. Furthermore, prior literature finds that strong corporate governance can lead to a 
positive market response to tax sheltering as corporate governance reduces principal agent 
conflicts (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009; Wilson, 2009). Their findings suggest that the capital 
market also reacts particularly positive if costs and risk associated with tax avoidance are 
minimized.  
Our study relates to the above-mentioned strands of literature because the tax structures 
and ATRs detected by LuxLeaks represent a firm’s decision to engage in additional tax 
planning. Furthermore, the revelation of such planning - and its possible implications - embody 
an exogenous event, which should induce a capital market reaction. In contrast to previous 
studies, our setting includes an important additional feature. LuxLeaks provides news about a 
particular, more sophisticated tax avoidance strategy because the tax structures are always 
accompanied by an ATR. An ATR is an agreement between a tax authority and a taxpayer about 
the application of tax law in the context of a special arrangement. By definition, ATRs provide 
tax certainty as fiscal authorities have to comply with the consequences set out in the ATR 
(Givati, 2009; Diller, Kortebusch, Schneider, and Sureth, 2017; Hoke, 2015). The risk of future 
payments is reduced. Thus, an ATR not only helps implement structures to avoid taxes, it also 
lowers tax litigation risks. 
We test the following hypothesis: 
H1a. The capital market reaction to LuxLeaks should be positive if shareholders reward 
disclosure of tax avoidance structures which are associated with low litigation risks. 
However, tax avoidance might as well have negative effects on firm value. In the matter 
of tax avoidance, MNC’s strategies might be directly accompanied by penalties and additional 
taxes. Possibly for this reason, prior literature finds that investors do not favor tax transparency 
(Omartian, 2016; Robinson and Schmidt, 2013). Excessive tax avoidance may also be perceived 
as a firm’s willingness to lie to its shareholders (Desai, Dyck, and Zingales, 2007) or may lead 
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to reputational consequences, such as consumers choosing to buy from the firm’s competitors 
(Klein and Leffler, 1981) or increased scrutiny by fiscal and supra-governmental authorities. 
Using an event study design, Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) and Gallemore et al. (2014) 
find weak evidence that news about tax shelter involvement, i.e., the most aggressive form of 
tax planning, yields capital market losses. Other studies reveal a potentially negative effect of 
tax avoidance on firm value (Kim, Li, and Zhang, 2011; Mironov, 2013; O’Donovan, Wagner, 
and Zeume, 2017). For example, Kim et al. (2011) identify an increase in stock price crash risk 
as a result of tax avoidance and Mironov (2013) finds that income diversion reduces firm 
performance. In addition to that, Graham et al. (2014) and Gordon (1989) show that managers 
anticipate potential reputational concerns when they make tax avoidance decisions.  
As ATRs are, in general, perfectly legal and provide tax certainty, LuxLeaks was – at the 
time of its revelation – not associated with any expectations about penalties or additional taxes. 
Previous literature shows that fines and penalties influence the market response (e.g., Karpoff 
and Lott, 1993). Unlike prior examinations of tax avoidance detections (e.g., Hanlon and 
Slemrod, 2009; Gallemore et al., 2014), our unique setting therefore allows us to eliminate a 
potential, negative effect caused by penalties and additional taxes. Other collaborating negative 
effects remain. As the MNCs investigated in this study elicited severe public criticism, we argue 
that, in particular, the capital market might view LuxLeaks in the same negative light as the 
press presented it, due to a loss of reputation. 
Taking the different potential effects into account, we cannot predict unambiguously how 
the capital market will react to tax avoidance. Aiming to shed light on the impact of these 
different effects, we test the following to hypothesis H1a contrarian hypothesis: 
H1b. The capital market reaction to LuxLeaks should be negative if the reputational effects of 
disclosing tax avoidance predominate. 
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4.2.3 Cross-Sectional Predictions for Different Levels of Tax Avoidance Already 
Disclosed 
In the particular case of LuxLeaks, a positive effect of sophisticated tax planning can be 
attributed to two features: a capital market reward for a commitment to engage in tax avoidance 
or news about tax certainty and low litigation risks due to the ATR. We aim to disentangle the 
two effects by considering previous literature which suggests that the capital market response 
to news about tax avoidance depends on the level of tax avoidance already disclosed. In 
particular, previous studies differentiate between high- and low-ETR firms (Hanlon and 
Slemrod, 2009; Hill, Kubick, Lockhart, and Wan, 2013; Brooks et al., 2016).  
A low ETR is perceived as a result of aggressive tax avoidance strategies. Moreover, 
Dyreng et al. (2017) find that low ETRs are associated with additional uncertain tax positions. 
Therefore, the capital market should anticipate a higher risk of additional taxes and penalties 
for these tax aggressive firms.62 Studying the effect of lobbying, Hill et al. (2013) show that the 
generally positive effect of a firm’s engagement in tax planning does not hold for firms with 
low ETRs. Brooks et al. (2016) and Guenther, Matsunaga, and Williams (2017) find a relation 
between high levels of tax avoidance and tax risk, respectively, with high stock price risk.  
The ATRs disclosed by the LuxLeaks publications, however, eliminate at least part of 
the litigation risks associated with aggressive tax avoidance strategies. In line with this 
argument, Diller et al. (2017) show that ATRs, which eliminate the uncertainty of the otherwise 
risky tax planning, should attract tax aggressive firms. Consequently, news about a firm having 
an ATR with Luxembourg provides information to the capital market about a sustainable form 
of tax planning without the risk of additional taxes.  
While for low-ETR firms the LuxLeaks publications do not reveal much information 
about the firms’ general commitment to tax avoidance, the capital market should reward MNCs 
because the investors are relieved that the MNCs suffer less tax risk than originally expected. 
                                                 
62
 Hasan et al. (2014) show, for example, that banks associate tax avoidance of MNCs with significant risks. 
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Therefore, the positive effect associated with the information about reduced tax uncertainty 
should be especially distinct for firms with extraordinarily low ETRs. We test the following 
hypothesis: 
H2a. The capital market reaction to LuxLeaks should be particularly positive for firms with 
extraordinarily low ETRs because LuxLeaks provides new information about low litigation 
risks. 
In contrast, MNCs with high ETRs are believed to engage in less tax avoidance. In fact, 
the market does not expect any tax planning from them. In their study of capital market reactions 
to tax shelter involvement, Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) find no negative capital market effect 
for high-ETR firms. They argue that the market rewards the fact that those firms are “not as 
tax-passive as previously believed” (Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009, p. 127). This is in line with the 
undersheltering puzzle (Weisbach, 2002), according to which investors wonder why not all 
firms engage in tax avoidance. Consequently, any new information about involvement in tax 
planning should positively influence the capital market reaction for those firms that are 
perceived as passive in terms of tax avoidance. In the case of LuxLeaks, the capital market 
receives information that the MNC is not only involved in international tax avoidance but that 
it has a legally assured tax avoidance structure. Nevertheless, as ATRs have been signed prior 
to LuxLeaks, investors might believe the ATRs to be ineffective as the MNC still exhibits high 
ETRs. Therefore, we might expect a negative capital market reaction due to disappointment. 
However, as high ETRs represent a serious competitive disadvantage, we believe that the 
positive surprise outweighs other concerns. Thus, we hypothesize the following: 
H2b. The capital market reaction to LuxLeaks should be particularly positive for firms with 
extraordinarily high ETRs because LuxLeaks provides new information about their involvement 
in a sophisticated tax planning structure. 
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4.3 Research Design 
4.3.1 Data and Sample Selection 
The information needed to perform our analyses is gathered from different data sources. 
In addition to the information revealed by the ICIJ, the stock prices and accounting data used 
in this study stem primarily from Compustat North America and Compustat Global. We 
augment the data by filling in missing values with corresponding information from Datastream 
and consolidated financial reports. All index price information is taken from Datastream.  
Table 1. Sample Selection 
Description # of firms 
Firms revealed by ICIJ 345 
Less:  
   Firms that cannot be identified as public firms 150 
   Missing identifier in Compustat for parent company 20 
   Missing leading index in Datastream and missing data in Security Daily  23 
   Firms that were revealed on December 9, 2014 4 
Sample 1 148 
Less:  
   Missing financial data in Compustat 2 
   Missing cash effective tax rate 43 
Sample 2  103 
Notes: Table 1 describes the sample selection process of sample 1 (baseline sample) and sample 2 (ETR 
subsample). Starting point are the 345 firms that were revealed by the ICIJ. Data availability in the used databases 
as well as the focus on November 5, 2014, result in a baseline sample of 148 firms. The ETR subsample contains 
only 103 firms for which the CASH ETR as defined in table A1 of the appendix can be calculated. 
We apply the following data selection process. We start from 345 firm names released 
by the ICIJ on November 5, 2014. In a first step, we only retain public firms that we can identify 
as being listed on a capital market. We use either the corresponding Compustat North 
America/Compustat Global identifier (gvkey) or the international securities identification 
number (ISIN). We lose many firms that are not listed on the stock market (private firms) and, 
thus, their stock prices are not available. We drop firms if we cannot find a reliable index for 
their countries on Datastream or if the daily prices on Security Daily or Datastream are missing 
or incomplete. The latter are needed to appropriately calculate a firm’s (cumulated) abnormal 
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return (CAR). We retrieve all price information from Monday to Friday and use each firm’s 
daily closing price. We further exclude firms that were revealed by the ICIJ in December 
2014.63 Finally, we are left with quoted stock prices from 22 countries. This leads – for our 
main event (LuxLeaks on November 5, 2014) – to a baseline sample of 148 revealed firms 
(sample 1). 
In addition, we conduct further inquiries regarding the capital market reaction depending 
on the previously disclosed level of tax avoidance. Our requirement is financial data to calculate 
cash effective tax rates.64 Due to missing firm-level information, we can only consider a 
somewhat smaller sample for these additional tests (sample 2). Table 1 shows the sample 
selection process.  
A complete list of the MNCs included in our baseline sample, with their respective 
headquarters locations and industry classifications, is provided in table A2 of the appendix. A 
total of 22 countries is included in our sample. Most MNCs are located in the United States or 
the United Kingdom. The firms are from various industries like manufacturing, high tech, 
consumer, and health industry. However, a large group of MNCs included in LuxLeaks operates 
in the financial sector.65 
Panel A of table 2 provides a first indication of a positive net effect of unintended 
disclosure of tax avoidance as the CARs of LuxLeaks firms are positive and much higher than 
those of other firms in the same countries. The median shows that CARs are more or less equally 
spread above and below 0 (0.0031). In sample 1, the minimum value is -0.18 and the maximum 
0.24 for LuxLeaks firms. Furthermore, figure A2 of the appendix shows that the values roughly 
represent a normal distribution. 
                                                 
63
 As this second event revealed eight firms of which only four meet our initial data requirements, we exclude them 
due to comparability in our sample as this second event experienced considerably less media coverage.  
64
 Following Hanlon and Slemrod (2009), we set ETRs, in general defined as tax expenses over pretax income, 
below 0 and above 0.5 to missing in order to limit the influence of extraordinary tax payments. 
65
 We consider the Fama and French industry classification. Updated industry classification can be downloaded 
from http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/changes_ind.html. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of cumulated abnormal returns 
 # of firms Mean Median Std. dev. 
LuxLeaks firms in sample 1 148 0.0122 0.0031 0.0496 
LuxLeaks firms in sample 2 103 0.0119 0.0055 0.0342 
Other listed firms in the same countries 7,437 -0.0007 0.0003 0.1575 
     
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of LuxLeaks firms (sample 2)     
Variable # of firms Mean Median Std. dev. 
CASH ETR 103 0.2151 0.2155 0.1211 
SIZE (Total Assets logged) 99 10.2799 10.0203 2.1599 
ROA (Return on Assets) 103 0.0787 0.0532 0.1043 
LEV (Leverage) 99 0.0504 0.0247 0.0663 
     
Panel C: Descriptive statistics of other listed firms in the same countries   
Variable # of firms Mean Median Std. dev. 
CASH ETR 7,437 0.1457 0.1264 0.1401 
SIZE (Total Assets logged) 7,437 6.3769 6.2109 2.0082 
ROA (Return on Assets) 7,437 0.1036 0.0630 1.2708 
LEV (Leverage) 7,437 0.0705 0.0287 0.1023 
Notes: Panel A shows descriptives of the calculated cumulated abnormal returns applying the market model. 
Panel B and C show descriptive statistics of firms included in sample 2 (ETR subsample) for which all firm-
specific data is available as well as for other firms located in the same countries. Financial data is taken from the 
consolidated financial statements 2013 available in Compustat North America/Compustat Global. CASH ETR is 
defined as taxes paid divided by pretax income; SIZE is the logarithm of total assets (before taking the logarithm, 
total assets are measured in million U.S. Dollars); Profitability, i.e., return on assets (ROA) is defined as pretax 
income divided by total assets; Leverage (LEV) is calculated as debt in current liabilities divided by total assets. 
Regarding the ratios, variables are left in their original currency for calculation. 
Panel B of table 2 lists some descriptive statistics for our ETR subsample consisting of 
103 LuxLeaks firms. To investigate the representativeness of our sample, panel C of table 2 
displays statistics for all other listed firms with available firm-level data located in the same 
22 countries. Table 2 shows that all firms have a reasonable return on assets and are not highly 
leveraged. LuxLeaks firms exhibit a mean CASH ETR of 21.5 % whereas all other firms 
– excluding the LuxLeaks firms – report a smaller CASH ETR of 14.6 %. Interestingly, in 
general, LuxLeaks firms seem to not avoid more taxes in terms of CASH ETR. Another 
difference occurs with regard to firm size. The MNCs involved in LuxLeaks and included in 
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our sample seem to be rather large. Thus, even though we are operating with a small sample66, 
our sample covers a significant market volume. 
4.3.2 Research Methodology 
We analyze the capital market reaction, i.e., share price effects, to disclosure of tax 
avoidance by implementing an event study methodology that considers CARs as proposed by 
MacKinlay (1997) and Kothari and Warner (2007). Market efficiency results in investors 
quickly reacting to the news (Ball and Brown, 1968). This means we investigate the abnormal 
returns of MNCs over a short period surrounding the disclosure of information. A CAR is equal 
to the sum of daily abnormal returns. The latter is explained by the difference of the realized 
return and an expected return. CARs are computed using the market model in a first step 
(MacKinlay, 1997; Nelson, Price, and Rountree, 2008): 
 = 5 + 6 + 7    (1) 
 represents the daily (t) return of a firm’s (i) share, whereas 6 symbolizes the daily 
return of the market portfolio. 7 is a zero mean disturbance term. As a proxy for the market 
portfolio, we consider the leading index of firm i’s country. The applied indices for each country 
are displayed in table 3.  
By using a different index for each country, we implicitly control for any home market 
shocks that may affect the daily returns around our event date. For example, one day before our 
event, the U.S. midterm elections took place. The outcome could certainly affect corporations’ 
share prices. However, as the effect applies to the whole U.S. market, it is incorporated into the 
leading share index, which then serves as the benchmark for the calculation of abnormal returns. 
Thus, abnormal returns should only capture effects that are specific to certain firms.67 
                                                 
66
 Rather small samples are very common in literature that covers the capitalization of tax sheltering (i.e., 
aggressive tax avoidance). Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) use a sample of 108 tax shelter firms to investigate the 
CARs after the involvement in tax sheltering. Gallemore et al. (2014) apply a sample of 118 corporations.  
67
 Please note that about 5 % of the benchmark firms are LuxLeaks firms as some of the latter are listed in the 
leading indices of their respective country. This may possibly result in an underestimation of effect size.  
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Table 3. Considered Capital Markets 
Country Leading Index LuxLeaks firms Country Leading Index 
LuxLeaks 
firms 
Australia All Ordinaries 4 Italy FTSE MIB 6 
Belgium BEL20 4 Japan Nikkei 225 4 
Bulgaria Sofix 1 Luxembourg LuxX Index 6 
Canada TSX Composite 6 Norway OBX Index 1 
China SSE Composite 1 Philippines PSEi 1 
Finland OMX Helsinki 25 1 Russia RTS-Index 2 
France CAC40 8 Sweden OMX Stockholm 30 2 
Germany DAX 10 Switzerland SMI 11 
Hong 
Kong Hang Seng HSI 1 Taiwan TAIEX 1 
Ireland ISEQ Overall Index 8 UK FTSE 100 Index 22 
Israel TA-100 2 USA Dow Jones 46 
Notes: Table 3 lists the 22 countries included in our baseline sample, the respective leading index which is used 
as a benchmark in calculating the abnormal returns of a firm i in that country, and the number of LuxLeaks firms 
considered. 
We estimate equation (1) for each share using a window of 100 days, ending 6 days 
before the considered event to ensure that no pricing information related to the event affects the 
predictive factors (MacKinlay, 1997). Then, we use our estimates to predict each share’s return 
(89:;<:;) for each day belonging to the event window. Next, we calculate the daily abnormal 
returns by subtracting the predicted returns from the actual returns, which we find in our 
databases. CARs are subsequently computed as the sum of abnormal returns over the event 
window (equation (2)). In most of our analyses, we apply a seven-day event window from -3 to 
+3 assuming our event took place on day	. 
 = ∑ ( − 
89:;<:;
)
@AB
@CB
	 	 	 	 (2)	
Finally, we exert a two-tailed t-test to check whether the mean CAR of LuxLeaks firms 
is significantly different from 0. A positive and significant result would be consistent with 
hypothesis H1a, whereas a significantly negative estimator would suggest support for 
hypothesis H1b. At this point, it has to be noted that if the event day is the same for all sample 
firms, abnormal returns tend to be cross-sectionally correlated. This may result in an over-
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rejection of the null hypothesis. Therefore, we report adjusted standard errors according to 
Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) in an additional column as their test statistic takes the potential 
correlation into account.68  
An alternative method to compute abnormal returns is denoted as the market adjusted 
model (MacKinlay, 1997). In this model, the corresponding country’s index return is subtracted 
from the firm’s actual return. Considering equation (1), 5 is set to 0 and 	is set to 1 for all 
shares. The market adjusted model therefore provides a much simpler way to predict each 
share’s return compared to the market model. Put differently, it provides an alternative approach 
with significant limitations (MacKinlay, 1997). As this method is, however, used by related 
studies investigating market responses to tax avoidance (Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009; Gallemore 
et al., 2014), we consider it as a robustness check. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Cumulated Abnormal Returns around LuxLeaks 
In this section, we present our results for the capital market reaction to LuxLeaks on 
November 5, 2014. According to the discussion in section 4.2, our prediction of the sign of the 
capital market reaction is ambiguous. On the one hand, shareholders may reward the unintended 
disclosure of MNCs as, through LuxLeaks, new information about their commitment to tax 
avoidance and, in particular, to an involvement in legally assured tax avoidance, became 
publicly known (H1a). On the other hand, shareholders may punish the same MNCs, as stock 
prices mirror possible reputational losses (H1b). We test which effect dominates using the 
methodology described in section 4.3. 
Table 4 presents the mean CARs for the LuxLeaks firms. Across different event 
windows, we find positive CARs. We consider coefficient estimates significant if p<0.1 in a 
two-tailed test reflecting the competing predictions in hypotheses H1a and H1b. Considering 
                                                 
68
 To implement different test statistics, we employ the non-official Stata command eventstudy2 programmed by 
Kaspereit (2015). 
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the common test statistic, CARs are statistically significant across several event windows. 
However, if we account for cross-sectional correlation, only the CAR of the seven-day (-3/+3) 
event window is significant.69 This result suggests that LuxLeaks firms, on average, show CARs 
of 1.22 %70 over the seven days surrounding the LuxLeaks announcement. This effect means 
that LuxLeaks firms achieve an abnormal return that is 1.22 percentage points higher than the 
market return.71 The effect size is also economically meaningful. For example, the U.S.-based 
firm Procter & Gamble has approximately 2.7 billion shares outstanding, which had a closing 
price of roughly $ 87 three days prior to LuxLeaks leading to a firm value of $ 235 billion. 
Considering the mean CAR of LuxLeaks firms of 1.22 %, Procter & Gamble was able to 
increase firm value by $ 2.9 billion more than an average U.S. corporation listed in the Dow 
Jones within the seven days surrounding November 5, 2014. 
Table 4. CARs for Different Window Lengths  
CARs applying the market model 
  # of firms Mean CAR Std. err. Adjusted std. err. 
Window length: -3/+3 148 0.0122 0.0034*** 0.0063* 
Window length: -2/+2 148 0.0054 0.0028* 0.0052 
Window length:  0/+3 148 0.0057 0.0026** 0.0068 
Notes: Table 4 presents cumulated abnormal returns for the baseline sample. The results are shown for varying 
window lengths. We consider the market model to calculate abnormal returns. In an additional column, we report 
standard errors adjusted for cross-correlation according to Kolari and Pynnönen (2010). *, **, and *** show 
significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
To mitigate a possible bias from other events influencing the results, we also consider 
shorter event windows. Shortening the event window to 2 days before and after the event also 
results in positive CARs (0.0054). Even excluding all days prior to LuxLeaks indicates a 
positive capital market reaction. The exclusion obviously leads to smaller CARs, as it must be 
                                                 
69
 Outliers as visible in figure A2 of the appendix may influence the results. However, results are mostly robust to 
excluding outliers, i.e., corporations with CARs in the lowest and highest percent of the CAR distribution (compare 
table A3 of the appendix). Point estimates decrease slightly, but significance levels remain very similar. 
70
 In absolute values, the effect size is similar in magnitude to the CARs found in previous event studies, e.g., 
Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) reported 0.53 % and Gallemore et al. (2014) 0.75 %. Even though our effect is positive 
whereas other studies mainly find negative effects. 
71
 Please note that, in this context, market return is a stylized expression for the term 

∗ . Consequently, the 
abnormal return is determined for each firm by its individual correlation with the return of the respective leading 
index.  
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assumed that some rumors prior to the leak had already affected market returns. Moreover, the 
shorter event windows appear to be more affected by cross-sectional correlation as results are 
not robust to adjusted standard errors. Therefore, we mainly consider the seven-day event 
window in additional analyses. 
Table 5. Robustness Tests  
Panel A: Exclude underrepresented markets     
  # of firms Mean CAR Std. err. Adjusted std. err. 
Window length: -3/+3 135 0.0135 0.0034*** 0.0067** 
Window length: -2/+2 135 0.0062 0.0029** 0.0053 
Window length:  0/+3 135 0.0061 0.0026** 0.0067 
         
Panel B: U.S. corporations 
 # of firms Mean CAR Std. err. Adjusted std. err. 
Window length: -3/+3 46 0.0204 0.0054*** 0.0165 
Window length: -2/+2 46 0.0111 0.0045** 0.0147 
Window length:  0/+3 46 0.0091 0.0041** 0.0091 
     
Panel C: EU corporations  
 # of firms Mean CAR Std. err. Adjusted std. err. 
Window length: -3/+3 68 0.0095 0.0053* 0.0057* 
Window length: -2/+2 68 0.0012 0.0044 0.0021 
Window length:  0/+3 68 0.0016 0.0040 0.0222 
     
Panel D: Market adjusted model     
  # of firms Mean CAR Std. err. Adjusted std. err. 
Window length: -3/+3 148 0.0280 0.0039*** 0.0171 
Window length: -2/+2 148 0.0062 0.0032* 0.0299 
Window length:  0/+3 148 0.0176 0.0029*** 0.0119 
Notes: Table 5 presents robustness tests to our main findings presented in table 4. The results are shown for varying 
window lengths. In panel A, we exclude countries in which less than three LuxLeaks firms are headquartered and 
panel B and C show the results for U.S. and EU corporations only. Panel D repeats the prior analysis using the 
market adjusted model to compute the CARs. In an additional column, we report standard errors adjusted for cross-
correlation according to Kolari and Pynnönen (2010). *, **, and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, 
and 1 %, respectively. 
Table 5 provides results of some robustness checks. First, we exclude markets that are 
underrepresented from our sample. That is, we exclude countries in which less than three 
LuxLeaks firms are headquartered. The positive CARs as shown in panel A of table 5 are 
comparable to our main findings in table 4. In panel B, we consider the subsample of U.S. 
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corporations. We also find positive CARs. In line with these results, Marian (2017) states that 
more U.S. firms avoid taxes using ATRs in Europe and Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) provide 
evidence of U.S. firms’ success in avoiding foreign taxes. Nesbitt, Outslay, and Persson (2017) 
perform a similar analysis focusing on firms listed on the U.S. stock exchange. The magnitude 
of their findings covering the same event window is smaller with a mean CAR of 0.38 %. 
However, they do not account for cross-sectional correlation. Robust statistical significance, 
that is to say, can only be found for corporations from the European Union (EU) as shown in 
panel C. In panel D of table 5, we alternatively apply the market adjusted model to calculate 
expected returns because it is used by related studies. We reveal similar positive CARs using 
the alternative method. Again, accounting for cross-sectional correlation results in a loss of 
significance. Nevertheless, we interpret these results with some caution because only the 
standard market model considers the specific correlation between the performance of the market 
and the single share. 
Overall, we find mostly positive and significant CARs. However, some effects are 
influenced by cross-sectional correlation. Thus, we can only cautiously infer that the capital 
market rewards MNCs for credible information about engaging in ATRs with the tax authorities 
in Luxembourg. Thereby, our findings suggest some evidence for hypothesis H1a. 
Nevertheless, as we do not find any negative CARs, the dominance of reputational effects, as 
proposed in hypothesis H1b, can be declined. Positive and negative effects are at least equally 
balanced or, as our results suggest, the potential reputational effects are outweighed by the 
positive effects of disclosing sophisticated tax planning.72 The latter can be attributed either to 
a capital market reward for a commitment to engaging in tax avoidance or to the particularly 
positive feature of additional tax certainty provided by an ATR. It is, however, a challenging 
                                                 
72
 Even though we identify a rather positive effect of disclosure of tax avoidance on firm value, it has to be noted 
that these results cannot directly be used to assess the capital market reaction to voluntary disclosure. As described 
in section 2.1, MNCs did not voluntarily disclose ATR information before the leak due to a potentially negative 
perception by investors. Even after the leak, other MNCs did not claim to be involved in ATRs as their disclosure 
may also be perceived as boasting, be less credible, and thereby, lead to predominantly negative effects. 
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empirical task to disentangle the two mechanisms. As described in section 4.2, the effectiveness 
of the two mechanisms depends on the level of tax avoidance that was already disclosed to the 
capital market before the news about LuxLeaks was released. We therefore distinguish between 
different levels of tax avoidance already disclosed by the LuxLeaks firms. 
More precisely, we analyze the capital market reaction to LuxLeaks for different levels 
of ETRs. We consider a firm’s CASH ETR (taxes paid divided by pretax income) and GAAP 
ETR (total income taxes divided by pretax income)73. As we aim to approximate the level of 
tax avoidance that was disclosed before LuxLeaks, we consider financial statement data from 
2013. Due to missing financial data, we are left with a somewhat smaller sample. In panel A of 
table 6, we therefore repeat the initial test for the subsample. The mean CAR (0.0119) is again 
positive and significant. 
In panel B of table 6, we divide our sample into four subsamples, one for each quartile 
of the ETR distribution. We find positive and significant CARs only for firms with 
extraordinarily low CASH ETRs (below 12.71 %) and for firms with extraordinarily high 
CASH ETRs (above 30.35 %). Firms with moderate levels of tax avoidance show CARs that 
are small and statistically insignificant. Thus, our results suggest that the level of tax avoidance 
that was already disclosed before the LuxLeaks event affects the capital market reaction around 
the LuxLeaks announcements. Moreover, our results suggest that the positive responses can be 
attributed to two different mechanisms.  
The positive capital market reaction for MNCs with particularly high ETRs is in line with 
the view that additional information about firms’ engagements in tax avoidance positively 
surprises shareholders. Until the revelation by the ICIJ, the LuxLeaks firms with high ETRs 
cannot be identified as being particularly engaged in tax avoidance. The news about a firm’s 
commitment to tax avoidance is rewarded by the capital market. Regarding low-ETR firms, the 
                                                 
73
 For an overview on measures of tax avoidance see Hanlon and Heitzman (2010). 
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capital market could already assume a strong engagement in tax planning strategies. Therefore, 
our results, showing a particularly positive response to the disclosure of certain tax avoidance 
strategy for firms that had not already disclosed small ETRs, are in line with hypothesis H2b.   
Table 6. CARs for Different Levels of Tax Avoidance 
Panel A: Initial test   
 # of firms Mean CAR Std. err. Adjusted std. err. 
ETR subsample 103 0.0119 0.0037*** 0.0057** 
        
Panel B: Tax avoidance measured by CASH ETR 
  # of firms Mean CAR Std. err. Adjusted std. err. 
CASH ETR below 25th 
percentile 26 0.0171 0.0063*** 0.0128 
CASH ETR above 25th 
percentile and below 
median 
26 0.0072 0.0064 0.0071 
CASH ETR above median 
and below 75th percentile 26 0.0039 0.0082 0.0046 
CASH ETR above 75th 
percentile 25 0.0199 0.0090** 0.0114* 
        
Panel C: Tax avoidance measured by GAAP ETR 
  # of firms Mean CAR Std. err. Adjusted std. err. 
GAAP ETR below 25th 
percentile 30 0.0128 0.0104 0.0097 
GAAP ETR above 25th 
percentile and below 
median 
30 0.0102 0.0064 0.0079 
GAAP ETR above median 
and below 75th percentile 30 0.0092 0.0054* 0.0110 
GAAP ETR above 75th 
percentile 30 0.0196 0.0064*** 0.0108* 
Notes: Table 6 presents the results of the t-tests that are applied to test hypotheses H2a and H2b. CARs are the 
mean cumulated abnormal returns over a seven-day event window (-3 to +3 where 0 is the event day). We consider 
the market model to calculate abnormal returns. The level of tax avoidance is measured by cash effective tax rates. 
CASH ETR is taxes paid divided by pretax income. Data availability reduces the sample size to 103 firms. Panel A 
repeats the first analysis of table 4 to justify the application of a reduced sample. Panel B differentiates between 
firms with high and low CASH ETRs. Panel C considers a different measure of tax avoidance. GAAP ETR is total 
taxes divided by pretax income. Due to higher data availability, the GAAP ETR sample consists of 120 firms. In 
an additional column, we report standard errors adjusted for cross-correlation according to Kolari and Pynnönen 
(2010). *, **, and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
The positive capital market reaction for MNCs with extraordinarily low ETRs can be 
attributed to the additional tax certainty associated with an ATR. Because extensive tax 
avoidance is associated with serious litigation risks and potentially additional taxes in future 
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years, share prices should reflect some level of discount if a firm discloses an extraordinarily 
low ETR. The LuxLeaks announcement provides news about legal certainty for part of the 
firm’s tax avoidance. Consequently, the information is especially positive. One might argue 
that LuxLeaks also provides information about tax certainty for all involved firms. If disclosed 
ETRs were moderate or even high, the capital market might not even expect significant tax risks 
before the LuxLeaks announcements. Consequently, the presented positive market reaction to 
LuxLeaks for low-ETR firms is in line with our hypothesis H2a. However, the effect is 
insignificant if we apply adjusted standard errors.  
For firms with CASH ETRs in the interquartile range, we find no significant capital 
market response. Our results, however, suggest that potential negative effects are at least 
outweighed by positive effects due to new information about an engagement in an additional 
and secure type of tax avoidance. Firms that reported a moderate CASH ETR prior to the 
LuxLeaks event might be perceived as already committed to some sophisticated tax avoidance. 
In panel C of table 6, we consider GAAP ETR as an alternative measure to disclose tax 
avoidance. Again, we analyze the response to LuxLeaks for different levels of ETRs disclosed 
in 2013, the financial year before LuxLeaks arises. Our results only suggest a robust positive 
effect of news about involvement in tax planning for firms that disclosed very high GAAP 
ETRs (above 29.12 %). The results are consistent with hypothesis H2b, i.e., a positive capital 
market response to new information about involvement in sophisticated tax avoidance. 
However, we cannot find any support for news merely about tax certainty (H2a).74  
The results for different levels of GAAP ETR may originate in the definition of GAAP 
ETR. As total income taxes (nominator) include current as well as deferred taxes, tax avoidance 
                                                 
74
 UTBs (unrecognized tax benefits) disclosed according to FIN 48 might be another potential measure for 
additional analyses, as they provide the capital market with information about tax certainty. However, data on 
UTBs is only available for U.S. firms and splitting a U.S. subsample (46 MNCs) into yet another four groups leads 
to insufficient small sample sizes. Therefore, we perform an additional test with the commonly applied three-year 
volatility of CASH ETR as a measure of tax risk, which also provides the capital market with information about 
tax certainty. The results are displayed in table A4 of the appendix. We find that especially corporations with low 
tax risk are significantly rewarded by the capital market. Even though this implies that investor value tax certainty, 
this does not suggest support for hypothesis H2a as one would expect significant effects for high-risk firms. 
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structures such as increased deductions and deferral of income are not reflected by GAAP ETRs 
(Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2008). Thus, investors may perceive GAAP ETR as an 
imperfect measure of tax avoidance and the associated risk. 
4.4.2 Additional Tests 
Our baseline results suggest a rather positive response to the LuxLeaks event. Potential 
negative effects are balanced or even dominated by other opposing effects. In additional 
analyses, we further scrutinize these potential negative effects of disclosing tax avoidance, i.e., 
reputational losses and the litigation risk.  
Industry Membership 
In table 7, we exploit how the capital market reacts to MNCs with different characteristics 
in the context of LuxLeaks. First, we consider industry membership (panel A of table 7) because 
reputational losses might vary across industries.75 As far as common belief about reputation 
goes, negative media coverage, such as the news about LuxLeaks may have a stronger impact 
on firms that face the end-customer. If consumers respond to news about aggressive tax 
avoidance with a buying resistance, or if business-to-consumer relationships are important, we 
would expect particularly negative effects for consumer industries.  
However, our results do not confirm this expectation. Instead, we find robust positive 
CARs for firms from the business-to-consumer industries76. These counterintuitive results are 
in line with prior literature studying reputational effects in the context of tax planning. Austin 
and Wilson (2015) can neither confirm nor reject that firms with valuable brands engage in 
more tax avoidance and Gallemore et al. (2014) have difficulties identifying a reputational 
effect of tax sheltering.  
                                                 
75
 We only consider 146 firms in panel A of table 7 due to two missing data on industry codes. 
76
 We consider industries 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 43, 44 of the 49 Fama and French industry classification as 
business-to-consumer industries. Remaining industries are classified as business-to-business firms or financial 
firms. 
 142 
 
Additionally, we consider a subsample of financial firms because many LuxLeaks firms 
can be classified as financial institutions. However, those exhibit no significant capital market 
reaction. 
Table 7. CARs for Different Firm Characteristics 
Panel A: Industry membership  
 # of firms Mean CAR Std. err. Adjusted std. err. 
Business-to-consumer firms 18 0.0333 0.0086*** 0.0179* 
Business-to-business firms 69 0.0118 0.0057** 0.0100 
Financial institutions 59 0.0068 0.0047 0.0055 
         
Panel B: Profitability 
  # of firms Mean CAR Std. err. Adjusted std. err. 
ROA below (and incl.) 
median 52 0.0127 0.0051** 0.0080 
ROA above median 51 0.0112 0.0055** 0.0065* 
     
Panel C: Firm size 
  # of firms Mean CAR Std. err. Adjusted std. err. 
Size below (and incl.) 
median 50 0.0216 0.0059*** 0.0100** 
Size above median 49 0.0038 0.0049 0.0046 
Notes: Table 7 presents additional results of cross-sectional t-tests to further analyze hypothesis H1b. CARs are 
the mean cumulated abnormal returns over a seven-day event window (-3 to +3 where 0 is the event day) for the 
examined firms. We consider the market model to calculate abnormal returns. In panel A, the baseline sample is 
divided into three different industry groups according to Fama and French industry classification. Panel B 
differentiates between firms with high and low ROA measured as firm’s pretax profit divided by total assets. 
Panel C differentiates between smaller and larger firms. Firm size is measured by the logarithm of total assets. In 
an additional column, we report standard errors adjusted for cross-correlation according to Kolari and Pynnönen 
(2010). *, **, and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
Market Position 
The lack of evidence for reputational effects might be explained by the strong market 
position of a MNC. If a MNC has a strong market position, customers might not respond 
significantly to news about aggressive tax avoidance. Consequently, MNCs with strong market 
positions can more easily compensate for reputational losses than firms who already suffer from 
intense competition. We approximate a firm’s market position by profitability (pretax profit 
divided by total assets) and SIZE (logarithm of total assets). Considering subsamples below and 
above the median of ROA and SIZE, we expect positive and significant CARs for the highest 
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values of the two measures. Panels B and C of table 7 depict the results for the capital market 
response to LuxLeaks.  
In panel B, we find a positive and robust capital market reaction for the most profitable 
firms. The influence of reputational concerns seems to be more easily compensated by MNCs 
with a strong market position. However, regarding firm size, table 7 does not reveal the 
expected results, as we would have assumed a higher influence of reputational concerns for 
small firms. The positive effect for small firms (0.0216) may be due to a stronger perception by 
the capital market of the news about involvement in tax avoidance. For large multinationals the 
capital market receives abundant information whereas smaller firms are rarely mentioned in the 
media (Brooks et al., 2016). Thus, our results do not support reputational effects. 
As even more detailed analyses do not provide evidence for hypothesis H1b, we conclude 
that possible reputational effects due to unintended disclosure of tax avoidance and resulting 
from unfavorable media coverage seem to be less relevant to the capital market. Instead, the 
results hint at further support of hypothesis H1a, which states that the positive effects of 
additional information about a low litigation risk outweigh reputational losses. 
Reaction to Potential Removal of Tax Benefits 
So far, we have analyzed the capital market response to the LuxLeaks disclosure of tax 
structures characterized by particularly low litigation risks because all cases include a binding 
ATR. Therefore, the positive valuation of LuxLeaks by the capital market can be – at least 
partly – explained by disclosure of reduced tax payments associated with a low level of tax 
litigation risk. What happens if the low level of litigation risk is removed, i.e., the risk increases?  
In the aftermath of the leak, an unexpected debate arose over whether special tax deals 
might conflict with European law. Even though the ATRs released in the course of LuxLeaks 
represent binding legal documents on a national level, they also have to comply with European 
law. To be precise, this debate did not affect the perception of LuxLeaks around the date of its 
 144 
 
revelation as, to the best of our knowledge, a potential conflict with European law was not 
expected in November 2014.  
Almost one year after the ICIJ’s publications, on October 21, 2015, the European 
Commission ruled – for the first time ever – on the question of illegal state aid in the cases of 
Fiat in Luxembourg and Starbucks in the Netherlands (European Commission, 2015). Starbucks 
and Fiat were granted tax advantages by fiscal authorities in the Netherlands and Luxembourg, 
respectively, which were not available to other MNCs. Similar to the LuxLeaks firms, Fiat and 
Starbucks had secured their tax planning through ATRs and were believed to have achieved tax 
certainty. According to the European Commission (2015), ATRs – in general – remain legal, 
however, these special cases lack an economic justification leading to unfair competitive 
advantages. The investigation by the European Commission was a new development and the 
European Commission had never ruled on special tax deals with tax authorities before. 
Therefore, we argue that the judgment was unexpected by the capital market.  
While Fiat and Starbucks were not involved in the LuxLeaks publications77, worldwide 
news immediately predicted additional judgments for other MNCs involved in tax agreements 
with fiscal authorities and made connections to LuxLeaks.78 As this decision may lead to further 
investigations of other firms, it poses a potential threat to the LuxLeaks firms. Thus, the capital 
market might anticipate judgments for LuxLeaks firms even though the latter had previously 
secured tax certainty. We therefore use this second event in October 2015 – almost one year 
after LuxLeaks – to scrutinize the potential removal of the low litigation risk. 
As the LuxLeaks firms were not named by the European Commission in October 2015, 
we argue that reputational effects are very unlikely for this second event. Moreover, no 
                                                 
77
 Although Fiat was convicted based on a Luxembourg ATR, Fiat is not included in our sample of LuxLeaks firms 
because it was not one of the firms which were revealed by the ICIJ.  
78
 For example, The New York Times (2015, October 21), available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/10/22/business/international/starbucks-fiat-eu-tax-netherlands-luxembourg.html, and BloombergBusiness 
(2015, October 21), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-21/starbucks-fiat-first-in-
firing-line-as-eu-orders-tax-repayments-ig0kk625. 
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additional information about an involvement in tax planning was revealed in October 2015. 
Consequently, the effect of a potentially higher litigation risk can be isolated. If the capital 
market anticipates similar future judgments, i.e., an ex post amendment for LuxLeaks firms and 
their ATRs, we expect a negative capital market reaction. 
We use the date of the judgment and analyze the CARs of LuxLeaks firms surrounding 
October 21, 2015. Mean CARs are presented in table 8. We again consider different event 
windows. CARs are close to 0 and statistically insignificant. The capital market seems to not 
value the higher litigation risk or even anticipate any additional taxes for the LuxLeaks firms. 
Further tests in table A5 of the appendix show that even differentiating among the levels of tax 
avoidance applied in previous tests does not provide further insight. The coefficients in the 
lowest and highest levels of tax avoidance are negative but statistically insignificant. Panel C 
and D of table A5 consider U.S. and EU firms, respectively. However, results remain 
insignificant. Consequently, we do not find evidence of negative effects due to a potential rise 
in litigation risk.  
Table 8. CARs around European Commission Judgment 
Mean CARs applying the market model 
  # of firms Mean CAR Std. err. Adjusted std. err. 
Window length: -3/+3 147 -0.0020 0.0041 0.0032 
Window length: -2/+2 147 -0.0011 0.0035 0.0031 
Window length:  0/+3 147 -0.0010 0.0031 0.0024 
Notes: Table 8 presents the results of the t-tests that are applied to test a potential effect due to a rising litigation 
risk. CARs are the mean cumulated abnormal returns for the baseline sample. We consider the market model to 
calculate abnormal returns. The number of firms differs slightly to our previous baseline sample due to differing 
availability of price information. The results are shown for varying window lengths. In an additional column, we 
report standard errors adjusted for cross-correlation according to Kolari and Pynnönen (2010). *, **, and *** show 
significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
Several reasons might affect this evidence. First, a measurement error may occur as it is 
not fully clear when the capital market reacts to the judgment with respect to the new 
development. Judgments and changes in law are often widely anticipated, as they take a long 
time to develop. Thus, the capital market reaction may be spread over the months prior to or 
after the judgment and consequently, not be clearly identifiable. The study by Bauckloh, 
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Hardeck, Wittenstein, and Zwergel (2017), which investigates the capital market reaction to 
several events associated with European state aid investigations for U.S. corporations, finds 
some evidence of a negative reaction for U.S. LuxLeaks firms to a decision on the recovery of 
taxes and an announcement of state aid investigations at the end of 2015. Another explanation 
may be that the capital market does not believe in future, similar judgments, as it is precisely 
stated that ATRs are per se legal. Furthermore, investors might believe in support of the home 
country’s political institutions (cf. Bauckloh et al., 2017). Last, the reduced certainty due to the 
possibility of additional taxes may simply not be reflected in share prices. This last argument is 
in line with prior research that had difficulty identifying an overall negative capital market 
reaction to tax sheltering (e.g., Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009). 
4.4.3 Spillover Effect on Similar Firms 
In additional tests, we analyze potential spillover effects of LuxLeaks disclosure on 
similar firms. One reason for this influence on other MNCs may be that almost all firms covered 
by LuxLeaks are clients of PricewaterhouseCoopers (ICIJ, 2014b; Marian, 2017). Thus, one 
might expect that other multinationals being advised by the remaining Big Four firms were just 
lucky to not be revealed. This is also in line with one strand of literature that shows the impact 
of one firm’s behavior on the behavior of its peers (e.g. Gleason, Jenkins, and Johnson, 2008; 
Beatty, Liao, and Yu, 2013). Furthermore, as 32 out of all OECD countries offer ATRs (OECD, 
2013), it is likely that Luxembourg is not the only country that engaged in special tax 
agreements with MNCs. 
Moreover, spillover effects are well-known from other events. If one firm of a certain 
industry issues a profit warning, shareholders anticipate that the same will occur with other 
firms in the same industry. A prominent case, which recently dominated worldwide news and 
depicts this transfer of information, is the emissions scandal at Volkswagen. The German 
automobile manufacturer manipulated engines to produce certain emission values during 
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testing. On September 18, 2015, the scandal was revealed.79 Following the event, share prices 
of Volkswagen dropped dramatically, but very similar German MNCs, such as BMW and 
Daimler, also experienced distinctive market losses. However, MNCs that are perceived to be 
different, e.g. Toyota as a non-German automaker exhibited a rather stable market performance 
and seemed to be unaffected by the event.80 As the Volkswagen emissions scandal reveals, the 
capital market seems to expect the same behavior only of very similar firms. Considering the 
spillover effect of the emissions scandal on firms other than Volkswagen itself, LuxLeaks, i.e., 
unintended disclosure of engagement in ATRs, may have an effect on more than just the firms 
uncovered by the ICIJ.  
To identify firms similar to the LuxLeaks firms, we apply a one-to-five nearest neighbor 
propensity score matching procedure according to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Caliendo 
and Kopeinig (2008). We calculate the propensity score based on SIZE, profitability, and 
leverage and we require that the matched firms be located in the same country and operate in 
the same industry. Furthermore, to reach a reasonable matching quality, we only consider firms 
with differences in propensity scores of less than 0.025.  
We lose 21 firms of our sample 2 as no matching partners can be found. For the remaining 
82 LuxLeaks firms, we find a total of 299 very similar firms, for which all necessary data is 
available. We apply our previously used event study methodology to the 82 LuxLeaks firms as 
well as to the 299 matched firms. The results of the t-tests are shown in table 9. Panel A 
considers the actual LuxLeaks event on November 5, 2014. The significant CAR of 0.0142 is 
consistent with prior results for the capital market reaction to LuxLeaks (cf. table 4). We also 
find a positive and significant result for very similar firms (0.0081). We do not report adjusted 
standard errors in table 9 as correcting for cross-sectional correlation would obviously result in 
                                                 
79
 On September 18, 2015, the United States Environmental Protection Agency issued the “notice of violation 
(NOV) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) to Volkswagen”. EPA (2015, September 18), available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/21b8983ffa5d0e4685257dd4006b85e2/dfc8e33b5ab162b985257ec400
57813b!OpenDocument.  
80
 Please compare figure A3 of the appendix for a depiction of mentioned share prices. 
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a loss of significance. By definition, the analyzed spillover effect can only exist due to cross-
sectional correlation.81 In panel B of table 9, we use the same matching partners with non-
missing values to analyze a possible spillover effect to the removal of tax benefits on 
October 21, 2015. Consistent with results in table 8, we find no significant effect for LuxLeaks 
firms. However, for the other firms, we find a significant, negative effect (-0.0075). 
Table 9. Spillover Effects on Similar Firms 
Panel A: Mean CARs applying the market model for leakage of documents 
  # of firms Mean CAR Std. err. 
LuxLeaks firms after matching 82 0.0142 0.0043*** 
Other firms after matching 299 0.0081 0.0028*** 
   
 
Panel B: Mean CARs applying the market model for removal of tax benefits 
  # of firms Mean CAR Std. err. 
LuxLeaks firms after matching 82 0.0064 0.0048 
Other firms after matching 290 -0.0075 0.0027*** 
Notes: Table 9 presents the results of the t-tests that are applied to test the effect of LuxLeaks on the overall capital 
market. CARs are the mean cumulated abnormal returns over a seven-day event window (-3 to +3 where 0 is the 
event day). We consider the market model to calculate abnormal returns. Similar firms are obtained by executing 
one-to-five nearest neighbor propensity score matching. In panel A, we consider the revelation of documents on 
November 5, 2014. In panel B, we analyze the effect with regard to the potential removal of tax benefits on October 
21, 2015. As far as possible we use the same matching partners as in 2014. However, we do lose some observations 
due to missing data in 2015. *, **, and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
We conclude that the capital market anticipates similar firms to also be involved in 
sophisticated, i.e., legally assured tax avoidance through ATRs. With regard to the potential 
removal of tax benefits, investors of similar firms, in contrast to investors of LuxLeaks firms, 
anticipate a significant raise of litigation risk, which is worth to be reflected in share prices. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this study, we examine the capital market reaction to the LuxLeaks publications on 
November 5, 2014. This revelation offered new and credible information about firms’ 
involvement in sophisticated tax planning. Interestingly, these tax avoidance activities are 
accompanied by a low level of litigation risk because all involved MNCs had signed ATRs with 
                                                 
81
 Please note that as we do find a spillover effect for the investigated disclosure due to cross-sectional correlation, 
the necessity to apply adjusted standard errors in our main analyses becomes even more apparent. 
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the tax authority in Luxembourg. Using an event study methodology, we find robust evidence 
that the positive effects attributed to additional information about tax avoidance with low 
litigation risks balance potential negative reputational effects. They might even outweigh the 
latter as our findings suggest overall positive CARs.  
In additional tests, we find a more pronounced positive capital market reaction to 
LuxLeaks for firms with extraordinarily high ETRs. This finding supports the argument that 
the capital market rewards new information about a firm’s commitment to tax avoidance, 
particularly if new information about an involvement in secure tax planning is detected that had 
not already been disclosed by the ETR. However, we find only very limited evidence for the 
view that the capital market rewards information about low litigation risks for those MNCs that 
are perceived as particularly tax aggressive.  
Our results contribute to the discussion about the impact of disclosing tax avoidance on 
firm value. Our results cast significant doubts on reputational effects. Instead, we find some 
evidence that the capital market potentially rewards unintended disclosure, which provides 
additional information about a commitment to tax avoidance that is not associated with 
litigation risks and additional taxes. Consequently, our results suggest that increased 
transparency about sophisticated tax planning strategies is not detrimental to MNCs and may 
even help to capitalize the competitive advantages of tax avoidance. 
We acknowledge that our results are subject to some limitations. First, we only show a 
short-term effect of LuxLeaks on share prices. However, including a longer period as the event 
window increases the chance of a possible bias due to other influences. Second, our results may 
be questioned because taxes represent only a small fraction of the information that influences 
share prices, and some investors might simply not care about tax avoidance. Third, our results 
have to be interpreted with some caution as they only reveal effects of the specific analyzed 
disclosure, i.e., unintended disclosure of tax avoidance with low litigation risk, on equity 
holders of MNCs. The conclusion might not hold in the case of voluntary disclosure, which 
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may be perceived as boasting, be less credible, and thereby, lead to predominantly negative 
effects. Thus, future research on other forms of disclosure as well as research on the effect on 
credit market participants or customers may complement our results. Additionally, as prior 
literature shows, public and private firms exhibit different levels of tax avoidance (Badertscher, 
Katz, and Rego, 2013). Due to the design of our event study, we can only consider public firms. 
Therefore, future research on the effects of disclosing more details about tax avoidance on the 
firm value of private firms would be interesting. 
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Appendix 
Figure A1. LuxLeaks Timeline 
Notes: Figure A1 displays a timeline of events associated with LuxLeaks starting at the discovery of the documents 
by Antoine Deltour in October 2010 until the release of the documents through the ICIJ on November 5th, 2014. 
Figure A2. Distribution of Cumulated Abnormal Returns 
 
Notes: The columns in figure A2 present the distribution of cumulated abnormal returns in 
sample 1. The x-axis shows the value of CARs as defined in table A1 of the appendix, whereas 
the y-axis plots the respective fractions (in %) of all corporations in sample 1. The line represents 
a normal distribution. 
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Figure A3. Share Prices around Volkswagen Emissions Scandal  
 
Notes: Figure A3 shows share prices of big automobile firms and DAX (German leading index) around the 
Volkswagen emissions scandal of September 18, 2015. The share prices represent closing prices of the mentioned 
date and are portrayed relative to the share price on September 16, 2015 to simplify the comparison between firms. 
Figure A3 depicts a big decline for Volkswagen and other German automakers whereas non-German firms and 
the market exhibit a more stable performance. 
Table A1. Variable Definitions 
Measure of Capital Market Reaction 
CAR Cumulated abnormal returns, 7 day centered unless 
otherwise indicated 
  
Perceived Levels of Tax Avoidance 
CASH ETR txpd / pi; income taxes paid over pretax income 
GAAP ETR txt / (pi – spi); total income taxes over for special items 
adjusted pretax income 
VOLATILITY Three-year standard deviation of the annual CASH ETR  
 
Firm Characteristics 
SIZE log (at); logarithm of total assets in U.S. Dollar 
ROA (Profitability / Return 
on Assets) 
pi / at; pretax income over total assets 
LEV (Leverage) dlc / at; total debt in current liabilities over total assets 
Notes: Table A1 shows variable definitions. Compustat data items are in italic. 
  
16.09.2015 17.09.2015 18.09.2015 21.09.2015 22.09.2015
GM Daimler Toyota BMW VW DAX
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Table A2. Sample Firms 
 
Notes: Table A2 presents a list of all firms included in sample 1 as well as sample 2. 
Company name Country Industry Sample 2 Company name Country Industry Sample 2
3I GROUP PLC GBR Other (Fin.) x HUTCHISON HKG High Tech x
ABBOTT LABORATORIES USA Health x HYPO REAL DEU Other (Fin.)
ABS-CBN PHL High Tech x ICAP PLC GBR Other (Fin.)
ACCENTURE PLC IRL Other x INFORMA PLC GBR Consumer
ALLERGAN PLC USA Health INTELSAT LUX High Tech
ALLIANZ SE DEU Other (Fin.) x INTERPUBLIC GROUP OF COS USA Other x
AMAZON.COM INC USA Consumer x INTESA SANPAOLO SPA ITA Other (Fin.)
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL USA Other (Fin.) x INTL FLAVORS & FRAGRANCES USA Manufacturing x
AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL INC USA Other (Fin.) x JAZZ PHARM IRL Health x
AMP CAPITA AUS Other (Fin.) x JONES LANG LASALLE INC USA Other (Fin.) x
AOZORA BANK LTD JPN Other (Fin.) x JULIUS BAER GRUPPE AG CHE Other (Fin.) x
APOLLO GLOBAL MANAGEMENT USA Other (Fin.) x LAGARDERE (GROUPE) FRA Consumer x
APPLE INC USA High Tech x LANDESBANK DEU Other (Fin.)
AVERY DENNISON CORP USA Manufacturing x LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC USA -
AVIVA PLC GBR Other (Fin.) x LVMH MOET HENNESSY LOUIS V FRA Consumer x
AXA SA FRA Other (Fin.) x MACQUARIE GROUP LTD AUS Other (Fin.)
BALL CORP USA Manufacturing x MCGRAW HILL FINANCIAL USA Other
BALOISE HOLDING CHE Other (Fin.) x MERCK KGAA DEU Health x
BANCA POPOLARE EMILIA ITA Other (Fin.) METTLER-TOLEDO INTL INC USA High Tech x
BANK OF AMERICA CORP USA Other (Fin.) x MYLAN NV GBR Health x
BANQUE DEG BEL Other (Fin.) x NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL CORP USA Consumer
BARCLAYS PLC GBR Other (Fin.) NEXT PLC GBR Consumer x
BAYTEX ENERGY CORP CAN Manufacturing NIKKO CORD JPN -
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY USA Other x NIPPON SHEET GLASS CO LTD JPN Manufacturing
BLACKSTONE GROUP LP USA Other (Fin.) x NISSHINBO HOLDINGS INC JPN Consumer x
BNP PARIBAS FRA Other (Fin.) x NORDSON CORP USA Manufacturing x
BRITISH AMER TOBACCO PLC GBR Consumer x OAKTREE CAPITAL GROUP LLC USA Other (Fin.) x
BROOKFIELD ASSET MANAGEMENT CAN Other (Fin.) x OFFICE DEPOT INC USA Consumer
BUCHER INDUSTRIES AG CHE Manufacturing x PROCTER & GAMBLE CO USA Manufacturing x
BURBERRY GROUP PLC GBR Consumer x PROLOGIS INC USA Other (Fin.) x
CARLYLE GROUP LP USA Other (Fin.) x PROSPECTOR OFFSHORE DRILLING LUX Manufacturing
CATERPILLAR INC USA Manufacturing x PRUDENTIAL PLC GBR Other (Fin.) x
CBRE GROUP INC USA Other (Fin.) x QUILVEST SA LUX Other (Fin.) x
CIRCOR INTL INC USA Manufacturing x RECKITT BENCKISER GROUP PLC GBR Manufacturing x
CITIGROUP INC USA Other (Fin.) x ROSEBUD RE ISR Other (Fin.)
CLIFFS NATURAL RESOURCES INC USA Other x ROTHSCHILD AND CO SCA FRA Other (Fin.) x
CNP ASSURANCES SA FRA Other (Fin.) x ROWAN COMPANIES PLC USA Manufacturing
COACH INC USA Consumer x ROYAL BANK OF CANADA CAN Other (Fin.) x
COCA-COLA HBC AG CHE Consumer x SAN PAOLO ITA Other (Fin.)
COMMERZBANK DEU Other (Fin.) SBERBANK OF RUSSIA OJSC RUS Other (Fin.) x
COMPASS GROUP PLC GBR Consumer x SCHRODERS PLC GBR Other (Fin.) x
COVIDIEN D IRL Health x SHIRE PLC IRL Health x
CREDIT SUISSE GROUP CHE Other (Fin.) x SINOPEC EN CHN Manufacturing x
DEAN FOODS CO USA Consumer SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA BANK SWE Other (Fin.) x
DEUTSCHE BANK AG DEU Other (Fin.) SOCFINAL LUX Consumer
DEVELOPER USA Other (Fin.) STABILUS SA LUX Consumer
DEXIA SA BEL Other (Fin.) x STAPLES INC USA Consumer
DMG MORI AG DEU Manufacturing x STATE STREET CORP USA Other (Fin.) x
DNB ASA NOR Other (Fin.) SUBSEA 7 SA GBR Manufacturing x
DST SYSTEMS INC USA High Tech x SYKES ENTERPRISES INC USA High Tech x
DUET GROUP AUS Manufacturing x TAYLOR WIMPEY PLC GBR Other
E.ON SE DEU Other x TE CONNECTIVITY LTD CHE High Tech x
EMULEX CORP USA High Tech TELE2 AB SWE High Tech x
EQT CORP USA Manufacturing x TELENET GROUP HOLDING N.V. BEL High Tech x
EUROHOLD B BGR Other (Fin.) TEMENOS GROUP AG CHE High Tech x
EVRAZ PLC GBR Manufacturing TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS ISR Health x
EXPERIAN PLC IRL High Tech x TITAN INTERNATIONAL INC USA Manufacturing
FAIRFAX FINANCIAL HOLDINGS CAN Other (Fin.) TYCO INTERNATIONAL PLC IRL High Tech x
FEDEX CORP USA Other x UBM PLC GBR Other x
FINMECCANICA SPA ITA Manufacturing UBS AG CHE Other (Fin.) x
FONCIERE INEA FRA Other (Fin.) UN HOLDING IRL Other (Fin.)
FOYER DEAD LUX Other (Fin.) UNICREDIT SPA ITA Other (Fin.)
GATE GROUP HLDGS AG CHE Consumer x UNIONE DI BANCHE ITALIANE ITA Other (Fin.)
GAZPROM PJSC RUS Manufacturing x UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP USA Manufacturing x
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO USA Other x VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC USA High Tech x
GIGAMEDIA TWN High Tech VERMILION ENERGY INC CAN Manufacturing x
GLANBIA PLC IRL Health x VITEC GROUP PLC GBR Manufacturing x
GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC GBR Health x VODAFONE GROUP PLC GBR High Tech
GOODMAN GROUP AUS Other (Fin.) x VOLKSWAGEN AG DEU Consumer x
GROUPE BRUXELLES LAMBERT BEL Other (Fin.) x WEATHERFOR CHE Manufacturing
HENDERSON GROUP PLC GBR Other (Fin.) x WENDEL FRA Other x
HRG GROUP INC USA High Tech x WGZ BK.GSH DEU Other (Fin.) x
HSBC HLDGS PLC GBR Other (Fin.) x WOLSELEY PLC CHE Consumer x
HUHTAMAKI OYJ FIN Manufacturing x YAMANA GOLD INC CAN Other
LuxLeaks firms included in baseline sample
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Table A3. Exclusion of Outliers 
CARs applying the market model 
  # of firms Mean CAR Std. err. Adjusted std. err. 
Window length: -3/+3 146 0.0043 0.0029 0.0042 
Window length: -2/+2 146 0.0120 0.0034*** 0.0057** 
Window length:  0/+3 146 0.0050 0.0026* 0.0071 
Notes: Table A3 presents cumulated abnormal returns for the baseline sample. The results are shown for varying 
window lengths. In contrast to table 4, we exclude corporations whose CAR is in the lowest and highest percent 
of the respective CAR distribution. We consider the market model to calculate abnormal returns. In an additional 
column, we report standard errors adjusted for cross-correlation according to Kolari and Pynnönen (2010). *, **, 
and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
 
Table A4. CARs for Different Levels of Tax Risk 
CARs applying the market model   
  # of firms Mean CAR Std. err. Adjusted std. err. 
VOLATILITY below 25th 
percentile 21 0.0177 0.0065*** 0.0066*** 
VOLATILITY above 25th 
percentile and below median 21 0.0075 0.0070 0.0069 
VOLATILITY above median 
and below 75th percentile 21 -0.0007 0.0101 0.0054 
VOLATILITY above 75th 
percentile 20 0.0213 0.0107** 0.0149 
Notes: Table A4 presents mean cumulated abnormal returns for different levels of CASH ETR Volatility. 
VOLATILITY is the three-year standard deviation of the annual CASH ETR measure. We consider the market 
model to calculate abnormal returns. In an additional column, we report standard errors adjusted for cross-
correlation according to Kolari and Pynnönen (2010). *, **, and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, 
and 1 %, respectively. 
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Table A5. Additional Tests regarding the Potential Removal of Tax Benefits 
Panel A: Tax avoidance measured by CASH ETR  
  # of firms Mean CAR Std. err. Adjusted 
std. err. 
CASH ETR below 25th percentile 26 -0.0005 0.0072 0.0010 
CASH ETR above 25th percentile 
and below median 26 0.0145 0.0079* 0.0080* 
CASH ETR above median and 
below 75th percentile 26 0.0078 0.0077 0.0128 
CASH ETR above 75th percentile 25 -0.0064 0.0129 0.0088 
   
Panel B: Tax avoidance measured by GAAP ETR   
  # of firms Mean CAR Std. err. Adjusted 
std. err. 
GAAP ETR below 25th percentile 30 -0.0098 0.0106 0.0237 
GAAP ETR above 25th percentile 
and below median 30 0.0081 0.0082 0.0157 
GAAP ETR above median and 
below 75th percentile 30 0.0021 0.0076 0.0021 
GAAP ETR above 75th percentile 30 -0.0079 0.0084 0.0515 
 
   
 
Panel C: Mean CARs of U.S. Firms  
  # of firms Mean CAR Std. err. Adjusted 
std. err. 
Window length: -2/+2 44 -0.0010 0.0006 0.0025 
Window length: -3/+3 44 -0.0078 0.0070 1.6804 
Window length:  0/+3 44 -0.0039 0.0052 0.0120 
 
   
 
Panel D: Mean CARs of EU Firms  
  # of firms Mean CAR Std. err. Adjusted 
std. err. 
Window length: -2/+2 69 -0.0025 0.0044 0.0115 
Window length: -3/+3 69 0.0017 0.0052 0.0021 
Window length:  0/+3 69 0.0002 0.0039 0.0005 
Notes: Table A5 presents results of additional t-tests to test a potential effect due to a rising litigation risk. CARs 
are the mean cumulated abnormal returns for the baseline sample. We consider the market model to calculate 
abnormal returns. In panel A and B, we test the significance of CARs for varying levels of tax avoidance measured 
by CASH ETR and GAAP ETR. We use the same groups as in table 6. Panel C and D differentiate between U.S. 
and EU firms. The number of firms differs slightly to our previous baseline sample due to availability of price 
information. All results are shown for varying window lengths. In an additional column, we report standard errors 
adjusted for cross-correlation according to Kolari and Pynnönen (2010). *, **, and *** show significance at the 
level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
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